"Cognitive and emotional factors in decision-making: a comparative study between problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers" by CARPENTIERI, MICHELE
 
 
1 
 
 
XXX cycle of the PhD program in Mind, Gender and Languages 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis 
 
“Cognitive and emotional factors in decision-making: 
 
a comparative study between problem gamblers  
and non-problem gamblers” 
 
 
 
 
PhD Student 
 
Michele Carpentieri 
 
Student nr: DRQ92086 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor 
 
Professor Olimpia Matarazzo 
 
 
2 
Index 
 
CHAPTER I ...................................................................................................................................................... 4 
Gambling phenomenology ............................................................................................................................... 4 
1.1. Origins .................................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.2. Typology and propagation of gambling in Italy ................................................................................. 6 
1.3. Prevalence studies .................................................................................................................................. 7 
1.5. Diagnostic tools ...................................................................................................................................... 9 
1.6. Gambling and personality characteristics ......................................................................................... 10 
1.7. Cognitive distortions and gambling ................................................................................................... 13 
1.8. Emotion and gambling ........................................................................................................................ 15 
Overview of the studies .................................................................................................................................. 16 
CHAPTER II .................................................................................................................................................. 19 
The illusion of control in problem gamblers and in non-problem gamblers ............................................ 19 
2.1. Theoretical interpretations and empirical evidence ......................................................................... 20 
2.2. The illusion of control in problem gamblers ..................................................................................... 24 
2.3. Illusion of control, probability estimates, and betting ..................................................................... 26 
3.4 Theoretical and methodological differences in the research on the illusion of control .................. 30 
Overview of the study ................................................................................................................................. 31 
Experiment .................................................................................................................................................. 35 
Participants .............................................................................................................................................. 35 
Design ...................................................................................................................................................... 36 
Materials and procedure ......................................................................................................................... 37 
Results ...................................................................................................................................................... 40 
Discussion and conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 53 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................................................. 58 
The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers ....... 58 
3.1. Theoretical interpretations and empirical evidence .................................................................... 59 
3.2. The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy in problem gamblers ........................................... 63 
3.3. Gamblers’ fallacy, hot hand fallacy, probability estimate, and betting in problem gamblers and 
non-problem gamblers ............................................................................................................................... 65 
Overview of the present study ................................................................................................................... 66 
Experiment .................................................................................................................................................. 68 
Participants .................................................................................................................................................. 68 
 
 
3 
Design .......................................................................................................................................................... 68 
Materials and procedure ............................................................................................................................. 69 
Results ......................................................................................................................................................... 71 
Discussion and conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 82 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................................................. 85 
Emotions and decision-making in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers .................................. 85 
4.1. Incidental emotions and risk-taking in decision-making ................................................................. 86 
4.2. Incidental emotions and risk-taking in problem-gamblers ............................................................. 88 
4.4. Emotions, arousal, and gambling ....................................................................................................... 93 
Overview of the study ................................................................................................................................... 97 
Experiment .................................................................................................................................................. 99 
Participants .................................................................................................................................................. 99 
Design ........................................................................................................................................................ 100 
Materials and Procedure ........................................................................................................................... 100 
Acquisition of physiological data .............................................................................................................. 103 
Extraction of physiological data ............................................................................................................... 104 
Results ........................................................................................................................................................ 104 
Discussion and conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 114 
Appendix Study 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 124 
Appendix Study 2 ......................................................................................................................................... 126 
Appendix Study 3 ......................................................................................................................................... 128 
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 130 
 
  
 
 
4 
CHAPTER I 
 
Gambling phenomenology 
 
1.1. Origins 
 The prediction of a future event is intrinsic to all human ages. At the same time, 
gambling is a practice that dates back to the beginnings of humanity, constantly expanding 
and still spreading to our present day. 
 The first evidences of this activity date back to China about 5000 years ago where it 
was supposedly an exclusive practice of priests and seers who, throwing dice built using 
animal bones, had the purpose of understanding the divine will (Lavanco, 2001). Soon 
gambling became a social habit, a challenge not only between man and fate, but also between 
man and man. Romans, who believed in the existence of the Fortuna Goddess, legalized bets 
in fights among gladiators and “bighe or quadrighe” (the ancestors of horseracing), 
establishing rules and stakes to guarantee the social order1.  
 During the Middle Ages, the “Baratteria” was the first location, far from places of 
worship or squares of the inhabited centre, where gambling was allowed. During this era, 
Emperor Federico II decreed that those who ran these affairs could not have administrative 
burdens (or be witnesses in a trial), as he suspected them to swindle people and considered 
them unreliable (Willmann, 1999).  The Renaissance, on the other hand, recognized the right 
to gamble, allowing the Italian Comuni to introduce the so-called gabelle, namely the fees 
paid by the managers. This was followed by the spread of lotteries. Queen Elizabeth I of 
England instituted the first state-recognized national lottery in 1566. 
 The lottery has been played in Italy since 1500. Its ancestor was the “game of the 
seminar" dating back to Genoa, whose bets were linked to the biannual draw, among the 120 
best personalities in the city, of the 5 who would be elected in the local Councils (Serenissimi 
                                                          
1 Even the Emperors Claudio, Nero and Caligula were known to be passionate gamblers (Dickerson, 
1993). 
 
 
5 
Collegi). In 1638, the opening of the Venice’ Ridotto, the first state-run playhouse, sanctioned 
the beginning of the gambling business era, which led to the spread of these gambling sites in 
other cities, as Montecarlo (in 1861) and Sanremo (in 1906). At the same time, in 1895, 
Charles Fey, in collaboration with Mills Novelty Company, produced Mills Liberty Bell, the 
slot machine with the bells of freedom. The speed and ease of use of slot machines made 
gambling even more enjoyable and, in 1931, the enactment of the law that legalized gambling 
facilitated Las Vegas Casinos in Nevada (Gherardi, 1991). Shortly after the end of Second 
World War, Totocalcio was introduced, the first betting system linked to soccer, which rapidly 
spread in countries where this sport was popular.  
 Gambling and its related socio-sanitary problems became so widespread that, in 
1977, it was introduced in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9) for the first 
time. However, over the last twenty years, the various governments contributed to the 
unprecedented spread of new games. The first instant lottery (“Scratch and Win”) and 
Lotto/Superenalotto, were created respectively in 1994 and 1997. Shortly afterwards, Betting 
and Bingo Halls were introduced. Even in Italy, the biggest increase in gambling took place 
after 2003, when the new Slot machines were legalized (Fiasco, 2014). Subsequently, Lotto's 
third game and new national numeral totalizer games (Win for Life) were introduced. In 2009, 
the Video Lottery Terminal (VLT) machines, similar to slot machines but with higher prizes 
and (above all) giving the possibility to play with higher stakes, proliferated. The diffusion of 
mobile devices (since 2008 the first online gambling websites) including poker (2011) have 
also been legalized (Bellio & Croce, 2014). On the one hand, this diffusion has enabled to 
access a variety of online services, both for free and playing with real money. On the other 
hand, this reduced the differences between virtual and real gambling, due also to the "live" 
gambling services giving gamblers, connected via webcam, experiences that are very similar 
to those of a real casino (Gainsbury et al., 2015). 
As it can be seen from this short excursus, gambling has become a widely widespread 
and socially accepted pastime, although its propagation is creating considerable problems 
both at the individual and social levels. Gambling addiction is today one of the most serious 
problems that healthcare has to face.  
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1.2. Typology and propagation of gambling in Italy  
 In Italy, the Customs and Monopoly Agency2, the new name of the authority 
responsible for regulating the gambling market, distinguishes the offer of public gambling in 
seven homogeneous categories (ADM, 2016):  
- Fixed-stake numerical games, based on the extraction of numbers in which the potential 
winning amount is known a priori3 (i.e. Lotto and 10eLotto);  
- Totalizer numerical games, also based on drawing numbers, but the potential winning 
amount is not known at the time of the game4 (i.e., Win For Life, Superenalotto); 
- Sport-based games, based on the forecast of an outcome or a combination of more events; 
- Horse-based games, based on the ability to predict the outcome of horse racing (i.e., national 
horse racing); 
- Gaming machines, where the player interacts with an electro-mechanical (skill fishing) or 
electronic (video-poker) device, which automatically distributes cash or other prizes in case 
of win; 
- Lotteries, based on extraction of numbers, whose win amount is known at the time of the 
game5. Lotteries are divided into two categories: "Deferred Extraction" (the winning ticket is 
determined following a time-out draw) and "Instant extraction" (it allows to check 
immediately whether the combination is winning by removing the film that hides the pre-
printed code, i.e., Scratch and Win);  
- Bingo, played in equipped rooms, where it is not possible to know the winning amount in 
advance, as it depends on the number of played folders and winning ones. 
 At present, people mainly prefer playing slot machines and the latest generation of 
new video-lotteries (VLT), along with sports betting and Lotto sectors (mostly 10eLotto). It 
                                                          
2 ADM: Agency of the Customs and Monopoly, formerly AAMS (Autonomous Administration of 
the Monopolies of State). 
3 It is determined by multiplying the stake for a coefficient that is inversely proportional to the 
probability for the event to occur. 
4 The amount of prize money depends on the total number of games played; instead, the winning 
depends on the number of winning games. In "totalizator" bets, the jackpot is shared between players 
who have correctly predicted the betting event (or combination). Instead, in "fixed-stake" bets, 
bettors, in case of win, receive a sum equal to the amount of the bet multiplied by the amount 
determined at the time when the bet was made. 
5 Unlike fixed-numbered games, they do not require any active behavior from the player, who 
participates simply by purchasing the ticket. 
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should be noted that these games are the easiest to access, also due to their online and 
increasingly widespread distribution. Instead, horse betting and totalizator numeric game, 
such as Superenalotto, are dropping (ADM, 2016).  
 Although gambling in Italy has spread for so long, the lack of exhaustive studies 
does not allow estimating precisely the extent of the phenomenon (Serpelloni, 2013). In less 
than three decades, gambling revenue managed by the ADM has increased by 20 times: in 
1990, tax revenue was about 5 billion Euros per year. According to recent data provided to 
the Chamber of Deputies (2017), the collection (the total bets made in one year) is about 95 
billion euros (4.4% of the GDP, Gross Domestic Product) for 2016. This sum represents an 
8% increase compared to the previous year, when collection was over € 88 billions. The 
expense (the collection minus gambling winnings) in 2016 is around 19 billion (1.5 billion 
more than the previous year). The data for 2016 represents a record testifying the return to the 
record levels of previous years, after the slight decline in 2013 and 2014 (comparing with 
2008, since when spending on gambling has doubled).  
 
1.3. Prevalence studies 
 Despite some variations in prevalence estimates, a recent meta-analysis by Calado 
and Griffiths (2016) reveals that studies conducted in Europe show rather homogeneous 
results related to the socio-demographic characteristics of gamblers. The phenomenon seems 
to involve largely men (Olason et al., 2015), unmarried or separated individuals (Klein et al., 
2012), with a low level of education (Costes et al., 2015), belonging to minorities (Seabury 
& Wardle, 2014) and unemployed or having a low-income job (Meyer et al., 2015). Compared 
to this latter attribute, in Italy, as well as in Estonia, the relationship between income and 
gambling seems to be opposite to that reported in other European countries (Barbaranelli, 
2013).   
 However, in Italy research on pathological gambling is conducted mainly on a local 
or regional basis, resulting in studies with an unrepresentative sample. At present, there are 
three prevalence studies of the gambling phenomenon: Bastiani et al. (2011), Barbaranelli et 
al. (2013), Colasante et al. (2013). The study of Bastiani et al. (2011), which re-elaborated 
data obtained from the IPSAD-Italia 2007-08 research (Italian Population Survey on Alcohol 
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and Other Drugs), curated by the National Research Council (CNR), included 31,984 
participants aged between 15 and 64. Using the Canadian Problem Gambling Index - Short 
form scale (CPGI, Ferris & Wynne, 2001; Italian translation of Capitanucci, 2006), the 
authors estimated that 42.1% of participants bet at least once in the last year: 33.8% of them 
were classified as "non-risk gamblers”, 6.1 % as "low risk gamblers" and 2.2% as 
"problematic or moderate risk gamblers”. The latter sub-category included 73.4% men and 
26.6% women. The authors estimated a prevalence of problematic gambling in 2.3% of the 
young population (15-24 years) and 2.2% of the adult population (25-64 years) while, among 
those with slight problems, 6.9% were young and 5.8% adults. 
 The study of Barbaranelli et al. (2013) was conducted on a sample of 1,979 
participants, aged 18 to 74, and representative of the “adult Italian population who gambled 
at least once for money in the last 12 months”. To estimate the phenomenon spread, they used 
the South Oask Gambling Screen (SOGS, Leiseur & Blume, 1987; Italian version developed 
by Guerreschi and Gander, 2002) and the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI, Ferris 
and Wynne, 2001; Italian translation of Capitanucci, 2006), a subset of 9 items from the CPGI. 
The results indicated a 1.27% problematic gambling, 1.56% risk gambling and 50.73% non-
problematic gambling, while the percentage of non-gamblers was 46.44%. Moreover, 
problematic or risk gamblers were prevalently male (66% vs. 55%, respectively), separated 
(10% vs. 5%), with at least one relative with gambling-related problems (12.2% vs. 4.4%), 
having difficulties in managing money (28% vs. 14%) and debts (11% vs. 2%). 
 The study of Colasante et al. (2013), performed on a sample of 5,292 individuals, 
aimed to adapt the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI, Ferris &Wynne H., 2001) to 
the Italian context. They found that, based on this instrument, 83.2% of participants were 
classified as non-gamblers, 11.2% as low-risk gamblers, 4.3% as moderate risk gamblers and 
1.3% as pathological gamblers. 
 
 1.4. The diagnosis of gambling disorder 
A few years after the first inclusion of pathological gambling in the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-9), it also was included among the pathological disorders of 
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the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-III, 1980), 
in the "Impulse Control Disorders not otherwise classified" section. 
In line with the scientific research of the last few years, which has placed the issues 
related to gambling closer to those of addiction disorders, in the fifth and last edition of DSM 
(APA, 2013), changes with respect to previous DSM IV can be noted. In fact, Gambling 
Disorder (GD) has changed both label and diagnostic placement, as it is included in the 
Addiction category (substance-related and addictive disorders), in a particular subcategory: 
Non-Substance-Related Disorders. Many recent studies have shown that syndrome, brain 
correlates and physiology, as well as GD (Gambling Disorder) treatment, are very similar to 
dependency-based behaviour, although they do not involve drug assumption (Dixon, 2014; 
Coriale, 2015; Murch & Clark, 2015). In fact, the gambler’s excitement during the game 
would be comparable to that produced by drug intake, as well as there seems to be a 
correlation with an alteration of the gratification system. 
Regarding the diagnostic criteria of GD, they did not undergo any significant changes, 
except for the deletion of the criteria concerning the enactment of antisocial acts. However, 
the diagnostic criteria must be evident over a maximum period of twelve months for the 
diagnosis to be valid, correcting the previous position according to which the diagnosis was 
considered throughout the life span (DSM-5, APA, 2013). 
 
1.5. Diagnostic tools 
 The use of screening tools contributes to provide systematic information that can 
guide the individual’s placement in the recreational or pathological gambling sphere. 
Currently there are several tools for diagnosing and evaluating the level of problematic 
gambling. However, the DSM criteria are the main diagnostic tools to understand crucial 
elements and an initial evaluation and confirming a diagnostic hypothesis of the disorder. 
 Among the diagnostic tools that refer to the classification of DSM (see for a review 
Calado and Griffiths, 2016), one of the most widely used to assess the gambling problem is 
the aforementioned SOGS questionnaire (Leiseur & Blume, 1987), whose results correlate 
with the diagnosis of DSM-III (APA, 1980). As I wrote, the Italian version has been published 
by Guerreschi and Gander (2002). More precisely, the SOGS is a self-assessment screening 
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tool consisting of 20 questions, which allow to detect possible gambling problems and to 
know some aspects of gambler behaviour6. A score of 3 and 4 indicates the presence of 
problem gambling, whereas a score of 5 (or more) suggests the presence of pathological 
gambling. The SOGS is considered a reliable tool, although several studies (Lavanco, 2001; 
Stinchfield et al., 2010) have highlighted how it tends to overstate the number of problem 
gamblers ("false positives"). There is also a developed version for adolescents (SOGS-RA, 
Winters et al., 1993). 
 Other widely used tools are the above-mentioned CPGI (Ferris and Wynne, 2001) 
and the National Opinion Research Center Diagnostic Screen for Gambling Problems 
(NODS; Gerstein et al. 1999). The former tool is highly correlated with the DSM-IV criteria 
(r = 0.81) and with the SOGS  (r = 0.80). The Italian version has been published by Colasante 
et al. (2013). The latter is a population-based telephone-screening tool composed by 21 item 
identifying gambling problems according to DSM-IV criteria. It was found to be highly 
correlated (r =.85; Wickwire et al., 2008) with the SOGS. At present, this tool is not available 
in an Italian version. 
 Other measures referring to the DSM are the DSM-IV Questionnaire (Ladouceur, 
2000), the Fisher DSM-IV Screen (in Rönnberg et al., 1999), the Beaudoin-Cox (1999), and 
the Short Gambling Questionnaire (Petry, 1996).  
 Further diagnostic approaches relate to the classification of the disorder in obsessive-
compulsive disorders (Pathological Gambling Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; 
Melli et al., 2015) and refer to an evolutionary perspective (Custer's Diagram, 1982)7 or to a 
motivational approach (MAC-G, Prochaska and Di Clemente, 1988).  
 
1.6. Gambling and personality characteristics 
A large part of gambling research has investigated personality factors involved in such 
behaviour, focusing the attention on impulsivity and sensation seeking in particular. The first 
                                                          
6 Some examples are: preferred game and frequency with which the individual is committed; some 
signs of problematic gambling (chasing, lies about gambling, loss of control, etc.); individual's 
relationship with the family over game and money; the consequences of the game; the research for 
money to play. 
7 It highlights the stages of social gambling progression to pathology. 
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diagnostic classification of problematic gambling in the impulse control section has fostered 
studies to find empirical evidence for this inclusion. Impulsivity is supposed to reflect a 
predisposition to develop a range of addictive disorders, including non-drug-related risky 
behaviours, as compulsive shopping or risky sexual behaviours. Currently, impulsivity is 
increasingly considered a multidimensional construct where personality, cognitive (i.e. delay 
discounting) and behavioural (i.e. impulsive choices or actions, impaired response inhibition) 
aspects may play a role in gambling behaviour (Ledgerwood et al., 2009). Some studies (Finn 
et al., 1999; 2002; Marsh et al., 2002; Horn et al., 2003) found a significant negative 
relationship between response inhibition and impulsivity. Addictive behaviour of problematic 
gamblers may result from impaired self-regulation that, in turn, translates into the inability to 
inhibit a response or to shift behaviour towards another target (Goudriaan et al., 2004). Studies 
investigating the delay discounting (i.e. the depreciation of the value of a reward depending 
on the time it takes to be released) in problem/pathological gamblers and non-problem 
gamblers found that the former depreciated delayed reward more than non-problem gamblers8 
(Petry and Casarella, 1999; Petry, 2001; Alessi and Petry, 2003). Lejuez et al. (2002) found a 
positive correlation between risk-taking behaviour, measured by the balloon analogue risk 
task (BART), and gambling involvement. Several studies found that pathological gamblers 
exhibit marked levels of impulsivity (Blaszczynski et al., 1997; Vitaro et al., 1999; Nower & 
Blaszczynski, 2006). Ledgerwood et al. (2009) have assessed impulsivity and other 
personality traits in pathological gamblers (with and without substance use disorders) and in 
healthy controls. Different scales and tasks were used to measure specific indices of 
impulsivity: self-reported impulsivity (through the Barratt Impulsiveness scale, BIS), 
sensation seeking (Zuckermann’s Sensation-seeking scale – SSS), delay discounting 
(Delayed Discounting of Monetary Rewards task and Single Key Impulsivity Paradigm), 
attention/memory (Immediate and Delayed memory task), response inhibition (Go-Stop 
                                                          
8 Note that, in the presentation of the literature review, the original nomenclature used by the authors 
to classify participants as a function of gambling severity will be reported.  
As suggested by one of the two reviewers, Prof. Luke Clark, in the three studies presented in the 
following chapters, the problem gamblers vs non-problem gamblers classification will be adopted to 
indicate, respectively, the gamblers’ group and the one used as control.  
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Impulsivity Paradigm); risk-taking (BART), and distress tolerance (Paced Auditory Serial 
Addition Task). They found that pathological gamblers were more impulsive than healthy 
controls in specific ways. Regardless of substance use disorders, pathological gamblers 
discounted delayed rewards more than control participants did. Moreover, greater rate of 
discounting was associated with higher scores on the BIS Attention and Non-Planning 
subscales, where pathological gamblers showed more elevated scores than the control group. 
Both gamblers groups did not differ from control on sensation-seeking scores and risk-taking 
behaviour. Gamblers with and without substance use disorders did not differ on delay 
discounting and self-reported impulsivity measures as well as on sensations seeking scores.  
However, the relationship between gambling severity and the personality trait of 
impulsivity has not always been found. Studies investigating this clinical association showed 
discordant results (Ginley et al., 2104; Lorains et al., 2014; Patterson et al., 2003; De Wilde 
et al., 2013) that may derive from the scales used. A recent study conducted by Leppink et al. 
(2016) examined, in 154 pathological gamblers, the clinical association between three 
different measures of personality (Eysenck Impulsiveness questionnaire: EIQ; Barratt 
Impulsiveness scale: BIS; Stop-Signal test: SST) with gambling disorder diagnosis. They 
found that BIS showed the most direct association with gambling clinical severity. Differently 
from EIQ and SST, all three domains of BIS were associated with clinical diseases. In 
particular, high motor and attentional impulsivity subscales were associated with gambling 
severity whereas high non-planning impulsivity was associated with depressive 
symptomatology. 
Sensation seeking, characterized by a need for novel, varied and complex experiences, 
appears to be strictly linked to the characteristics of gambling (i.e., expectations on outcomes, 
risk taking). Nevertheless, the studies investigating its relationship with gambling status 
showed discordant results. On one hand, some studies (Kuley and Jacobs, 1988; Powell et al. 
1999; Gupta et al. 2006) found higher sensation-seeking scores in problem gamblers than in 
social gamblers. On the other hand, in other studies pathological gamblers exhibited lower 
sensation-seeking scores than non-gamblers (Blaszczynski et al. 1986; Carrasco et al. 1994; 
Blanco et al. 1996). In addition, other studies did not reveal significant differences between 
the two groups (Dickerson et al. 1990; Blaszczynski et al. 1990; Coventry and Brown 1993; 
Bonnaire et al. 2004; Parke et al. 2004). Some authors posit that sensation seeking is a 
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component of the impulsivity construct rather than a separate personality trait. Gullo et al. 
(2014) argued that impulsivity is composed by two interconnected processes (approach vs. 
inhibition), including personality, cognitive and behavioural levels. Sensation seeking would 
be comprised, together with reward sensitivity, in the personality level of the approach 
process whereas delay discounting and impulsive choices would be included in the cognitive 
and behavioural levels. Recently, Hodgins and Holub (2015) examined the structure of 
impulsivity construct in relation to gambling behaviour. They administered to 104 
problematic gamblers both behavioural and self-report measures of impulsivity. The results 
found that the two emerging factors, trait impulsivity and sensation seeking, respectively 
correlated with problem gambling severity and involvement. 
 
1.7. Cognitive distortions and gambling  
Gambling games are mostly random (i.e., lotteries, roulette, slot-machines) or involve 
a little degree of skill (i.e., sports betting, blackjack). Nevertheless, research revealed that 
when dealing with chance human beings may recur to an erroneous processing of randomness, 
as showed by cognitive distortions. The cognitive approach to the gambling study highlighted 
that cognitive distortions have a key role in the development and maintenance of problem 
gambling behaviour. Using mainly psychometric measures of cognitive distortions 
concerning the gambling field (i.e.: GRCS: Gambling-related Cognitions Scale; GBQ: 
Gambling Beliefs Questionnaire), the studies adopting a cognitive approach found that people 
with gambling disorder reported higher levels of distorted cognitions than social gamblers 
(Joukhador et al., 2003; Myrseth et al., 2010) or non-gamblers (Miller and Currie, 2008; 
Emond and Marmurek, 2010). One of the crucial aspects of gamblers’ cognitive 
characteristics seems to be the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of winning due to the 
variety of cognitive distortions (Ladouceur and Walker, 1996; Clark et al., 2010; Michalczuk 
et al., 2011), most of them deriving from representativeness and availability heuristics 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). The most studied cognitive distortion related to the 
representativeness heuristic (the belief that an event is likely to belong to a class as it appears 
to be representative of that class) is the gambler’s fallacy. Such distortion would occur when 
people believe that even a short run of random events correspond to their randomness 
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conception and would lead to believe that a particular outcome is due. Another cognitive 
distortion related to the representativeness heuristic is the trends in number picking (i.e., 
believing that random events are instead governed by specific “laws”, according to which 
future outcomes are predictable): several studies have found that gamblers prefer number 
strings not containing close digits (Haigh, 1997) or avoid picking duplicate numbers 
(Holtgraves and Skeel, 1992; Rogers and Webley, 2001).  
The cognitive distortions related to the availability heuristic (i.e., believing that an 
event is more likely when it is easily available in memory) are the availability of others’ wins, 
the inherent memory bias, and illusory correlations. Griffiths (1994) found that hearing and 
seeing the effect of the wins of close slot machines lead gamblers to increase their subjective 
winning probabilities. Erroneous perceptions of a relationship between unrelated events (i.e. 
believing that personal luck influences gambling outcomes), as well as other superstitious 
beliefs, are found in gamblers (Petry, 2004).    
The illusion of control (i.e. the belief of being capable to influence outcomes that are 
instead out of one’s control) has been considered as another key cognitive distortion affecting 
gambling behaviour. This distortion, often associated with overconfidence (i.e., high degrees 
of confidence in oneself, not supported by real abilities or possibilities), would lead gamblers 
to assign greater value to their own choices rather than to those of other people or to 
randomness, even if the success possibilities are not influenced by the opportunity to choose.  
Most forms of gambling deliver near misses, that is, an unsuccessful outcome close to 
the win (i.e., a lotter ticket differing only slightly from the winning number, or a slot machine 
showing two cherries with the third cherry falling close to the pay line). Several studies 
showed that near-miss events are perceived as more aversive than complete-miss events 
(Chase & Clark, 2010; Clark et al., 2013; Sharman et al., 2015), that they increase the wish 
to continue the game especially when the possibility of personal control is present (Clark et 
al., 2009).  
Among the possible cognitive distortions, the illusion of control and the gambler’s 
fallacy have received particular attention and have been strongly associated with gambling 
disorder (Goodie and Fortune, 2013; Clark, 2014). They will be widely discussed in the 
second and third chapter, respectively. 
 
 
15 
 
1.8. Emotion and gambling  
The relationship between emotion and gambling behaviour is a topic of growing 
importance in gambling research. It will be discussed extensively in the fourth chapter, where 
a study aimed to investigate the influence of positive and negative discrete emotions, induced 
through the autobiographical recall technique, on problem gamblers and non-problem 
gamblers’ decision-making will be reported. 
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Overview of the studies 
 
In the next three chapters three studies will be reported, in which the effects of two 
cognitive distortions (the illusion of control and the gambler’s fallacy) and some induced 
emotions (anger, fear, sadness, joy) on problem and non-problem gamblers’ decision-making 
have been respectively investigated.  
Specifically, in chapter II, a study aimed to investigate the putative existence of the 
illusion of control in problem and non-problem gamblers will be presented. Such study 
examined whether previous outcomes associated with personal and random choices in a 
gambling task influenced the winning probability estimates (linked to personal or random 
choice of the next event to bet on), the selection of the choice-agent, and the bet amount.  
Chapter III is focused on a study investigating the occurrence of the gambler’s fallacy 
(or the hot hand fallacy) and its relationship with probability estimates of the next outcome 
and the bet amount. Such study examined whether a series of identical outcomes induced one 
of the two fallacies and whether the induced fallacy was linked to an increase in probability 
estimates of the target event and in bet size. 
Finally, chapter IV will be centered on a study on the effect of positive and negative 
emotional states on decision-making. Such study examined whether the activation of 
incidental discrete positive/negative emotions was accompanied by a change of physiological 
parameters, whether the induced emotional states would affect the participants’ bet choice 
and whether such choices were influenced by the physiological arousal.  
The three studies also investigated whether such effects were present to a different 
extent in problem and non-problem gamblers.  
The two samples were recruited among residents in the Campania region. Problem 
gamblers were recruited among users requiring assistance in different Gambling Addictions 
Services9. The managers of the structures were demanded to select only problem gamblers 
who did not have comorbidity with other psychopathologies (e.g. drug addiction) and had not 
                                                          
9 These services are placed in the frame of the Drug and addiction services, but they are specifically 
devoted to gambling addiction. 
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yet undergone psychological treatment. Non-problem gamblers were recruited among 
relatives and friends of problem gamblers or by means of posters placed in the same addiction 
services or in local pharmacies, gyms, and medical and physiotherapy practices. The two 
groups of participants were paired by age and educational level. All participants were male 
since in Italy, and more specifically in the region where the studies have been conducted, 
problematic gambling affects more males than females.  
As it will described in the first study, the main gambling activities performed by 
problem-gamblers’ group were Sports betting (more than once a week: 53%), Slot machines 
and VLT (26%), Cards games (11%) and Lotteries (10%).  The gambling forms that were 
played by the problem gamblers group were assessed through the item 1 of the SOGS, as the 
Gambling Addictions Services could not provide such information in order to respect user 
privacy. 
Each of the three studies consisted of a quasi-experiment where one of the independent 
variables was always the participants’ gambling status, which was not manipulated.  
In the first two studies, presented in a counterbalanced order, participants were invited 
to take part in a fictitious American roulette game (modified ad hoc, by excluding the two 
green slots associated with 0 and 00), consisting of an equal number of red (50%) and black 
(50%) slots where the white ball could land. In both experiments, participants were presented 
with twelve balls throws. At the thirteenth and final round, they were asked to estimate the 
percentage probability of both winning possibilities (in the illusion of control study) or of 
both outcomes (in the gambler’s fallacy study). Then, they were asked to make a choice 
(personal or random, in the illusion of control study, or between one of the outcomes, in the 
gambler’s fallacy study) and, finally, to indicate how much they would bet on the choice 
made.  
The study investigating the effect of emotions on decision-making was presented in 
the end of the experimental session in order to avoid interferences with the first two studies, 
because the experimental procedure required the setup of electrodes for the measurement of 
physiological parameters. In this study, after the emotional induction by the autobiographical 
recall technique, participants took part in four decision-making tasks, representing four game 
situations that differed from each other as a function of the ownership of hypothetical money 
used to play and of winning probabilities.  
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At the end of the three studies, participants completed, in a counterbalanced order, the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) and the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS). The 
scale scores were considered as covariates in each of the three studies in order to investigate 
the role of personality factors (impulsivity and sensation seeking) in gambling behavior, as, 
according to the literature previously discussed, this relationship remains unclear.  
Finally, participants completed the SOGS, which was used as further tool to distinguish 
between problem and non-problem gamblers, as it will be specified in the first study.  
In none of the three studies monetary incentives were contemplated for two main 
reasons. As several authors (e.g. Kühberger, 2001; Read, 2005) argue, the presence of 
economic incentives is not necessary to evaluate how people behave in hypothetical contexts, 
as they already have an “intrinsic” motivation to do their best so the (extrinsic) monetary 
incentive does not necessarily increase their level of motivation. Moreover, providing real 
winnings would have created ethical problems with seeking-treatment participants and neither 
the heads of Gambling addiction services nor the department ethics committee would have 
consented this procedure. 
The three experiments were carried out in apposite rooms provided by the Gambling 
Addiction Services of Campania, in a single experimental session lasting about 1h. Due to the 
enormous difficulty in recruiting problem gamblers, participants were the same for all three 
studies. Before each experimental session, they signed the informed consent.  
At the end of the third study, participants were thanked and carefully debriefed. During 
the debriefing, participants were clarified about the research hypotheses and it was ensured 
that they had not suspected the studies purposes during the experimental sessions.     
The three studies were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of 
Psychology of the University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, to which my tutor belongs.  
Note that the characteristics of participants, recruiting methods and aspects of 
experimental procedure, that were common in the three studies, will be described only in the 
first presented study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
The illusion of control in problem gamblers and in non-problem gamblers  
 
 The first description of the concept of illusion of control was provided by Langer 
(1975), who defined it as the erroneous attribution of accidental positive outcomes to personal 
abilities rather than to chance. This definition is based on the hypothesis that people can 
confuse situations depending on chance with contexts where personal skills are required. 
According to Langer, such confusion would be generated by the presence in causal situations 
of features that can be interpreted as “skill cues”: familiarity with the task, opportunity of 
choosing, active involvement, competition, predictability of an event. In a series of 
experiments, Langer (1975) showed that, in purely random contexts, people tended to act as 
if they were able to control outcomes unrelated to their actions. In fact, participants who were 
given the opportunity to personally choose a lottery ticket later refused to trade it with others 
having more odds to win. Similarly, people who had the opportunity to select personally 
tickets subsequently requested a higher price to resell them than those whose tickets were 
randomly assigned ($ 8.67 vs. $ 1.96). Based on the people’s confusion between chance and 
skills hypothesized by Langer, these results express people’s tendency to overestimate the 
control that personal actions have on a situation and its outcome. Such tendency is implicitly 
associated with an increase in perceived success probabilities10. 
 Subsequently, the phenomenon described by Langer was interpreted using two 
opposing explanatory hypotheses, i.e. control heuristic (Thompson et al., 1998) and 
erroneous perception of control (Gino et al., 2011). Moreover, it has also been linked to 
preference for agency (Tversky and Wakker 1995, Chew and Sagi, 2006; 2008; Abdellaoui 
et al., 2011). These hypotheses will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
                                                          
10 Langer defined the illusion of control as “an expectancy of a personal success probability 
inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” (p.313, 1975). 
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2.1. Theoretical interpretations and empirical evidence 
 
 According to Langer & Roth (1975), in tasks involving personal abilities, a steady 
sequence of wins or losses is predictable, whereas in casual tasks outcomes are much more 
variable. Therefore, winnings and losses can be a clue to determine the controllability of a 
task. For this reason, in a casual task, a consistent sequence of winnings or losses can increase 
perceptions of controllability. 
 In order to test such hypothesis, several authors (Langer & Roth, 1975; Ladouceur 
et al., 1984; Burger, 1986; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Matute, 1995; Ejova et al., 2013) 
investigated the relationship between the perception of control and positive/negative 
outcomes (perceived failures or successes) in a situation. In such experiments, the 
presentation scheme of the wins varied in tasks where it was required to predict the outcome 
of a random sequence. Although the same number of wins was presented to all participants, 
a run of wins was presented in a condition at the beginning of the sequence (descending 
progression) and in another one at the end (ascending progression). In a third condition, 
instead, the wins were presented in random sequence. Results emerging from these studies 
were not consistent. Some studies (Langer & Roth, 1975; Ladouceur et al., 1984; Burger, 
1986; Coventry & Norman, 1998) found control to be greatest in the “descending” condition, 
where people receiving a descending sequence of wins believed they were more likely to win 
in the future. On the contrary, other studies (Matute, 1995; Ejova et al., 2013) found that 
inferred control was more present in the “ascending” condition, where people receiving an 
ascending sequence showed an increase in perception of task learning.  
 The studies above mentioned have varied the presentation order of wins into a 
seemingly casual task. Other authors (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Tennen & Sharp, 1983; 
Thompson et al., 2004; 2007) have instead operationalized the positive and negative outcomes 
of an action through the frequency of the reinforcements, that is, the number of times the 
target event occurs after one’s action. Studies adopting the "contingency judgments" 
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paradigm11 (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) showed that, when a specific action is followed by the 
desired outcome, people tend to experience the illusion of control, even if actually their own 
behaviour has no causal link with the occurrence of the event target. Using this procedure, 
Thompson et al. (2004; 2007) have shown that, under non-contingent conditions, although an 
outcome is random and does not depend on the participants’ behaviour, those who more 
frequently see the outcome as a result of their own action (high reinforcement) provide higher 
control estimates than those whose outcome occurs with a lower frequency (low 
reinforcement).  
 According to Thompson et al. (1998), people, in evaluating their own personal 
control, use a “control heuristic” based on the estimate of the connection (between an action 
and its outcome) and the intention (to achieve the expected outcome). In other words, when 
people perceive a connection between their own behaviour and a specific result, and an 
intentionality, based both on the desirability of the outcome and the motivation to engage in 
a consistent effort to obtain it, they can increase their own perception of causality over the 
outcome appearance, thus increasing personal control estimates. 
 In one of their studies (Thompson et al., 2004), participants were assigned to four 
experimental conditions based on the manipulation of the reinforcement (high/low) and 
motivation (presence/absence of a monetary incentive). Their task was to understand their 
degree of control over the appearance of the target stimulus by pressing or not a button. In 
line with their hypothesis, the results showed that the effect of the reinforcement on personal 
control judgments was "mediated" by the perceptions of connection between their actions and 
its outcome. In addition, the motivation to obtain the outcome led participants to overestimate 
their control12. 
 According to these authors, the illusion of control may also occur in situations of 
actual control, that is, in contingency situations. In a subsequent study (Thompson et al., 
                                                          
11 In the classical version of this paradigm, in each trial participants decided whether to take an action 
(press a button) to obtain a target event (the appearance of a light) and, in the end, they were asked to 
indicate their own degree of control over the event appearance. 
12 In the high-reinforcement condition, participants motivated to obtain the outcome overestimated 
their control. 
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2007), where the actual control (none, medium, high) and reinforcement (high, low) were 
manipulated, people overestimated their control in the condition with high control and high 
reinforcement, but not in the condition with medium control and high reinforcement. 
Furthermore, several participants underestimated their control. Actually, not all authors agree 
with the universality of the illusion of control. In this regard, Gino et al. (2011) hypothesized 
that people have an imperfect knowledge of the actual control exerted on events, so they tend 
to overestimate control when it is low (or non-existent) while tend to underestimate it when 
it is high.  
 In their study, participants were presented with a white screen with a random 
sequence of black letters. With a 5 seconds frequency, the screen colour turned black and the 
letters became purple. The participants’ task was to find two consecutive equal letters. The 
control13 was manipulated by varying the probability that, by pressing a button, participants 
could hold the white screen to read letters better (experiment 1 and 2). At the end of the trails, 
the perceived control measures were recorded through both the control estimates (as much 
control as participants believed they had when trying to stop the page-colour changing), and 
the effectiveness (of their action to cause the desired outcome).  
 In line with their hypotheses, results of experiment 1 showed that participants 
overestimated their control in low control conditions whereas they underestimated it in high 
control ones even if, as regard the effectiveness, participants believed they had greater control 
in the high-control conditions than low and no control ones. Such tendency was confirmed in 
experiment 2. In experiment 3, using the “stimulus appearance” paradigm, the degree of 
control14 and motivation15 was manipulated. Participants’ task was to understand their own 
degree of control over the appearance of the target stimulus on a screen. Results showed that, 
in estimating the perceived control, participants in high-control conditions provided estimates 
higher than those in low-control ones while, in estimating contingencies between their own 
actions and outcomes, participants in both high and low control conditions showed control 
                                                          
13 Four control levels: high: 85%, medium: 50%, low: 15%, nil: 0%. 
14 Low or high, depending on the percentage with which two possible actions (pressing or not a 
button) would produce the appearance of a stimulus. 
15 Motivation was manipulated through the presence/absence of reward (i.e. some money).  
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estimates below the actual effectiveness of their actions. In addition, in line with the control 
heuristic’s hypothesis, participants in highly motivated condition (possibility of receiving a 
reward) provided higher control estimates than those in lowly motivated condition (absence 
of reward).  
 Other authors (Tversky and Wakker 1995, Chew and Sagi, 2006; 2008; Abdellaoui 
et al., 2011) separate the illusion of control, which implies overestimating the probability of 
personal success, from the preference for agency, where the probability is estimated correctly. 
According to these authors, people’s proneness to control would be better explained by a 
preference for agency. Chew & Sagi (2006, 2008) highlighted that this tendency is not guided 
by an overestimation of personal success probabilities, which are exactly estimated, but rather 
by a source preference. For example, when an individual has to choose between a lottery 
ticket he/she personally selected and one chosen by a third party, he/she may prefer to choose 
autonomously, even though he/she is aware that in both cases winning odds are the same. 
 Li (2011) posits that people may have different preferences towards control 
(preference for control, preference for no control, and preference for randomization). He 
found that preference toward control was not due to a bias in probability belief but rather to 
the source preference. In his study, which consisted of two experiments, participants were 
presented with an urn with 10 balls and winning possibilities depending on the extraction of 
the ball whose number corresponded to one of the three held by participants. Participants’ 
task was to choose whether they wanted to select the numbers personally or let the 
experimenter do it. In addition, they had to indicate the related winning probabilities and to 
make a bet on both cases.  
 Results showed that people preferred to choose personally the numbers on which to 
bet, and they were also willing to pay a fee in order to do it. Nevertheless, regardless of who 
chose the numbers, most participants were aware that the odds of winning were the same. 
Only less than 5% of participants evaluated winning probabilities to be higher in the case of 
self-performed selection. Among these, 90% preferred to personally select the numbers. Thus, 
the author inferred that people with erroneous probability estimates are more likely to exhibit 
the illusion of control. 
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2.2. The illusion of control in problem gamblers 
 
 In some gambling contexts, such as roulette, dice or slot machines, where the 
outcomes are completely random, any perception of control can be certainly considered 
illusory. One of the hypotheses advanced to explain the development and maintenance of 
gambling behaviour is that the illusion of control is higher in problem gamblers than in non-
problem gamblers. Thus, some researchers have focused their research on the relationship 
between gambling and the illusion of control. In order to investigate the variables described 
by Langer, a field study conducted by Davis et al. (2000) examined the role of personal 
involvement in playing craps in a casino. Bets on the first throw and on total throws were 
compared with those of another yoked patron16. The results showed that participants bet more 
when they threw the dice themselves than the throws were made by another player, both on 
the first throw and all through the game. Similar results were obtained from a laboratory study 
conducted by Ladouceur & Sevigny (2005), which investigated the effect of the possibility to 
perform an instrumental action on beliefs and persistence at Video Lottery Terminal (VLT) 
game. In the first experiment, participants (49 occasional gamblers) took part in a VLT game 
and, at the end, were administered a questionnaire aimed to investigate the effects of the 
possibility of stopping device on the illusion of control and related erroneous beliefs17. The 
experimental session included two phases, which differed only because in the second one 
participants were given the possibility to use a button to stop (control) the machine. Results 
showed that, after the first phase, no participant developed any of the four beliefs; on the 
contrary, in the second phase these occurred after they used the button. Additionally, the 
probability of developing the illusion of control, represented by the increase in winning 
probabilities, was much more present (5 times greater) in participants who believed skills 
played a role in the game than in those who did not develop this belief. 
                                                          
16 At the craps table, all players play against the dealer, so they can also bet on others’ throws. 
17 Erroneous beliefs investigated:  Believing that they themselves could influence the outcome 
(symbols on screen) using the stopping button; believing that there is a method to control the game 
outcomes; believing that personal skills had a role on game outcomes; developing false strategies to 
increase the chances of winning after using the stopping device (the latter measuring the illusion of 
control).      
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 In the second experiment, the effect of the button stopping the machine on game 
persistence (measured by the number of turns played) was investigated. An experimental 
group played at VLT using the button to stop the machine while a control group played 
without it. At the end of the game, both groups were administered the same questionnaire as 
in the first experiment. Results showed that participants using the button played twice as much 
as the control group. In addition, similarly to the first experiment, the control group did not 
develop any of the four beliefs, while experimental group developed the four illusions to an 
extent almost identical to the first study.  
 More recently, pathological gamblers were found to make greater overestimations of 
control, compared to a healthy group, on a contingency judgment task (Orgaz, Estévez, & 
Matute, 2013). Participants were presented with a scenario where they were asked to imagine 
being a doctor testing a medicine (Batatrim) to cure a disease (Lindsay syndrome). They had 
to decide whether to administer the drug, which could have side effects18, to a fictitious patient 
for a total of 100 trials, and then received a feedback on successful (or unsuccessful) healing: 
regardless of participants’ choice, positive outcome of treatment was reported in 80% of 
cases. At the end of the trials, participants were asked to indicate (on a scale from 0 to 100) 
the drug efficacy: since the outcome occurred regardless of the participant's choice, the higher 
than zero estimates were index of illusion of control. Results showed that both groups 
overestimated the contingency between their own actions and the outcomes, with such 
overestimation being higher in gamblers group compared to the control one. Additionally, 
there was a positive correlation between the likelihood of drug administration and control 
judgment: as the number of administrations increased, there was an increase in the illusion of 
control. It should be noted that, since the likelihood of drug administration was not different 
between pathological gamblers and control group, the illusion of control of pathological 
gamblers was not associated with a greater number of drug administration. 
 
                                                          
18 This information was given to prevent administrations taking place every time. 
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2.3. Illusion of control, probability estimates, and betting 
 
 Although the processes underlying the illusion of control are subject to different 
explicative models, there seems to be a general agreement on the hypothesis that this belief 
implies an overestimation of the occurrence probability of the chosen event following a 
personal choice. However, most studies have only implicitly investigated the probability 
estimates of the occurrence of an event caused by a personal choice.  
 Most studies involve an experimental procedure that require participants to select the 
target event personally or let another agent choose for them and/or to indicate (i) if they are 
willing to pay a fee to personally choose the target event (Charness & Gneezy, 2010; Grou & 
Tabak, 2008; Li, 2011), (ii) their level of confidence in such choice (Kool et al., 2013) or (iii) 
both (Tobias-Webb et al., 2017). 
 For example, in the Charness & Gneezy’s study (2010) participants had to choose 
three numbers on the face of a die, of which only one extracted number would cause a win. 
Based on the four experimental conditions, participants had to (i) choose the numbers 
themselves, (ii) let the experimenter do it, (iii-iv), decide who (between themselves or the 
experimenter) would choose (freely or under fee payment). The results showed that personal 
choice dropped significantly when choosing between the two options implied a payment. 
Previously, Grou & Tabak (2008) using a similar procedure had obtained analogous results. 
In fact, they found that most participants chose to personally roll the die when it was free 
while only low percentages paid the fee for do it. Differently, in Kool et al. (2013), 
participants indicated their level of confidence in personal and imposed choices that would 
result in a win outcome. Their task was to select one of three spinners (wheels of fortune) 
containing a win sector. The three spinners had equal probabilities to result in a win. The size 
of the win sector varied between trials, while remaining the same within the three spinners. 
Depending on approval/vetoed condition, participants’ choices were next approved or vetoed 
and replaced by another one. The results showed that participants assigned higher confidence 
ratings to gambles that they chose than for the equivalent ones that were imposed. The results 
showed that participants assigned higher confidence ratings to gambles that they had chosen 
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rather than to gambles that had been imposed. The confidence ratings were also sensitive to 
win sector size, as they increased as the amount increased.  
 More recently, in Tobias-Webb et al. (2017), participants took part to the card-
guessing task, in which they had to find the winning card rotating a device. The control was 
manipulated in three conditions, where participants could exercise the control, freely or 
paying a fee, or not (baseline). Subsequently, they had to indicate the level of confidence (on 
a Likert scale from 0 to 100) to find the winning card. The authors found that the level of 
confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. 
Moreover, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, 
and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. 
 As regards the procedure to investigate the occurrence probability of an event related 
to a self-performed choice, most studies used an indirect measure of probability estimates. 
Also in Li's (2011) study, participants were asked to evaluate and choose whether they 
believed to have a higher probability in case of self-performed or experimenter’s choice or if 
the probabilities were the same in both cases. The procedure used in Ladouecer & Sevigny's 
(2005) study, instead, required participants to indicate whether and which strategies increased 
their winnings probabilities. Other studies have estimated subjective perceptions of control 
over the appearance of the desired event through different Likert scales, which evaluated 
winning expectations (Wohl & Enzle, 2002) or the effectiveness of their own actions (Vadillo 
et al., 2013; Matute & Blanco, 2014).  
 Using a procedure analogous to Langer’s (1975), Wohl & Enze’s study (2002) 
showed participants who were given the opportunity to personally choose a lottery ticket 
reported winning expectations (measured on a 1 to 7 point Likert scale) higher than those who 
had their ticket randomly assigned by a computer. In addition, participants who could select 
the tickets perceived themselves as more fortunate and believed that luck was a personal 
quality more than the other group did. Moreover, winning expectations correlated positively 
with fortune perceptions, since they paired with the growth of fortune perception as a personal 
quality. Vadillo et al. (2013) have instead shown that providing accurate information on 
alternative factors able to affect causal relationships can reduce the control illusion. 
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Participants were presented with an aversive stimulus (a sound) and their task was to eliminate 
it. In the experimental group, the disappearance of the stimulus was preceded by the presence 
of a signal (asterisk). Then they were asked to indicate (on two Likert scales from 0 to 100) 
if the disappearance of the stimulus was influenced by the signal and their behaviour. As 
expected, the results showed that the participants to whom the signal was presented estimated 
the disappearance of the stimulus as more influenced by the signal with respect to the group 
control19. Subsequently, Matute & Blanco (2014) showed that the illusion of control increased 
when a recurring undesirable outcome was attributed to alternative causes and this was 
associated with the use of a strategy where an action caused the outcome 50% of the time20. 
Using a procedure similar to the one above described for the study of Vadillo et al. (2013), 
participants were told that an undesired stimulus (a blue and white flash) would appear on the 
screen and that their task was to eliminate it (making the screen black) by pressing a button. 
Unlike the control group, participants in the experimental group received additional 
information: 1) the button could not work in some cases 2) they were advised to use the 
strategy where their action caused the desired outcome 50% of the time. The undesired 
stimulus sequence was manipulated so that, in both group, 75 % of the trials failed to keep 
the screen black. As expected, participants in the experimental group performed their action 
avoiding the undesired stimulus less frequently than the ones in control group. Therefore, they 
attributed the recurring undesired stimulus less to their actions and, more importantly, they 
could attribute it to an alternative cause. On the contrary, participants in the control group 
estimated their control to be less effective, as they could not attribute their rare successes to 
their frequent actions21.   
 Only Dixon's (2000) study explicitly investigated the probability estimates of a target 
event following a personal choice. In this study, conducted in a laboratory setting with a 
                                                          
19 However, both groups showed the illusion of control, as in both groups the effectiveness estimates 
of their responses were higher than zero. 
20 This strategy aims to find out if one’s behaviour is effective. 
21 However, even in this experiment, both groups showed the illusion of control as in both groups 
control judgments were higher than zero. 
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sample of five women playing roulette, the (accuracy vs. inaccuracy) game-related rules22 and 
(personal vs. made by experimenter) choice of the numbers on which to bet varied.  
 After a baseline game session, in the next two ones participants were first presented 
with three inaccurate rules related to roulette and then were presented with three accurate 
ones. At the end of each game session, participants were asked to estimate the winning 
probabilities, both when the choice was made by oneself and when it was made by the 
experimenter. Results showed that, before presenting any rule, participants tended to 
overestimate winning probabilities in case of a personal choice and to underestimate them 
when the experimenter selected the numbers. A similar more substantial pattern was observed 
after the presentation of inaccurate rules. Differently, after the presentation of the accurate 
rules, participants provided correct probability estimates in both selection modes. However, 
in a follow-up session they returned to overestimate winning odds in case of personal 
selection. A similar effect was also found with bets since, prior to the presentation of the rules, 
four participants bet more when they personally chose numbers compared to when the 
experimenter selected them. Moreover, also in this case the difference tended to decrease by 
introducing accurate rules and to return in the follow-up session.  
 Further studies have also investigated the relationship between the (personal vs. by 
another agent) choice of an event and the bet on the outcome of such event. In such 
experiments, after selecting an event by one of these two options, participants had to decide 
how much to bet on the occurrence of target event. Such studies found discordant results. On 
the one hand, studies conducted on both heathy individuals (Koehler et al., 1994; Chau & 
Phillips, 1995; Li, 2011) and gamblers (Davis et al., 2000) found that the highest bets were 
positively correlated with the illusion of control. On the other hand, the abovementioned 
studies of Charness & Gneezy (2010) and Grou & Tabak (2008) found that, although 
preferences for personal selection was higher when it was free compared to when it implied 
a cost, the bets made in the two conditions did not differ. Moreover, bets in case of personal 
                                                          
22 Three inaccurate vs. accurate roulette game rules:  
In order to win, personally picking up the numbers is necessary/indifferent;  
in order to obtain a big win, big bets are not/necessary;  
im/possibility to voluntarily draw the numbers that make a player lose. 
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selection did not even differ from the ones made when it was the experimenter who selected 
the numbers. 
 
3.4 Theoretical and methodological differences in the research on the illusion of 
control 
 
 As it could be seen from the literature review, there are both theoretical and 
methodological differences in the research on the illusion of control. From a theoretical point 
of view, some authors (Tversky and Wakker 1995, Chew and Sagi, 2006; 2008; Abdellaoui 
et al., 2011) have distinguished the illusion of control (involving erroneous probability 
estimates) from the preference for agency (in which probabilities were correctly estimated). 
Other scholars have disputed the Langer’s interpretation of the phenomenon, in favour of the 
control heuristic (Thompson, 1998; 2004; 2007), according to which people overestimate 
their control on events only when both intentionality and connection converge toward an 
(expected) outcome. Furthermore, few authors have advocate the existence of an erroneous 
perception of control (Gino et al., 2011), or a variable preference for different sources of 
control (Li, 2011).  
 Also from a methodological point of view, there are consistent differences among 
the studies. Most of them have used an experimental procedure in which participants were 
required to select personally the target event or let another agent choose for them. In other 
experimental paradigms using non/contingency task, in every trial a feedback on the 
performed action was delivered to participants, both pathological gamblers (Orgaz et al., 
2013) and healthy individuals (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Thompson, 2004; 2007; Vadillo 
et al., 2013; Matute & Blanco, 2014), who were asked to estimate their subjective perception 
of control over a target or desired outcome. Some scholars (Langer & Roth, 1975; Ladouceur 
et al., 1984; Burger, 1986; Coventry & Norman, 1998; Matute, 1995; Ejova et al., 2013) 
investigated the effect of previous positive/negative outcomes on the perceived control with 
discordant results. Only a few studies (Dixon, 2000; Li, 2011) have simultaneously examined 
the variables involved in the phenomenon.  
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 Although the processes underlying the illusion of control are interpreted by different 
explicative models, there seems to be a general agreement on the hypothesis that the illusion 
of control is linked to an overestimation of the probability of occurrence of the chosen event 
following a personal choice. However, most studies have only implicitly investigated the 
probability estimates of a target event. For example, in the Langer’s classic experimental 
procedure (Langer, 1975; Wohl & Enze, 2002), participants were asked to indicate, by 
different Likert scales, their winning expectations. Ladouecer & Sevigny's (2005) study 
required participants to indicate whether and which strategies increased their winnings 
probabilities. So far, only Dixon’s (2000) study explicitly investigated the probability 
estimates of the occurrence of a personally chosen event. Indeed, at the end of the game 
session, participants were asked to estimate the winning probabilities, both whether the choice 
was made personally and by the experimenter.   
 Finally, it should be remarked that one of the explanatory hypotheses on the 
development and persistence of pathological gambling is that gamblers are particularly 
susceptible to cognitive distortions, such as the illusion of control, which would cause a 
tendency to overestimate the winning probabilities (Griffiths, 1994; Ladouceur & Walker, 
1996; Miller & Currie, 2008; Romo et al., 2016). However, to the best of my knowledge, so 
far only the study of Orgaz et al. (2013) has specifically investigated whether the illusion of 
control phenomenon is present in a different extent in problem gamblers and non-problem 
gamblers comparing their performance in a gambling task. 
 
Overview of the study 
 
 The present study aimed to investigate the putative existence of the illusion of control 
in problem gamblers (PG) and non-problem gamblers and its relationship with probability 
estimates and wager size in a gambling task. Specifically, the study examined whether 
previous positive/negative outcomes associated with personal and random choices influenced 
(i) the probability estimate of winning linked to the personal choice and the random choice of 
the next event on which to bet (ii) the selection of the choice-agent, (iii) the bet amount.  
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 A specific goal of the study was to disentangle the illusion of control (where winning 
probabilities are overestimated) from the preference for agency (where probabilities are 
correctly estimated). In addition, the study aimed to investigate whether one or the other 
phenomenon was present to a different extent between PG and non-problem gamblers and 
whether personality factors, such impulsivity and sensation-seeking, affected the participants’ 
responses. 
 To this end, it was created a quasi-experiment with a 4 x 2 factorial design, with two 
independent variables, one of which (experimental condition) was manipulated whereas the 
other (problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) was not. The four experimental 
conditions were created manipulating the number of winning and losing outcomes associated 
with choices made personally by the participant and randomly by the computer, in a fictional 
American roulette game, modified ad hoc for the study, by eliminating the two green slots 
(see Materials and procedure section). Participants played 12 fake rounds: they could choose 
personally the slot color on which to bet in six rounds, whereas the computer made randomly 
the choice in other six rounds. In order to avoid the order effect, the possibility of choice by 
the participant or by the computer was presented randomly.  
 Actually, the outcomes of the first 12 rounds were predetermined in order to present, 
in each condition, a specific outcome sequence differing from the other in the number of wins 
and losses associated with the choices made personally by the participant and randomly by 
the computer. More specifically, in a condition, the personal choices mostly resulted in wins 
and the ones made by the computer were balanced between wins and losses (first). In other 
two conditions, the personal choices mostly resulted in losses whereas the ones made by the 
computer were balanced between wins and losses (second) or were mainly winnings (third). 
In a control condition, the outcomes both of the personal choices and the ones made by 
computer were equally distributed in wins and losses.  
At the thirteenth and final round, participants were asked to estimate, in percentage, 
the winning probability they had if they personally chose what colour to bet on, and the 
winning probability if the computer chose. Then, they were asked to choose whether they 
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wanted to let the computer make the choice of the colour on which to bet or if they wanted to 
choose personally and, finally, how much they would bet.  
The hypotheses underpinning the study concerned three issues: (i) the illusion of 
control (ii) the choice of the agent, (iii) the bet amount. For each issue, three contrasting 
expectations were advanced. 
The hypotheses about the illusion of control were the following:  
1. If people were prone to the illusion of control, then they should believe that, choosing 
personally the colour on which to bet, they should have more possibilities to win 
compared to the random choice made by the computer; this should occur both in the 
condition where the personal choices mostly resulted in wins and in the control one.  
2. Instead, if people were prone to the influence of previous outcomes, then they should 
believe that the probability of winning associated with the personal choice and with 
the computer-made choice vary depending on experimental conditions. In particular, 
the winning probability associated with the personal choice should be expected to be 
higher in the condition where the personal choices mostly resulted in wins. 
Analogously, the winning probability associated with the choice made by the computer 
should be expected to be higher in the two conditions where the personal choices 
mostly resulted in losses, while the outcomes of the choices made by the computer 
were either balanced between wins and losses or were mainly wins. 
3. If people were not prone to any of the two phenomena then the two probability 
estimates should not vary.  
The hypotheses about the choice of the agent were the following:  
1. If people desired to be agents of their own fate, then they should always prefer personal 
choices regardless of the winning probability attributed to the personal choice or the 
one made by the computer. Therefore, if participants made correct probability 
estimates but preferred to choose themselves, they would show a preference for agency 
but not the illusion of control. 
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2. If participants were prone to the influence of the previous outcomes, they should prefer 
to choose themselves in the condition in which personal choices are predominantly 
winning and let the computer choose in the conditions where the computer choices are 
predominantly winning. Note that the influence of previous outcomes on preference 
for agency could be independent from that on probability estimates. 
3. If people were insensitive to both phenomena, they should not reveal any preference 
for the decision-maker: so the proportion of personal choices should be similar to the 
one of computer choices.   
Similar contrasting hypotheses were made for bet amount:  
1. Betting more in case of overestimation of winning probabilities linked to personal 
choices would be an additional index of illusion of control. Also betting more after 
having opted for personal choice (without overestimating personal winning 
probabilities) should be considered an indicator of the illusion of control, since such 
behavior would suggest that positive outcomes were expected by personal rather than 
random choices.  
2. On the contrary, if the bet amount varied in function of the experimental conditions 
(i.e. if it increased following the “winning” conditions and decreased following the 
“losing” ones), people would be prone to the influence of previous outcomes.  
3. If people were insensitive to both phenomena, bet amount would not vary across the 
experimental conditions. 
In conformity with several evidences in the literature (e.g. Lim et al. 2015; Michalczuk et 
al. 2011; Myrseth et al. 2010; Nower et al., 2004; Petry, 2001), it is expected that problem 
gamblers are more prone than non-problem gamblers to the illusion of control and to 
impulsivity and sensation-seeking. Moreover, it is expected that higher scores on sensation-
seeking and/or impulsivity scales are positively associated with the illusion of control and the 
bet amount. 
It must be specified that the decision to request the probabilities estimates before choosing 
the agent selecting the slot colour aimed to avoid both that the participants could 
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misinterpreted the questions on probabilities as questions about their confidence in the 
possibility of winning and/or that they could indicated how lucky they felt after their choice.  
Furthermore, the purpose of asking two questions about the probability estimate was to 
understand both whether the participants overestimated one of the two outcomes (or both) 
and if they perceived them as complementary or independent from each other. The 
modification of the roulette, by eliminating the two green slots, aimed to maintain the 
probability level of each event constant to 50% and to allow participants to choose between 
two equiprobable events. 
 
Experiment  
The next paragraphs will describe the characteristics of participants and recruitment 
methods, which are analogous for the three experiments.  
 
Participants  
Three hundred twenty male23 unpaid volunteers (N=40 for each condition) of Italian 
nationality, aged between 18 and 68 years (mean = 34, SD = 10.451), took part in the three 
studies. All participants signed the informed consent form, in which anonymity was 
guaranteed. The only information required was age and educational level. They were also told 
that they could stop the experiment at any time.  
Participants were recruited among the residents of the provinces of Naples, Caserta 
and Salerno.  
Participants were recruited among the residents of the provinces of Naples, Caserta 
and Salerno. Pathological gamblers were recruited in different Gambling addiction Services, 
among those requiring assistance. As I already wrote, they did not have comorbidity with 
other psychopathologies. Moreover, they had not yet undergone psychological treatment. 
Indeed, since the three studies aimed to investigate putative differences between pathological 
                                                          
23 The participants were all male because the incidence of women among problem gamblers was 
reduced and it would not have been possible to make homogeneous groups by sex. 
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gamblers and healthy individuals (henceforth problem gamblers/non-problem gamblers), we 
ensured to avoid that any positive effect of psychological treatment would reduce the 
differences between the two groups of participants. Non-problem gamblers were recruited 
among the relatives and friends of problem gamblers or by means of posters placed in the 
same Gambling addiction Services or in local pharmacies, gyms, medical and physiotherapy 
practices. The two groups were paired according to age and educational level. 
Note that to use an additional discriminant criterion between problem gamblers and non- 
problem gamblers, at the end of the three experiments the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS, Lesieur & Blume, 1987) was administered. In this way, we aimed to eliminate from 
the non-problem gamblers group the participants having high scores on the SOGS and from 
the problem gamblers group those having low scores on the SOGS. Actually, no change in 
the two groups was needed: the few problem gamblers (about 15) who scored borderline on 
the SOGS (i.e. 4) were left in the problem gamblers group. The participants of the non-
problem gamblers group scored from 0 to 2 on the SOGS. 
The choice to use the SOGS was based on the observation that it is the mainly used 
screening tool in clinical and research in Italy. It was used as a further instrument of 
discrimination between the two groups and also to obtain information on the gambling forms 
played/preferred by the problem gamblers. All participants (problem gamblers and non-
problem gamblers) performed the tasks in appropriate rooms provided by the Gambling 
addiction Services. Each participant performed the tasks individually. No money incentive 
was offered.  
The studies were approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology 
of the University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, to which my tutor belongs. 
 
Design  
This study was a quasi-experiment with a 4 x 2 factorial design. Participants were 
divided into eight groups on the basis of two between-subjects variables: experimental 
condition (with four levels, described later), which was manipulated, and gambling status 
(with 2 levels: problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers), which was not manipulated. 
The four dependent variables will be described below.  
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In this study, as well as in the other two studies subsequently described, 2 covariates 
were considered: the impulsivity level, measured through an Italian version of the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale 11 (BIS-11, Patton et al. 1995, Italian version validated by Fossati et al. 
2001) and the sensation-seeking level, measured through the Italian version of the Brief 
Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS, Hoyle et al., 2002, Italian version validated by Primi et al., 
2011). Note that these last two measures were revealed once, at the end of the three 
experiments.  
 
Materials and procedure 
 In each of the experimental conditions, participants were invited to play in a fictional 
American roulette game (modified ad hoc, by excluding the two green slots associated with 
the 0 and 00 numbers) consisting of an equal number of red (50%) and black (50%) slots 
where the white ball could land.  
 The instructions informed participants that the present study entailed the 
participation in a roulette game with only two colours, for which they had an available budget 
of 20 chips. They explained that, in the first 12 rounds, sometimes the computer would decide, 
randomly, whether to bet on a red or black slot, and sometimes it would be the participant to 
decide on which colour to bet. In the first 12 rounds the bet would be always 2 chips, while 
at the thirteenth round the participant could decide how much to bet.  
Once read the instructions, the participant could press the "Next" button to begin the 
experiment.  
 Each of the first 12 rounds consisted of two phases. In the first one, a screen was 
presented showing a Graphics Interchange Format image of a roulette wheel rotating with a 
white ball on the inside ball track. In this phase, a phrase appeared on the screen informing 
whether the computer or the participant would decide the slot colour on which to bet. In the 
first case, the phrase “In this round, the computer will decide the bet. The computer bets on 
red/black” appeared; in the second one, the phrase “In this round, you will choose your bet. 
What do you want to bet on?” appeared and the participant had to select red or black slot 
colour.    
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By pressing the "Next" button, the participant went to the second phase. In this phase, 
a second screen appeared showing an image with the choice outcome, accompanied by the 
phrase "The ball landed on the red (or black) slot. You have earned (or lost) 2 coins". The 
second screen also informed participants about their current budget.  
Both phases had no time limit. The "Next" button allowed switching to the next round. 
 In the first 12 rounds, the participants and the computer chose the slot color for same 
number of times, in a random order.   
At the thirteenth and final round, participants were asked to estimate, on a scale from 
1 to 100, the winning probability they would have if they personally chose what colour to bet 
on ("How many probabilities to win you think you have if you choose on your own on which 
colour to bet? Indicate the probability, in percentage, by typing on the keyboard a number 
from 1 to 100”) and the winning probability if the computer chose ("How many probabilities 
to win do you think you have if the computer chooses on which colour to bet? Indicate the 
probability, in percentage, by typing on the keyboard a number from 1 to 100). The two 
questions were presented in a counterbalanced order across participants.  
Subsequently, participants were asked to choose whether they wanted to let the 
computer make the choice of the colour on which to bet or if they preferred to choose it 
personally (for half participants the question was: "Do you want the computer, randomly, to 
choose what colour to bet on or do you want to personally choose it?" For the other half the 
question was: Do you want to personally choose what colour to bet on or do you want the 
computer, randomly, to choose it?). Participants had to choose one of the two options 
(“computer” or “you”).  
Finally, they had to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 10, how many chips they wanted to 
bet ("How much would you bet from 1 to 10?"). 
As mentioned earlier, the outcomes of the first 12 rounds were predetermined by 
manipulating the number of wins and losses associated with the choices performed by the 
participant and by the computer, arranged to produce 4 experimental conditions. 
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In the first condition (Condition 1), the 6 participant choices resulted in 4 wins and 2 
losses, while the 6 computer choices resulted in 3 wins and 3 losses: in this condition, 
participants in the thirteenth round had 24 chips available;  
In the second condition (Condition 2), the 6 participant choices resulted in 2 wins and 
4 losses, while the 6 computer choices resulted in 3 wins and 3 losses: in this condition, 
participants in the thirteenth round had 16 chips available;  
In the third condition (Condition 3), the 6 participant’s choices resulted in 2 wins and 
4 losses, while the 6 computer choices resulted in 4 wins and 2 losses: in this condition, 
participants in the thirteenth round had 16 chips available;  
In the fourth (control) condition, the outcomes of the 6 choices performed by the 
participant were 3 wins and 3 losses as well as the outcomes of the 6 computer choices: in 
this condition, participants at the thirteenth round had 20 chips available. 
At the end of the three experiments, participants completed, in a counterbalanced order, 
the BIS-11 and BSSS. Finally, they completed the SOGS. The three scales used will be 
described below. Note that the description will not be repeated in the other two studies.  
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), used in the Italian version validated by 
Fossati et al. (2001) is a scale evaluating the tendency to impulsivity in three areas: motor 
impulsivity, impulsivity without planning, cognitive impulsivity. It consists of 30 items rated 
on a 4-point Likert scale (from 1 = never / rarely to 4 = almost always / always): total score 
ranges from 30 to 120.  
The Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (BSSS), used in the Italian version validated by 
Primi et al. (2011), is a one-dimensional scale evaluating the tendency to sensation seeking24. 
                                                          
24 Hoyle et al. (2002) developed the BSSS by selecting 8 items from the original SSS-V scale of 
Zuckerman et al. (1964), according to which sensation seeking was conceptualized as the search for 
intense, complex, new and varied experiences and sensations as well as the willingness to assume 
financial, legal, social and physical risks for such experiences.  
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It consists of 8 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = "completely disagree" to 5 = 
"totally in agreement"): total score ranges from 8 to 40. 
The SOGS is a questionnaire composed of 16 items: scores are obtained by summing 
up the number of questions that point to a risky response. The score rating ranges from 0-2 
(no problem) to 3-4 (problematic and at risk) to 5 or more (pathological gambler).  
In order to carry out the experiment, it was used a laptop computer with which data 
was collected. The task was implemented using Survey Monkey, an online survey 
development cloud-based software. The choice of this software was based on the possibility 
to support a Graphics Interchange Format image of a roulette wheel rotating with a ball on 
the inside ball track. As mentioned before, the experiment was not carry out online but rather 
in appropriate rooms provided by the Addiction gambling Services for all participants 
(problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers).   
The participants took about 15 minutes to complete the experiment after which they 
were thanked. 
Note that, after every of the three experiments, participants were thanked and that after 
the last one they were also accurately debriefed about the aims of the three studies. As I 
already wrote, during the debriefing, participants were clarified about the research hypotheses 
and it was ensured that they had not suspected the study purposes during the experimental 
session.     
 
 
 
Results 
 
Gambling activities 
The gambling forms that were played by the problem gamblers group were assessed 
through the item 1 of the SOGS. In this group, the most frequently reported gambling 
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activities were Sport betting (more than once a week: 53%), Slot machines and VLT (26%), 
Cards games (11%), and Lotto-Lottery-Scratchcard (10%). 
Table 2 shows the gambling activity frequencies in descending order of frequency. 
 
Table 2. Gambling activities (in percentage) reported by the gamblers group. 
Gambling activity Less than once a week More than once a week 
Sport betting 37 53 
Slot machines, VLT  33 26 
Cards 71 11 
Lotto, lottery, scratch card 54 10 
Bingo 51 4 
Casino 26 4 
Horse racing 18 3 
Skill games 16 0 
Other 7 0 
Note that participants may indicate more than one form, so the total does not sum to 100%. 
 
Preliminary analyses  
 
In table 1 and 2 the distributions of educational level, age, BSSS and BIS_11 scores as 
a function of study conditions and gambling status were reported.  
In order to test whether educational level was homogeneously distributed, a stratified 
chi-square was performed, which was not significant for both problem gamblers (χ2 = 6.037, 
df = 6, p = .419) and non-problem gamblers (χ2 = 9.455, df = 6, p = .150).  
The 4 (Condition) x 2 (Gambling status) ANOVA carried out on age revealed no 
difference due either to Condition (F3,312 =.481, p= .696, pη² = .005) or Gambling status 
(F3,312 =.138, p= .711, pη² <.001) in the age distribution.  
The same ANOVAs were performed on the two personality scales, BSSS and BIS-11.  
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As to the first scale, the results showed that BSSS scores were analogously distributed 
among the four study conditions (F3,312 =.900, p= .442, pη² = .009) but not between problem 
gamblers and non-problem gamblers (F3,312 =30.662, p< .001, pη² = .089): the former scored 
higher than the latter. No effect was due to Condition x Gambling status interaction.  
Also the ANOVA conducted on BIS_11 showed that problem gamblers scored higher 
than non-problem gamblers (F3,312 =87.383, p< .001, pη² = .219); moreover results revealed 
a weak but significant effect concerning the Condition (F3,312 =2.675, p< .05, pη² = .025): 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment revealed that participants in Condition 1 
(where the participant choices resulted in 2 wins and 4 losses, while the computer choices 
resulted in 3 wins and 3 losses) scored higher than participants in Control Condition. The 
Condition x Gambling status interaction was not significant. 
 
Table 1 – Frequency of participants in function of gambling status and conditions.  
Percentages indicate the distribution of each education level within the two groups. 
 Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Control Total  
Problem  
gamblers 
Primary-
middle school 
9 (37.5%) 4 (16.7%) 6 (25%) 5 (20.8%) 
24  
(15.1%) 
High-school 30 (23.8%) 30 (23.8%) 31 (24.6%) 35 (27.8%) 
126 
(79.24%) 
Degree 1 (11.1%) 5 (55.6%) 3 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 
9  
(5.66%) 
Non-
problem  
gamblers 
Primary-
middle school 
8 (36.4%) 6 (27.3%) 6 (27.3%) 2 (9.1%) 
22  
(14%) 
High-school 30 (24.8%) 26 (21.5%) 30 (24.8%) 35 (28.9%) 
121 
(77.1%) 
Degree 2 (14.3%) 5 (35.7%) 4 (28.6%) 3 (21.4%) 
14  
(8.9%) 
Table 2 – means (and s.d.) of participants’age, BSSS and BIS-11 scores as a function of the 
experimental conditions and gambling status. 
 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Control 
AGE     
Problem gamblers 34.5 (11.8) 35.18 (10.51) 33.45 (9.26) 33.75 (11.38) 
Non-problem gamblers 35.03 (11.13) 34 (9.95) 32.63 (9.3) 33.48 (10.59) 
BSSS     
Problem gamblers 23.23 (6.06) 25.08 (6.35) 22.23 (4.36) 22.7 (4.82) 
Non-problem gamblers 19.12 (6) 19.78 (5.27) 21 (5.71) 19.7 (5.11) 
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BIS-11     
Problem gamblers 64.72 (11.24) 60.28 (11.28) 58.57 (10.74) 58.9 (7.77) 
Non-problem gamblers 51.45 (9.12) 49.85 (8.69) 51.98 (9.59) 49.02 (7.63) 
 
Inferential analyses 
As suggested by one of the two reviewers, Prof. Luke Clark, all statistical analyses 
were firstly performed without any covariates. Then the two covariates, i.e. BSSS and BIS-11 
scores, were included in the analyses in order to examine their potential impact on the results. 
The same procedure has been adopted in all the three studies.  
I will report the results of the analyses without covariates. Only when the results of 
two types of analyses differed, I will report both results.  
First, the effects of the independent variables - Condition (1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. control) and 
Gambling status (problem gamblers vs. non problem gamblers) - on each of the three 
dependent variables (winning probability estimates of each of the two selection modes of the 
slot colour, preference for the choice - personal or made by the computer - of the colour on 
which to bet, and bet amount) were tested, without and with covariates. Then, mediation 
analyses were performed to examine whether winning probability estimates and choice 
mediated the effect of the independent variables on bet amount. 
 
Probability  
In order to examine the incidence of the two independent variables on participants’ 
probability estimates, a 4 (condition: 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. control) x 2 (gambling status: problem 
gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) x 2 (probability: you and pc) mixed ANOVA was 
performed. The between-subjects variables were condition and gambling status. The within 
variable was probability estimate (2 levels: you vs. pc).  
Results showed a main effect of Probability, F1,312 = 30,84; p < .000; pη² = .09: 
participants estimated you probability (51.31%) to be higher than pc probability (45.16%). 
This effect was moderated by Condition, as revealed by the two-way interaction, Condition x 
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Probability, F3,312 = 3.016; p < .05; pη² = .028, which was examined through simple effects 
analysis with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that in almost all conditions, you probability was higher than pc probability (all ps < .001). 
Only in the condition 3, in which the participants' choices were mainly losing while those of 
the computer were mainly winning, the two probability estimates did not significantly differ 
(p = .693). These results did not vary when the two covariates were introduced in the model 
and an ANCOVA was carried out, after checking that there were no interactions between 
covariates and independent variables, in conformity with the assumption of homogeneity of 
regression slopes.  
Furthermore, in order to detect potential collinearity between independent variables 
and covariates, a multiple linear regression was performed, in which the two repeated 
dependent variables were transformed in a single variable, probability delta, calculated by 
subtracting pc probability from you probability. The multicategorical independent variable, 
Condition, was coded as three dummy variables (Condition 1 = 1; other conditions = 0 / 
Condition 2 = 1; other conditions = 0 / Condition 3 = 1; other conditions = 0) with control 
condition as reference category25. The other predictors entered in the model were gambling 
status (1 = problem gamblers; 0 = non-problem gamblers) and BSSS and BIS-11 scores. 
Results showed that, compared to the control condition, in Condition 3 probability delta 
decreased (B= -7.595; SE = 3.15; t = -2.412; p <.05). In line with previous results, in condition 
3, in which the participants' choices were mainly losing while those of the computer were 
mainly winning, the difference between the two probabilities decreased, while in the other 
two conditions it did not differ from the control one (where you probability was higher than 
pc probability). The VIF values ranged from 1.314 to 1.537, which indicates the absence of 
multicollinearity problem (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).  
Graphic 1 shows the participants’ probability estimates in the study conditions.  
 Graphic 2 shows the Probability x Condition interaction.  
 
                                                          
25  The three dummy variables were the following:  
condition 1: you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses);  
condition 2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses);  
condition 3: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses).   
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Graphic 1. Means (with SD in bars) of participants’ probability estimates as a function of 
the study conditions (PG= problem gamblers; NPG=non-problem gamblers). 
 
Condition 1: you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). Condition 2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
Condition 3: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses); Control: you(3wins+3losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
 
 
 
Graphic 2: Means (with SD in bars) of the two probability estimates as a function of the Condition x 
Probability interaction  
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Control Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Control
NPG 53,75 51,35 51,25 54,68 46 41,02 48,88 46,5
PG 56,05 45,75 47,35 50,37 44,98 44,55 47,97 41,45
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Probability estimates
You PC
 
 
46 
 
Condition 1: you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). Condition 2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
Condition 3: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses); Control: you(3wins+3losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
 
To investigate whether the participants perceived you probability and pc probability 
as complementary or independent from each other as a function of experimental conditions 
and gambling status, three chi-squares were performed on the following variables, calculated 
ad hoc:  a) the number of cases where the sum of the two probabilities in percentage was 
equal to 100 (i.e. for which the two probabilities were complementary); b) the number of 
cases where each of the two probabilities was equal to 50 (i.e. those giving correct 
probabilities); c) the number of cases where the sum of the two probabilities was different 
from 100 (i.e. for which the two probabilities were independent from each other)26. None of 
the results was statistically significant: neither the experimental condition nor the gambling 
status affected participants’ conceptions of probability27. In graphic 3 the distribution of the 
three types of probability conceptions in function of the independent variables were reported.  
 
                                                          
26  Note that the cases in group b) were a sub-category of those in the group a) and that the sum of the 
cases in groups a) and c) was equal to the totality of participants. 
27 Complementary probability estimates: χ2 (3) = .125, p = .989; Correct probability estimates: χ2 (3) 
= .276, p = .965; Independent probability estimates: χ2 (3) = .276, p = .965. 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Control
YOU probability 54,9 48,55 49,3 52,52
PC probability 45,48 42,78 48,42 43,97
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Graphic 3. Distribution of the three types of probability conceptions in function of the independent 
variables:  
 
Legenda: PG = problem gamblers; NPG = non-problem gamblers. C1 = Condition1: 
you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses); C2 = Condition2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses); C3 = Condition 3: 
you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses); C = Control condition: you(3wins+3losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
 
Choice 
In order to assess the incidence of the two independent variables on the participants’ 
preference for the agent performing the choice of the slot colour at the thirteenth round, a 4 
(condition: 1 vs 2 vs 3 vs control) x 2 (gambling status: problem gamblers vs. non-problem 
gamblers) between-subject ANOVA was performed. Choice was coded as a dummy variable 
(1 = personal choice; 0 = computer choice); so, ANOVA was performed on the proportion of 
the personal choices. 
Graphic 4 shows the distribution of the personal choices made by the two participants’ groups 
at the 13th round. 
C1 C2 C3 C C1 C2 C3 C C1 C2 C3 C
PG 28 22 21 24 16 14 18 18 12 18 11 16
NPG 30 21 28 25 22 13 21 22 10 19 12 15
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Graphic 4. Percentage (with SD in bars) of the personal choices as a function of the study conditions  
(PG= problem gamblers; NPG= non-problem gamblers).
 
Condition 1: you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). Condition 2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
Condition 3: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses); Control: you(3wins+3losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). 
No statistically significant effects emerged from the results: independently of the study 
conditions, the personal choice was always predominant. The same results were obtained from 
ANCOVA. 
 
Bet amount 
To assess the incidence of the two independent variables on the bets carried out by 
participants, a 4 (condition: 1 vs 2 vs 3 vs control) x 2 (gambling status: problem gamblers 
vs non-problem gamblers) between-subjects ANOVA was performed. The dependent 
variable was the bet amount.  
Graphic 5 shows the participants’ bets in the study conditions. 
Graphic 5. Means (with SD in bars) of participants’ bets as a function of the study conditions. 
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Condition 1: you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). Condition 2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses). Condition 
3: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses); Control: you(3wins+3losses)+pc(3wins+3losses).  
 
Results revealed a main effect of the Gambling status, F1.312 = 19.196; p < .001; pη² = 
.058: problem gamblers, regardless of experimental conditions, betting more (5.57) than non- 
problem gamblers (4.53). They also revealed a main effect of the condition, F 3,3129 = 3.419; 
p = .05; pη² = .032. LSD pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the control 
condition bet more (5.57) than those in the conditions 2 (4.71) and 3 (4.67), where personal 
choices were predominantly losing. No difference was found between the control condition 
and the condition 1 (5.26), in which personal choices were predominantly winning. Similar 
results were found with the ANCOVA. 
 
 
 
Effect of the experimental conditions on the choice via probability estimates 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3 Control
Problem Gamblers 5,73 5,4 5,1 6,08
Non-problem gamblers 4,8 4,03 4,25 5,07
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To investigate whether the experimental condition affected the choice via probability 
estimates, a mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro28 (model 4) for SPSS (Hayes, 
2013) was performed. This analysis was carried out despite the ANOVA results, showing the 
absence of any significant effects of the independent variables on the agent choice, in order 
to test a possible suppression effect of probability estimates withdrawing the relationship 
between the experimental conditions and the agent choice.  
The multicategorical independent variable (IV) was coded as three dummy variables 
(Condition 1 = 1; other conditions = 0 / Condition 2 = 1; other conditions = 0 / Condition 3 = 
1; other conditions = 0) with control condition as reference category29. Since the probability 
estimate was a within-subjects variable (you probability and pc probability), the probability 
delta was calculated, by subtracting pc probability from you probability, and introduced as 
potential mediator (M) (Montoya & Hayes, 2017). The choice, coded in a dummy variable (1 
= personal choice; 0 = computer choice), was the dependent variable (DV). As Process macro 
as well as Mplus structural equation models do not allow performing a moderated mediation 
analysis with a multicategorical independent variable, gambling status, coded in a dummy 
variable (1 = problem gamblers; 0 = non-problem gamblers), was entered into the analysis as 
covariate, rather than as a moderator.  
The macro uses bootstrapping method for estimating indirect effects (i.e. the effect of 
intervenient or mediating variables); 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals were calculated 
through 5000 bootstrap samples. 
Results showed that Condition 3 affected the probability delta: compared to the Control 
Condition, in Condition 3 probability delta decreased (B= -7.675; SE = 3.1396; t = -2.4446; 
p <.05). In line with mixed ANOVA’s results, in Condition 3, where the participants' choices 
were mainly losing while those of the computer were mainly winning, the difference between 
the two probabilities decreased, while in the other two conditions it did not differ from the 
control one. The total effects that the IV and the covariates exerted on the choice were not 
significant, in line with the mixed ANOVA results. However, when also the putative mediator 
                                                          
28 The macro is retrievable from http://afhayes.com/spss-sas-andmplus-macros-and-code.html 
29  The three dummy variables were the following:  
condition 1: you(4wins+2losses)+pc(3wins+3losses);  
condition 2: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(3wins+3losses);  
condition 3: you(2wins+4losses)+pc(4wins+2losses).  
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(probability delta) was included in the regression equation in order to assess the direct effect 
of IV on DV, the coefficient of Condition 3 increased (B = .2565) compared to that in the 
total effect model (B= .0603), while the coefficients of Condition 1 and Condition 2 remained 
analogous. So, as supposed, the effect exerted by probability delta (B = .0274; SE = .0078; z 
= 3.5263; p < .000) was a suppression effect rather than a mediation effect (MacKinnon et al. 
2000), since its inclusion strengthened the relationship between IV and DV rather than 
weakened it, as does a mediator. In fact the indirect effect that Condition 3 exerted on choice 
via probability delta (B = -.2103; SE = .1008, 95% CI = -.4726, -.0581) had a negative sign30, 
opposite to the positive sign of the direct effect (B = .2565; SE = .3564, z = .7198; p = .4716; 
95% CI = -.4419, .955) (MacKinnon et al. 2000). So, the opposite directions of direct and 
indirect effects strongly weakened the total effect of Condition 3 on personal choices 
compared to that of the control condition.  
The mediation analyses considering in the model also the BSSS and BIS-11 scores as 
covariates showed analogous results. 
 
Effect of the experimental conditions on the bet amount via probability estimates and choice  
To investigate whether the experimental conditions affected the bet amount via 
probability estimates and choice, two separate analyses were needed. As neither Process 
macro nor Mplus structural equation models allow a dichotomous mediator (i.e. choice), the 
following analyses were performed: a first mediation analysis to test whether the experimental 
conditions affected the bet amount via probability estimates, and a multiple regression 
analysis, in which choice was included among predictors.  
The mediation analysis was similar to the one above described: the only difference was 
that the dependent variable  (bet amount) was continuous, not dichotomous. The effect of the 
IV on the probability delta was already described: compared to the reference category (i.e. 
control condition) in the Condition 3 probability delta decreased. The total effects of the IV 
                                                          
30 The negative sign of the indirect effect (i.e. the product of the effects of IV on M and of M on DV) 
was due to the fact that in Condition 3 the probability delta (M) was reduced compared to the Control 
Condition (and the other conditions), whereas the increase of probability delta (M) increased personal 
choice.  
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and the covariates were in line with those emerged from ANOVA: compared to the control 
condition, bet amount decreased in Condition 2 (B = -.8625; SE = .3337; t = -2.5849; p < .05) 
and in Condition 3 (B = -.9000; SE = .3337; t = -2.6972; p < .005); problem gamblers bet 
more than non-problem gamblers (B = 1.0375; SE = .2359; t = 4.3972; p < .000). When also 
probability delta was entered in the regression equation to test the direct effects of IV on the 
DV, the results were the following: probability delta significantly increased the bet amount 
(B = .0132; SE = .006; t = 2.2137; p < .05); the direct effects of Condition 2 (B= -8258; SE = 
.332; t = -2.487; p < .05) and Condition 3 (B= -7989; SE = .3348; t = -2.3865; p < .05) still 
remained significant but the effect of Condition 3 slightly decreased compared to the total 
one, consistent with a partial mediation effect of probability delta31. In fact, Condition 3 
exerted an indirect negative effect on the bet amount through probability delta (B = -.1011; 
SE = .0678; 95% CI = -.2775, -.0068), with the same sign as that of the direct effect. Although 
Conditions 2 and 3 directly (i.e. after controlling for the probability delta) affected the bet 
amount by diminishing it, part of the effect of Condition 3 was exerted indirectly, through the 
mediation of probability delta.   
Subsequently, a multiple linear regression was performed entering the three dummy 
Conditions, gambling status, delta probability and choice as predictors of the bet amount. The 
results showed that, in line with previous analysis, compared to the Control Condition, 
Condition 2 (B= -.817; SE= .328; t= -2.488; p < .05) and Condition 3 (B= -.837; SE= .331; 
t= -2.527; p < .05) decreased the bet amount and that problem gamblers bet more than non-
problem gamblers (B= 1.023; SE= .232; t= 4.4; p < .000). However, the effect of delta 
probability was no longer significant (B= .01; SE= .006; t= 1.579; p = .115), whereas choice 
increased significantly the bet amount (B= .77; SE= .266; t= 2.895; p < .005). These results 
revealed that the inclusion of choice in the regression equation faded the effect of delta 
probability, suggesting that the latter could exert its effect on bet amount via choice. However, 
since it was not possible to test a mediational model with two mediators in series (because 
choice was a dichotomous variable), the putative indirect effect of probability delta on the bet 
amount trough choice was not assessed. It should be noted that the coefficients of Condition 
2 and 3 in the last multiple regression, in which also choice was entered, were similar to those 
                                                          
31 The direct effect of gambling status de was similar to the total one (B= 1.011; SE = .2348; t = 
4.3057; p < .000). 
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of the mediational model without choice, thus indicating the probable absence of mediation 
exerted by this variable. 
Once again, the analyses conducted by introducing also the BSSS and BIS-11 scores as 
covariates in the model showed the same effects above reported.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
 The present study investigated the putative existence of the illusion of control in 
problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers, examining whether previous outcomes 
associated with personal and random choices in a gambling task influenced (i) the winning 
probability estimate linked to personal or random choice of the next event to bet on, (ii) the 
selection of the choice-agent, and (iii) the bet amount. A specific aim of the study was to 
examine whether problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers behaved in similar or 
different ways in relation to such factors. As it has been written in the overview of the study, 
contrasting hypotheses concerning the study goals were tested.  
 More specifically, it was expected that if participants were prone to the illusion of 
control they should believe that, choosing personally the color on which to bet, they should 
have more possibilities to win compared to the random choice made by the computer. If they 
were not affected by the illusion of control but only preferred personal agency, the probability 
estimates would be correct but the predominant choice would be the personal one. If they 
were subject to the influence of previous outcomes, then they should believe that the winning 
probability associated with the personal choice and with the computer-made choice varied 
depending on experimental conditions: so, they should prefer to choose themselves in the 
condition in which personal choices are predominantly winning and let the computer choose 
in the conditions where the computer choices are predominantly winning.   
Concerning the hypotheses on betting, it was expected that if the bet amount varied in function 
of the experimental conditions (i.e. it increased following the “winning” conditions and 
decreased following the “losing” ones), people would be subject to the influence of previous 
outcomes. On the contrary, betting more in case of overestimation of winning probabilities 
linked to personal choices would be an index of illusion of control. Also betting more after 
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personal choice (without overestimating personal winning probabilities) was considered an 
indicator of the illusion of control, since such behaviour suggested that positive outcomes 
were expected by personal rather than random choices.  
Finally, in conformity with several evidences in the literature, it was expected that 
problem gamblers were more prone than non-problem gamblers to the illusion of control and 
that problem gamblers and the participants scoring higher on sensation-seeking and/or 
impulsivity scales would made higher bets. 
The results pointed out that the participants, regardless of their gambling status, 
showed both a preference for agency and the illusion of control. Indeed, in conformity with 
the preference for agency hypothesis, in all experimental conditions, regardless of the number 
of wins and losses due to the personal or computer choices, people preferred to choose 
personally the colour on which to bet instead of entrusting the choice to chance. In addition, 
in line with the illusion of control hypothesis, in almost all conditions, the participants tend 
to attribute higher winning probabilities to the personal choice than the one left to the 
computer. The only exception is represented by the condition in which the personal choices 
mostly resulted in losses whereas the ones made by the computer were mainly winnings 
(Condition 3), where the two probability estimates are analogous. In this case, the participants 
seemed to show a preference for agency rather than the illusion of control. In fact, in this 
condition, the connection between an action and its outcome, and the intention to achieve the 
expected outcome - that is, the two features that according to Thompson et al. (1998; 2004) 
underlie the control heuristic - seem to be absent. Consequently, the connection between one's 
actions and the desired outcome (winning) is not perceived. However, in the condition where 
personal choices mostly resulted in losses, whereas the ones made by the computer were 
balanced between wins and losses (Condition 2), the connection is still perceived, proving the 
strength of the illusion of control32.  
The picture so far described becomes more complex in the light of the results emerged 
by the mediational model performed to investigate the relationship between experimental 
conditions, the winning probability estimates attributed to oneself and to computer, and the 
selection of the choice-agent. On the one hand, the results showed that the higher the 
                                                          
32 A result that raises doubts about this interpretation will be discussed later, concerning the bet 
amount. 
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difference between the two probability estimates, the more frequent were personal choices 
than the computer-entrusted ones. On the other, they revealed that concerning Condition 3, 
where the difference between the two winning probability estimates (compared to the other 
conditions) reduced, the probability delta (i.e. the difference between the winning 
probabilities attributed to personal choice and those attributed to computer random choice) 
had a suppression effect on the relationship between such condition and the choice. When this 
effect is not controlled for, the total effect of Condition 3 on choice is weakened and becomes 
analogous to those of the other experimental conditions. 
The results of the analyses conducted on the bet amounts partly question the extent of 
the illusion of control, or at least, the extent of its effect on decision-making. In fact, the 
participants bet less in conditions 2 and 3, where personal choices were predominantly losing, 
than in control condition, where personal and computer choices were equally distributed in 
wins and losses. As regards the condition 3, the mediation analysis showed that this effect 
was partly mediated by the probability delta decrease in such condition. Overall, the results 
of the mediation analysis and of the multiple regression, in which the effect of all predictors 
(conditions, gambling status, delta probability, impulsivity and sensation-seeking scores, age, 
and choice) on the better amount was assessed, showed two effects going in opposite 
directions: personal choice (through which the effect of probability delta was exerted)33 
increased the bet amount, whereas conditions 2 and 3 (where personal choices were 
predominantly losing) decreased it. So, these findings suggest that people are prone to the 
illusion of control from a cognitive point of view (i.e. in estimating winning probabilities), 
whereas are also influenced by previous outcomes from a behavioral point of view (i.e. in 
deciding how much to bet). This finding is in line with the studies (e.g. Charness & Gneezy, 
2010; Grou & Tabak, 2008) showing that the preference for agency did not entail increased 
bet amounts: in case of personal selection, participants’ bets did not differ from the ones made 
when it was the experimenter who selected the numbers on which to bet. Moreover it is also 
in line with the study of Chau and Phillips (1995), conducted on a sample of non-problem 
                                                          
33 Although the data features impeded to test a three-path mediational model with two mediators 
(probability delta and choice) in series, the results of multiple regression analysis suggest that the 
probability delta affected the bet amount through personal choice.  
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gamblers, where participants adjusted their bet size in a computer blackjack according to the 
previous outcomes. 
 In the present study, the differences due to the gambling status were that problem 
gamblers bet more than non-problem gamblers and that problem gamblers scored higher than 
non- problem gamblers on the sensation-seeking and impulsivity scales. Nevertheless no 
effect has been exerted by the two personality scales on any of the dependent variables and 
no difference has been found between the two groups regarding the proneness to the illusion 
of control. So, one must acknowledge that the results of this study do not corroborate the 
widely shared assumptions that problem gamblers are particularly prone to cognitive 
distortions, such as the illusion of control, and that specific personality factors, such as higher 
levels of impulsivity and sensation-seeking, make people more subject to the illusion of 
control and to related behaviors, such as the increase in bet amount (Davis et al., 2000; 
Griffiths, 1994; Lim et al. 2015; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Michalczuk et al. 2011; Miller 
& Currie, 2008; Myrseth et al. 2010; Nower et al., 2004; Petry, 2001; Romo et al., 2016). 
However the only study that, to my knowledge, compared the extent of the illusion of control 
in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers with a contingency judgment task (Orgaz, 
Estévez, & Matute, 2013) found that problem gamblers overestimated their control more than 
non-problem gamblers but that the behaviour of the two groups in decision-making did not 
differ. 
Finally, it should be noted that asking participants to estimate the winning probabilities 
attributed both to personal and the computer choice has allowed to establish that, regardless 
of experimental conditions and gambling status, only 207 participants out of 320 considered 
the two probabilities complementary (and only 144 evaluated them correctly), while the 
remaining 113 considered the two probabilities as reciprocally independent.  
To the best of my knowledge, no previous study investigated the winning probability 
estimates associated with the two options of agent-choice in problem gamblers and non-
problem gamblers. Even in Dixon’s study (2000) where, at the end of the game session, 
problem gamblers were asked to estimate the winning probabilities, both whether the choice 
was made personally and by the experimenter, the overestimation of winning probabilities 
was in function of the presentation of accurate/inaccurate information. However, the (small) 
sample of problem gamblers was not compared to a control one.  
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In conclusion, as mentioned before, in the present study participants’ bets were more 
dependent from previous outcomes rather than probability estimates. Such results suggests 
that people, regardless of their gambling status, seem to be keener on taking into account past 
experiences from a behavioral point of view, rather than a cognitive one.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy in problem gamblers and non-problem 
gamblers 
 
 Gambling involves a succession of independent events. Sequences of lottery 
extractions, roulette draws or slot machine games are prototypes of random events unrelated 
from one other. However, numerous studies showed that people, when asked to make 
predictions on random sequences of events, may ignore the mutual independence relationship 
between them (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, Kahneman, & Tversky, 1972, Gilovich, Vallone 
and Tversky, 1985; Xue et al., 2012; Studer, Limbrick-Oldfield & Clark, 2015). In these 
cases, people mistakenly believe that a random sequence of events may influence the outcome 
of the next ones. Such beliefs can give rise to two opposite phenomena. 
The first is the gambler’s fallacy (or Monte Carlo’s fallacy), i.e. the belief that a 
succession of identical cases will be followed by an opposite event (negative recency). This 
phenomenon was discovered in the studies on the perception of randomness (Tversky and 
Kahneman,1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Wagenaar, 1972) where people, in 
recognizing and generating random sequences (heads or tails in a “flip of a coin”), preferred 
sequences not having a long series of the same outcome or sequences in which randomness 
was equated by balancing event frequencies.  
As opposed to the gambler’s fallacy, the hot hand fallacy is the belief that events 
correlate positively between them. In this case, people expect an outcome to be in line with 
the previous sequence of events (positive recency) instead of being opposed to it. This 
phenomenon was observed for the first time by Gilovich et al. (1985), who showed that people 
predicted that basketball players, after 5 consecutive winning scores, would score on the next 
throw, as they believed the player had, in fact, the "hot hand". 
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3.1. Theoretical interpretations and empirical evidence 
 
Although the two fallacies rely on opposite predictions (on the one hand, the inversion 
and, on the other, the continuation of outcomes), both of them have been theoretically 
associated with the heuristics of representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman, 
& Tversky, 1972; Rabin, 2002) and the law of small numbers. According to this hypothesis, 
people expect even a short random sequence to be representative of the event distribution in 
wider random sequences. Therefore, in the case of the gambler's fallacy, in front of a sequence 
of identical events that does not reproduce the personal representation of randomness, people 
tend to believe that in the future this sequence will be balanced by events of the opposite 
outcome. Differently, in the case of the hot hand fallacy, in front of a sequence of events that 
do not match own randomness expectation, people tend to attribute it to the agent's ability (to 
his "hot hand") instead of recognizing it as random.  
However, a wide corpus of research, mainly conducted with healthy individuals, has 
attempted to disentangle the factors responsible for the occurrence of one or the other fallacy. 
Nevertheless, to date, explanatory hypotheses and empirical evidence are discordant. Ayton 
& Fisher (2004) assumed that the expectation about the nature of events could be the 
discriminating factor between the two fallacies. According to this assumption, events related 
to human performance would be more controllable and less casual than inanimate events; 
therefore, the first ones would elicit the hot hand fallacy while the second ones the gambler’s 
fallacy. In the first experiment, participants were asked to make predictions on the outcomes 
of a random binary sequence (red and black on a computerized roulette) and to indicate the 
level of confidence in the success of their predictions. The results showed that they made 
predictions in line with the gambler's fallacy, and that confidence levels increased with the 
number of predictions having a positive outcome. In the second experiment, participants were 
presented with three sets of events, each consisting of a series of binary sequences varying in 
recency, and were asked to identify, for each set, the type of processes - human skilled 
performance vs. random sequence - to which the events belonged. According with the 
authors’ predictions, participants attributed the sequences with fewer alternations to human 
performance, while those with greater alternation to random processes. 
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Similarly, the study by Burns & Corpus (2004) showed that predictions about future 
events were in line with the gamblers’ fallacy or the hot hand fallacy as a function of the 
perceived randomness of the scenarios in which those events were embedded. In this study, 
the degree of randomness of several scenarios was manipulated and, for each of them, 
participants were asked to predict the next event between two possible ones, to estimate the 
probability that this event would represent the continuation of a sequence, and to indicate (on 
a 6-point scale) the degree of randomness of that event. The results showed that the more 
participants perceived the scenarios as random, the more their responses were in line with the 
gambler’s fallacy; on the contrary, when scenarios were perceived as less dependent on the 
chance, responses tended to be conform to the hot hand’s fallacy. 
Previously, three studies of Boynton (2003) indicated that the occurrence of the hot 
hand fallacy vs. the gambler’s fallacy was associated, respectively, with prior successes or 
failures in predicting future events in a sequence. For example, in the experiment 2, 
participants were presented with a binary sequence of two symbols (a red circle or a blue 
square), in which the pattern of the last three outcomes was varied as a function of the number 
of occurrences of the same outcome. In 100 trials, participants had to guess which symbol 
would appear on the computer screen and to indicate the confidence level in their predictions. 
Moreover, in the experiment 3, they also had to provide randomness judgments about the 
sequence. Overall, the results showed that, regardless of randomness judgements, the 
predictions were related to the success or failure in the previous trial and were not influenced 
by a preference for either of the two stimuli. They suggested a "positive recency" effect (in 
line with hot hand fallacy) after successes, interpretable, from a behavioural point of view, as 
a mere tendency to repeat the reinforcement-receiving responses, therefore producing a “win-
stay strategy”. On the contrary, after failures, participants did not merely adopt the opposite 
“lose-shift” strategy, but rather relied both on recency and frequency (run length) information, 
leading to the production of the gambler’s fallacy with long runs of the same outcome.  
 By stressing the different cognitive complexity of the two fallacies, these findings are in 
line with the explicative hypothesis of the two phenomena proposed by Braga et al. (2013), 
based on the cognitive load required by the processes underlying each of them. According to 
this hypothesis, the hot hand fallacy, being a simpler process based on the continuation of a 
sequence, would be related to the availability heuristic. This heuristic, relying upon 
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knowledge that is easily retrievable, would require lesser cognitive resources than the 
representativeness heuristics, which demands a judgment of similarity between an event and 
a category, and which has been considered at the basis of the gambler's fallacy, where an 
overturn is expected. In their study, the cognitive load was manipulated by varying the degree 
of time pressure under which participants had to make a choice (predicting the outcome of a 
binary sequence as a coin flip). The results showed that participants predicted, in line with the 
hot hand fallacy, a continuation of the sequence under strong pressure, and, in line with the 
gambler’s fallacy, more alterations in conditions of lower temporal pressure.  
 A somewhat different interpretation had been proposed by Caruso et al. (2010) 
according to which predictions about the next event in a sequence depends on the degree of 
perceived intentionality of the agent generating the sequence: the more a sequence is 
perceived as intentional, the more people predict its continuation. In the first experiment, the 
participants were informed that a sequence of dice throw had been performed by a 
professional player (intentional condition) or by chance (unintentional condition) and had to 
predict the next outcome. The results showed that participants in the intentional condition 
predicted a continuation of the sequence more frequently than those who assessed in the 
unintentional condition. In the second experiment, craps sequences ending with a series of 
identical or random outcomes were presented via video in a counterbalanced order. The 
results revealed that participants instructed to focus on the agent's purpose (intention 
condition) made predictions in line with the hot hand fallacy, while those instructed to focus 
on physical movements (action condition) tended to make predictions in line with the 
gambler’s fallacy. The other two experiments showed that the participants more prone to 
represent actions in terms of intentions (third experiment) or to attribute mental states to 
inanimate agents (fourth experiment) predicted more likely the continuation of a sequence to 
be more likely. Moreover, this study showed that the perception of intentionality also affected 
the probability estimate of the next event in a series. In the first experiment, after the 
presentation of a manipulated sequence of 12 dice rolls (ending with three consecutive 
outcomes of the winning number), participants were asked to predict the next outcome and to 
indicate (on a 7-point Likert scale) the probability of each die face being extracted. The 
participants in the "intentional condition" overestimated the extraction probability of the 
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winning number whereas those in the control condition did not. 
A different interpretation of the two fallacies derives from the evolutionary perspective 
(Wilke & Barrett, 2009; Scheibehenne et al., 2011; Wilke et al., 2014). According to this 
perspective, the hot hand phenomenon would be, rather than a fallacy, an evolved default 
assumption that environmental resources tend to be distributed in clumps rather than 
randomly. On the other hand, the gambler’s fallacy would take place within a system 
involving resource depletion (Wilke & Barrett, 2009). The empirical support about the 
evolutionary basis of the hot hand phenomenon derives from the Wilke & Barrett’s (2009) 
study, where two groups belonging to different populations (American students and Shuar 
residents) predicted the presence/absence of natural (fruits, bird's nests) and artificial (car 
parks, bus stops, flip a coin) resources in random binary sequences. Although the predictions 
of both groups showed a "positive recency" effect over all types of resources (with more 
robust effects on natural resources), this effect was reduced into the coin flip predictions of 
the Americans’ group that, unlike the Shuar residents, was familiar with the casual properties 
of this game. 
To my knowledge, no direct investigation about the gamblers’ fallacy has been carried 
out from this perspective.  
Instead, the studies performed by varying the length of a run found more evidence for 
the gamblers’ fallacy than for the hot hand fallacy.  For example, in the field study of Dohmen 
et al. (2009) conducted on a sample of 1000 subjects living in Germany, participants were 
invited to imagine a sequence of eight coin flips and to estimate the probability of occurrence 
of an outcome opposite to the last imagined. The results showed that about 21% overestimated 
the probability of occurrence of the opposite event (in line with gambler’s fallacy), while 
about 9% indicated a probability estimate below 50% (in line with the hot hand fallacy). The 
correct probability estimates were provided by about 60% of participants.  
More recently, Studer et al. (2015) presented participants with a computerized roulette 
consisting of two colors. After varying the length of a sequence of identical outcomes, 
participants were asked to predict the next outcome and to express the level of confidence in 
their choice. In line with the gambler’s fallacy, the choice of an outcome identical to the last 
presented reduced as a function of the run length. In addition, confidence in their choices also 
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increased as a function of the length of the sequence, with the highest levels associated with 
the choices in line with the gambler’s fallacy. Instead, regardless of the sequence length, 
confidence levels were higher after a win than after a loss. Finally, when participants, after 
predicting the next outcome, were required to bet on its occurrence (instead of indicating the 
confidence level in their own choices), they made more sizeable bets when choosing the color 
different from that of the run (in line with the gambler’s fallacy). 
Finally, a study of Matarazzo and colleagues (2017) investigated whether a winning 
sequence of identical outcomes induced one of the two fallacies and their relationship with 
probability estimates and proneness to bet. After the presentation of a run of same events 
(high or low cards) involving a payout, participants were asked to indicate the choice of the 
card on which to bet, the probability estimate and how much to bet on the occurrence of such 
choice. Despite the presentation of a winning sequence of outcomes, participants’ choices 
were mainly based on a preference (for high cards) rather than on the hot hand fallacy. They 
chose a card different to the last presented only when the run with the same outcome 
increased, in line with gambler’s fallacy. In addition, as the card sequence presented did not 
affect the probability estimates, choice and probability seem to be two independent processes. 
Finally, the choice of the card was not related to the bet size, which depended on subjective 
winning probabilities.  
 
3.2. The gambler’s fallacy and the hot hand fallacy in problem gamblers 
 
Whereas the abovementioned studies were performed with non-gambler participants, 
the following ones have been conducted with problem gamblers, in an attempt to investigate 
whether they were more prone to the two fallacies than non-problem gamblers. Clotfelter & 
Cook (1991) examined gamblers' bets at the Maryland State lottery during the extraction of 
52 numbers. The results showed that gamblers acted in line with the gambler’s fallacy, since 
the day after a number was extracted, the bets on that number diminished. Moreover, the bets 
on the drawn numbers tended to decrease in the three days following the extraction and to 
return to their average level after 84 days. Terrell (1994) obtained similar results through the 
New Jersey State Lottery’s betting analysis.  
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The field studies conducted by Croson & Sundali (2005) and by Sundali & Croson 
(2006), investigating bets made in a casino in the state of Nevada, showed that roulette players 
incurred in both fallacies, also at an individual level. In fact, players who tended to bet on 
numbers that had not previously appeared (in line with the gambler’s fallacy) also tended to 
bet on numbers that had recently won (in line with the hot hand fallacy34). Moreover, the 
number and the amount of bets tended to increase after winning.  
Also Suetens et al. (2015), in a study on betting on Danish Lotto, found gamblers to be 
affected by both fallacies. In line with the gambler’s fallacy, they bet to a lesser extent on the 
numbers drawn during the previous week but, in line with the hot hand fallacy, they also 
tended to bet more steadily on the numbers that had been more frequently extracted in the 
past. 
From an evolutionary perspective, Wilke et al. (2014) presented to experienced adult 
gamblers and to control group (adults having only little gambling experience) two fictitious 
slot machines generating a binary sequence of symbols, one of which was a completely casual 
sequence while the other was a quite negatively autocorrelated sequence, exhibiting higher 
alternation probability. Participants could choose, at each trial, which of the two slot machines 
to bet on by guessing the next symbol. After every bet, participants received feedback about 
their predictions and earned some money for every correct prediction. The results showed that 
gamblers preferred to bet on the random sequence, which allowed to perceive more illusory 
patterns (in particular the positive recency effect), rather than on the sequence quite negatively 
autocorrelated, which instead allowed to earn more money by following a win-shift lose-stay 
strategy. The control group did not show any preference for one or the other sequence.  
Moreover, problem and pathological gamblers and non-gamblers also differed in the 
cognitive strategies used in betting. Although in both groups the "win-stay lose-switch" 
strategy (appropriate in positively autocorrelated sequences, not in the negatively correlated 
                                                          
34 Sundali & Croson (2006) Sundali & Croson (2006) proposed to define as hot-outcome the 
phenomenon opposite to the gambler’s fallacy. For example, after three black numbers appeared on 
the roulette wheel, people would believe that another black number would be more likely to appear 
than a red one, because the black numbers would be hot. So, differently from the hot hand fallacy, in 
this case the outcome (and not the individual, or his/her hand) would be hot. 
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ones) prevailed, gamblers tended to apply it across both sequences, whereas non-gamblers 
applied it only in the random sequence.  
 
3.3. Gamblers’ fallacy, hot hand fallacy, probability estimate, and betting in 
problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers 
 
From a review of the literature, it seems that the studies with problem gamblers and 
non-problem gamblers have been conducted with quite different goals and research 
paradigms. 
On the one hand, the studies carried out with problem gamblers mainly rely on data 
such as number and size of the wagers placed on a particular outcome (Clotfelter & Cook, 
1991; Terrell, 1994; Croson & Sundali, 2005; Sundali & Croson, 2006; Suetens et al., 2015), 
implicitly hypothesizing an overestimation of the probability of the expected event. On the 
other hand, the experimental procedures employed in non- problem gamblers studies have 
mainly utilized the "what's next?" paradigm. As described, such a procedure requires, after 
varying the length of a sequence of identical outcomes, that participants predict the outcome 
of the next event (e.g. Ayton & Fisher, 2004; Xue et al., 2012; Braga et al., 2013) and 
eventually indicate the level of confidence in their own choice (Boynton, 2003; Clark et al., 
2014; Studer et al., 2015). Only in some studies (Burns & Corpus, 2004; Dohmen et al., 2009; 
Caruso et al., 2010; Navarrete & Santamaria, 2011; Matarazzo et al., 2017), participants were 
explicitly required to estimate the probability of a target event. In other studies (Roney & 
Trick, 2003; Lyons et al., 2013; Marmurek et al., 2015; Studer et al., 2015), after varying the 
run length of identical outcomes, participants were asked to predict the next event and to bet 
on its occurrence, without explicitly estimating its probability35.  
Actually, there are a few studies having simultaneously investigated the multiple 
factors underlying the two fallacies. For example, Burns & Corpus (2004) required to predict 
the next outcome and to estimate its probability of occurrence, but the two indices were 
                                                          
35 These studies showed that the highest bets were positively correlated with the choices made in line 
with the gambler’s fallacy (but see Lyons et al., 2013). 
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separately analysed. Navarrete & Santamaria (2011) asked to estimate the winning probability 
when betting on a particular color in a roulette wheel36. Studer and colleagues (2015) asked 
to predict the next outcome in a series, to indicate the level of choice confidence, or the wager 
size.  
Finally, to the best of my knowledge, so far only the study of Wilke and colleagues 
(2014) has compared the performance of problem gamblers and non- problem gamblers with 
regards to the occurrence of the two phenomena. 
The present study aims to extend our previous work (Matarazzo et al., 2017) by 
comparing decision-making of problem gamblers and non- problem gamblers in an 
experimental setting designed to induce both fallacies.  
 
Overview of the present study 
 
The present study aimed to investigate, in problem gamblers and non-problem 
gamblers, the occurrence of the gambler’s fallacy (or the hot-hand fallacy) and its relationship 
with probability estimates of the next outcome and the bet amount in a fictitious roulette game.  
Specifically, the study pursued the following goals: 1) To investigate whether a series 
of identical outcomes in a roulette wheel would induce the gambler’s fallacy or the hot-hand 
fallacy; 2) to assess whether the induced fallacy was linked to an increase in the probability 
estimates and in the bet amount; 3) to assess whether such effects were present to a different 
extent in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers and whether impulsivity and 
sensation-seeking affected the participants’ responses. 
To this end, it was created a quasi-experiment involving a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects 
design, with three independent variables, two of which (run length and run colour) were 
manipulated, whereas the third (gambling status) was not. 
                                                          
36 In this study, the roulette set (i.e the number of available colors of the pocket to bet on) was varied. 
The results showed that when the task complexity increased, participants less incurred in the 
gambler’s fallacy and provided more accurate probability estimates. 
 
 
67 
In each experimental condition, participants were invited to take part in a fictitious 
American roulette game (modified ad hoc, by excluding the two green slots associated with 
0 and 00), consisting of an equal number of red (50%) and black (50%) slots where the white 
ball could land.  
They were presented with a fictional random sequence of twelve ball throws, in which 
the ball could land on a red or a black slot.  At the thirteenth and final round, participants were 
asked to estimate, in percentage terms, which probability the ball had to land in a slot of a 
different colour than in the previous round, and which probability it had to land on the 
identical colour. Then, they were asked to choose which colour they would bet on and, finally, 
how much they would bet. 
Actually, the outcomes of the first 12 rounds were not random but predetermined in 
order to present, in each condition, a specific outcome sequence differing from the others in 
its final part. More specifically, in two conditions, the sequence ended with the last four 
throws having the same colour (four red or four black); instead, in the other two (i.e. control) 
conditions, only the last outcome had a different colour (red or black) from the previous one.  
The hypotheses underpinning the study were the following: 
If the manipulation were successful, then in the two conditions with long runs (4 last 
outcomes with red or black colour) one or the other fallacy should be induced. More 
specifically, since the presented sequences were composed of random events not associated 
with either wins or losses or with intentional actions, we expected the induction of the 
gambler’s fallacy rather than the hot hand fallacy (Ayton & Fisher, 2004; Boynton, 2003; 
Caruso et al., 2010; Sundali & Croson, 2006). In the control conditions, no fallacy was 
expected: so, the participants’ choices should be random.  
In addition, if one or the other fallacy were based on the probability estimate about the 
future occurrence of the chosen event, there should be a causal relationship between the two 
variables: in the two fallacy-inducing conditions, the participants should choose the colour 
slot whose probability had been overestimated. Furthermore, if the bet amount were based on 
the probability estimates of winning, there should be a relationship between probability 
estimates, choice of slot colour on which to bet, and bet amount. A main effect was also 
expected between the two participants’ groups: all conditions being equal, problem gamblers 
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should incur more than non-problem gamblers in one of the fallacies, and should make more 
sizable bets.   
Finally, it was expected that participants scoring higher on sensation seeking and 
impulsivity should made higher bets.  
Two indices of fallacy, the probability estimate of each of the two outcomes (red or 
black slot) and the choice of the outcome on which to bet, were used in order to explicitly test 
whether the choice was based on erroneous evaluations of probability, i.e. on cognitive 
processes, or on the preference for a colour rather than another, i.e. on affective processes. 
Moreover, the probability estimates were requested before the choice of the outcome which 
to bet on in order to prevent the possibility that participants, after their choice, would 
misinterpret the questions on probabilities as questions about how much they thought they 
were lucky37. Finally, asking to estimate the percentage probability of both outcomes aimed 
to avoid that participants focused only on one outcome and to investigate whether they 
perceived the two probabilities as complementary or independent from each other. In the first 
case, their sum would be 1, in the second not.  
 
Experiment 
 
Participants  
 
The participants were the same as the other two experiments. Their features and the 
recruitment procedure were already descripted in the previous study. They signed the 
informed consent form before the experiment. 
 
Design 
The 2 x 2 x 2 quasi-experimental design involved 3 between-subjects variables: run 
length (i.e. the number of times that the same colour appeared consecutively in the final part 
                                                          
37 This possibility has been discussed in Matarazzo et al. (2017). 
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of the run: 4 times vs. 1 time), colour (i.e. one of the two slot colour on which the ball landed: 
red vs. black), and gambling status (problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers).  
The dependent variables were the probability estimates that in the next round the ball 
would land on the red slot; the probability estimates that it would land on the black slot; the 
choice of the colour slot on which to bet, and the bet amount. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The instructions informed that the present study entailed the participation in a roulette 
game with only two colours: red and black. They explained that participants would attend a 
series of 12 roulette rounds, for each of which they would see the outcome (i.e. whether the 
ball would land on red or on black slot). At the thirteen round, they would be asked to choose 
the slot colour on which they would bet, and to indicate the bet amount. They were also 
informed that at the thirteen round, a 20 chips budget would be available.  
Once they read the instructions, the participants could press the "Next" button to begin 
the experiment.  
Each of the first 12 rounds was composed of two phases. In the first one, a screen was 
presented showing a Graphics Interchange Format image of a roulette wheel rotating with a 
white ball on the inside ball track. By pressing the "Next" button, the participant went to the 
second phase in which a second screen appeared showing an image of the outcome 
accompanied by the phrase "The ball landed on a red (or black) slot". Both phases had no 
time limit. The "Next" button allowed them to switch to the next round.  
At the thirteenth and final round, participants were asked to indicate, on a scale from 
1 to 100, the probability that in the next round the ball would land on a colour different from 
that of the last round, and the probability that it would land on the same colour as last round. 
The order of the two questions was counterbalanced across participants. For example, in the 
two conditions in which the sequences ended with the ball in a red slot, the questions were 
the following: “How much do you think it is likely that the ball will land on a black slot? 
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Indicate the probability, in percentage, by typing on the keyboard a number from 1 to 100”. 
"How much do you think it is likely that the ball will lands on a red slot? Indicate the 
probability, in percentage, by typing on the keyboard a number from 1 to 100". 
Then, they were asked to choose the slot colour which to bet on (“Select Red or Black 
to indicate which colour you want bet on”). The two options were presented in a 
counterbalanced order. Finally, they had to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 10, how many chips 
they wanted to bet on their choice ("Your available budget is 20 chips. How much would you 
bet from 1 to 10?"). 
As mentioned earlier, the outcomes of the first 12 rounds were not casual but 
predetermined in such a way to create the 4 experimental conditions - 2 fallacy-inducing 
conditions and 2 control conditions - by varying run length (4 vs. 1) and series colour (red vs. 
black). In the two fallacy-inducing conditions, the outcome sequences were constructed so 
that in the last 4 rounds the ball always landed on red slots (four-red condition) or on black 
slots (four-black condition). These two different sequences were created in order to control a 
possible colour preference and to disentangle this phenomenon from one or the other fallacy. 
In the two control conditions (one-red condition vs. one-black condition), the outcomes 
sequences were constructed in such a way to seem representative of a casually generated 
sequence. At this end, it was avoided that in the first 12 rounds the ball landed more than two 
consecutive times in a slot of the same colour. Moreover, the colour of the twelfth round 
always differed from that of the eleventh round.  
The task was implemented using Survey Monkey software. Also in this experiment, 
the choice of this software was based on the possibility to support a Graphics Interchange 
Format image of a roulette wheel rotating with a ball on the inside ball track. As mentioned 
before, the experiment was not carry out online but rather in appropriate rooms provided by 
the Gambling addiction Services for all participants (problem gamblers and non-problem 
gamblers).   
The participants took about 15 minutes to complete the experiment, after which they 
were thanked. 
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As it was written in describing the study of the illusion of control, at the end of the 
three experiments, participants completed, in a counterbalanced order, BIS-11 and BSSS. 
Finally, they completed the SOGS. As I already wrote, at the end of the three experiments 
participants were carefully debriefed. During the debriefing, they were clarified about the 
research hypotheses and it was ensured that they had not suspected the study purposes during 
the experimental session.     
 
Results 
Preliminarily, the effects of the independent variables – run length (4 vs. 1), colour 
(black vs. red), and gambling status (problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) - on each 
of the three dependent variables (probability estimates of each of the two next slot colours, 
choice of the colour on which to bet, and bet amount) were tested.  
Analogously to the study on the illusion of control, the data were first analysed without 
the two covariates, i.e. the BSSS and BIS_11 scores, and then with the two covariates in order 
to examine their impact on the results. 
 
 
 
 
Probability 
In order to examine the incidence of the three independent variables on participants’ 
probability estimates, a 2 (run length: 4 vs. 1) x 2 (colour: red vs. black) x 2 (gambling status: 
problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) x 2 (probability: red and black) mixed ANOVA 
was performed. The between-subjects variables were run length, colour and gambling status. 
The within variable was the probability estimates (2 levels: red vs. black).   
Graphic 1 shows the participants’ probability estimates in the study conditions.  
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Graphic n.1: Means (with SD in bars) of participants’ probability estimates as a function of the 
study conditions (PG= problem gamblers; NPG=non-problem gamblers). 
 
 The results revealed a main effect of Gambling status F1,312 = 5.289; p < .05; pη² = 
.017: non-problem gamblers provided higher probability estimates (49,9%) than problem 
gamblers (48.3%). They also revealed two two-way interactions, gambling status x 
probability, F1,312 = 6.041; p< .05; pη² = .019, colour x probability, F1,312 =6.041; p< .05; pη² 
= .019, and two three-way interactions, run length x colour x probability, F1,312 = 6.071; p< 
.05; pη² = .019, gambling status x colour x probability, F1,312 = 3.953; p< .05; pη² = .013. The 
interactions were examined through simple effects analysis with Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparisons.  
 The gambling status x probability interaction was due to the fact that non-problem 
gamblers estimated the black probability (52.07%) to be higher than the red probability 
(47.91%), whereas problem gamblers estimated analogously the two probabilities (47.86% 
vs. 48.75%, respectively).  
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 The colour x probability interaction was due to the fact in the conditions in which 
the sequence ended with (four or one) red slot(s), participants estimated the black probability 
(51.85%) to be higher than red probability (47.69%), whereas no difference appeared when 
the final colour(s) of the sequence was/were black (48.09% for black probability vs. 48.97 for 
red probability).  
 The three-way interaction gambling status x colour x probability, in which the two-
way interactions were comprised, showed that problem gamblers, in the two conditions where 
sequences ended with (four or one) black slot(s), estimated the red probability (50.38%) to 
be higher than the black probability (44.95%), whereas no significant effect appeared when 
sequences ended with red colour (red probability = 47.11%; black probability = 50.78%). 
Conversely, non-problem gamblers, in the two conditions where sequences ended with (four 
or one) red slot(s), estimated the black probability (52.91%) to be higher than the red 
probability (48.27%), whereas no significant effect appeared when sequences ended with 
black colour (red probability = 47.56%; black probability = 51.23%). 
 The run length x colour x probability interaction revealed that in the condition in 
which the sequence ended with four red slots, the black probability (53.6%) was higher than 
the red probability (45.75%), whereas no significant difference was found in the other 
conditions (the percentage values are reported in the graphic n.3).  
 The graphic n. 2 and 3 show the gambling status x colour x probability and the run 
length x colour x probability interactions, respectively.  
Graphic 2: Means of probability estimates (with SD in bars) in the three-way Gambling status x 
Colour x Probability x interaction. 
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*p <.05; #ns 
 
Graphic 3: Means (with SD in bars) of probability estimates in the three-way Run length x Colour x 
Probability interaction. 
 
Fallacy-inducing conditions: conditions ending with four black/red slots. Control conditions: conditions ending with one 
black/red slot. 
*p<.000; #ns. 
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 The ANCOVA38 model testing the effect of the two covariates on participants’ 
probability estimates showed that the main effect of the gambling status was no longer 
significant, F1,310 = 1.945; p =.164. However, the value of the interaction gambling status x 
probability increased, F1,310 = 9.819;  p < .01; pη² = .031. All other results remained similar 
to those of the ANOVA. Nevertheless, the three-way interaction gambling status x colour x 
probability was slightly changed compared to the ANOVA: problem gamblers, in the two 
conditions where sequences ended with (four or one) black slot(s), estimated the red 
probability (51.41%) to be higher than the black probability (44.59%), whereas no significant 
effect appeared when sequences ended with red colour (red probability = 47.76%; black 
probability = 50.49). Instead, non-problem gamblers, regardless of the experimental 
conditions, estimated the black probability to be higher than the red probability (53.23% vs. 
47.52% when the sequence ended with red, 51.71% vs. 46.65% when the sequence ended 
with black colour). 
To investigate whether the participants perceived red probability and black probability 
as complementary or independent from each other as a function of experimental conditions 
and gambling status, three chi-squares were performed on the following variables, calculated 
ad hoc:  a) the number of cases where the sum of the two probabilities in percentage was 
equal to 100 (i.e. for which the two probabilities were complementary); b) the number of 
cases where each of the two probabilities was equal to 50 (i.e. those giving correct 
probabilities); c) the number of cases where the sum of the two probabilities was different 
from 100 (i.e. for which the two probabilities were independent from each other)39. None of 
the results was statistically significant: neither the experimental condition nor the gambling 
status affected participants’ conceptions of probability40.  
                                                          
38 The ANCOVA was performed after checking that the assumption of homogeneity of regression 
slopes had been respected: indeed there were no interactions between the independent variables and 
the covariates. 
39  Note that the cases in the group b) were a sub-category of those in the group a) and that the sum 
of the cases in groups a) and c) was equal to the totality of participants. 
40 Complementary probability estimates: χ2 (3) = .072, p = .995. Correct probability estimates: χ2 (3) 
= .1.939, p = .585. Independent probability estimates: χ2 (3) = .149, p = .985. 
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In graphic 4 the distribution of the three types of probability conceptions in function 
of the independent variables were reported.  
 
Graphic 4. Distribution of the three types of probability conceptions in function of the independent variables 
  
PG= problem gamblers; NPG=non-problem gamblers; 4Red/4 Black/1Red/1Black = experimental conditions  
 
 
Choice 
 
In order to assess the incidence of the three independent variables on the choice of the 
colour which bet on, a 2 (run length: 4 vs. 1) x 2 (colour: red vs. black) x 2 (gambling status: 
problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) between-subjects ANOVA was performed. 
Choice was coded as a dummy variable (1 = choice of a colour different from the last one 
occurring in the sequence; 0 = choice of the same colour as the last one in the sequence); so, 
ANOVA was performed on the proportion of the different colour choices.  
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Graphic 4 shows the distribution of the different colour choices made by the two participants 
groups’ in the 13th round.  
Graphic 4. Percentage (with SD in bars) of the different colour choices as a function of the study 
conditions  
 
PG= problem gamblers; NPG= non-problem gamblers; 4Red/4 Black/1Red/1Black = experimental conditions  
 
Results revealed two main effects: colour, F1, 312 = 13.164; p < .001; pη² = .04, and run 
length, F1, 312 = 3.959; p < .05; pη² = .013. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment 
showed that the percentage of the different colour choice was higher in the conditions where 
sequences ended with the ball landing on a black slot (69.4%) than in those where sequences 
ended with a red one (50%). Moreover, this type of choice was higher with the series of four 
same colours (65%) than with that of one colour (54.4%). 
Results also revealed a two-way colour x run length interaction, F1,312 = 7.247; p < .05; 
pη² = .023, which was examined by means of simple effects analysis followed by pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. Results (reported in 
graphic 5) showed that, in line with the gambler’s fallacy, in the four-red condition, the 
percentage of the different colour choice was higher (62.5%) than in the one-red (control) 
condition (37.5%). On the contrary, the different colour choices did not differ between the 
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four-black condition (67.5%) and the one-black condition (71.3%), as both groups preferred 
to bet on a red slot. In fact, by analysing this interaction from the perspective of the run length, 
it emerged that in the one-black condition the percentage of the different (i.e. red) colour 
choice was higher (71.3%) than in the one-red condition, where that of the different (black) 
colour was 37.5%. Instead, the different colour choice did not differ between the four-black 
(67.5%) and four-red conditions (62.5%). Gambling status did not affect the participants' 
choices.  
 
Graphic n.5: Percentage of the different colour choices as a function of run length and run colour. 
The left side shows the significant difference between the means of the different choices in the two 
conditions in which the sequences ended with a red outcome. The right side shows the significant 
difference between the means of the different choices in the two control conditions (71.3% vs 37.5%). 
 
 
These results suggest that participants preferred to bet on a red slot but, when this 
preference was in contrast with the gambler's fallacy (i.e. with four red runs), their choice was 
no longer in line with the basic preference but was inverted, becoming in line with the 
gambler's fallacy. The same results were obtained from ANCOVA. 
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Bet amount 
 
In order to assess the incidence of the three independent variables on the bets carried 
out by participants, a 2 (run length: 4 vs. 1) x 2 (colour: red vs. black) x 2 (gambling status: 
problem gamblers vs non-problem gamblers) between-subjects ANOVA was performed. The 
dependent variable was the bet amount.  
Graphic 6 shows the participants’ bets in the study conditions.   
Results revealed only a main effect of the gambling status, F1.312 = 26.811; p < .000; 
pη² = .079. Pairwise comparisons showed that the bet amount was higher in problem gamblers 
(6.16) than in non-problem gamblers (4.96). Run length and colour did not affect the 
participants' bets.  
The same results were obtained from ANCOVA. 
 
Graphic 6.  Mean (with SD in bars) of participants’ bets as a function of the study conditions.
 
Once again, when BSSS and BIS scores were entered into the model as covariates, 
results did not show different effects. 
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Moderated mediation analyses  
To investigate whether the effect of run length on choice was moderated by colour and 
gambling status and mediated by probability estimates, a moderated mediation analysis using 
the PROCESS macro (model 10) for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) was carried out. To this end, the 
run length, coded as dummy variable (1 = 4 vs. 0 = 1), was introduced in the model as 
independent variable. Colour (1 = red; 0 = black) and gambling status (1 = problem gamblers; 
0 = non-problem gamblers) were introduced as moderators. As the probability estimates were 
repeated measures, probability delta was calculated, by subtracting red probability value from 
that of black probability, and introduced as mediator (Montoya & Hayes, 2017). Choice, 
coded as a dummy variable (1 = choice of a colour different from the last one occurring in the 
sequence; 0= same colour) was the criterion variable.  
Results revealed that run length x colour interaction affected probability delta: 
compared to other conditions, four-red ending condition produced an increase in probability 
delta (B= 10.1; SE = 4.134; t = 2.4432; p < .05).  
When previous variables and the putative mediator, probability delta, were entered in 
the equation regression to estimate the moderated mediation effect on choice, results revealed 
that choice was affected by colour (B= -1.421; SE = .3386; z = -4.1969; p < .000) and by the 
run length x colour interaction (B= 1.2169; SE = .479; z = 2.5405; p < .05). Compared to 
ending-black series, ending-red series produced a decrease of different colour choices; 
compared to the other conditions, the ending-four-red series produced an increase in different 
colour choice.  Probability delta did not affect choice (B = -.0016; SE = .0064; z = -.2503; p 
= .8024).  
The conditional direct effect of the run length on choice was moderated by colour both 
in problem gamblers and in non-problem gamblers. Compared to the one run length (assumed 
as reference category), when the four run length ended with the red colour, produced in both 
problem gamblers (B = 1.1748; SE = .4086, z = 2.8749; p < .005; 95% CI = .3739, 1.9757) 
and non-problem gamblers (B = .8952; SE = .4047, z = 2.2123; p < .05; 95% CI = .1021, 
1.6883) an increase of different colour choices.  
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Results showed no conditional indirect effects41 of run length on choice through 
probability delta (i.e. no moderated mediation was found). Compared to the control condition, 
the effect of 4 run length on choice was not mediate by probability delta, independently by 
the value assumed by colour and group.  
The moderated mediation analyses in which the BSSS and BIS-11 scores were entered 
into the model showed that gambling status affected probability delta. Compared to non-
problem gamblers, probability delta decreased in problem gamblers (B= -6.4404; SE = 
3.1027; t = -2.0757; p < .05): in line with the ANOVA’ results, black and red probability 
estimates were more similar in problem gamblers than in non-problem gamblers.  
To investigate whether the effect of run length on the bet amount was moderated by 
colour and gambling status and mediated by probability estimates and choice, two different 
analyses were carried out. As neither Process macro nor Mplus structural equation models 
allow a dichotomous mediator (i.e. choice), the following analyses were performed: a first 
moderated mediation analysis on bet amount similar to the one above described and a multiple 
regression analysis, in which choice was included among predictors.  
Concerning the results of the moderated mediation analysis, the effects of the 
independent variable and moderators on probability delta were already described. When all 
predictors were entered in the equation regression to estimate the moderated mediation effect 
on the bet amount, results showed only the effect of gambling status (B= 1.4353; SE = .3294; 
t = 4.358; p < .000): compared to non-problem gamblers, problem gamblers bet more. No 
conditional direct or indirect effects of the run length on bet amount were found. 
Then, a multiple linear regression was performed entering run length, colour, gambling 
status, delta probability and choice, as predictors of the bet amount. Entering choice into the 
regression equation did not change previous results: only gambling status (B = .794; SE = 
.269; t = 2.953; p < .005) affected bet amount: problem gamblers bet more than non-problem 
gamblers. 
                                                          
41 The indirect effects were estimated using 5000 bootstrap samples with 95% bias corrected 
confidence intervals. 
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The analyses conducted by introducing also the BSSS and BIS-11 scores as covariates 
in the model showed the same effects above reported. 
 
Discussion and conclusions   
 
The study has investigated the occurrence of the gambler’s fallacy (or the hot hand 
fallacy) and its relationship with probability estimates of the next outcome and the bet amount 
in a fictitious roulette game. More precisely, it was investigated whether a series of identical 
outcomes in a roulette wheel induced one of the two fallacies and whether the induced fallacy 
was linked to an increase in probability estimates of the target event and in the bet size. The 
study also investigated whether such effects were present to a different extent in problem 
gamblers and non-problem gamblers. Finally, the study aimed to distinguish the role played 
by cognitive (i.e. erroneous probability estimates) and affective (i.e. the preference for a 
colour rather than another) processes in the choice of the colour on which to bet. To this end, 
two different indices of fallacy were used: a cognitive index, the probability estimate of each 
of two possible roulette outcomes42, and a behavioural index, the choice of the outcome on 
which to bet. As it was written in the overview of the study, the request of estimating the 
probability (in percentage) of the two outcomes aimed to investigate whether participants 
perceived the two probabilities as complementary or independent from each other.  
Overall, the results highlighted that, regardless of their gambling status, the 
participants' choices were mainly based on a preference for the red slot. Such a preference 
was reversed in a choice in line with the gambler’s fallacy (i.e. choosing a black slot) only 
when the sequence ended with four red slots. More precisely, in the conditions where the 
sequences ended with black slots, the participants preferred to bet on a red slot, independently 
from the run length. On the contrary, in the conditions where the sequences ended with red 
slots, the gambler's fallacy was manifest: in such conditions, choosing black increased after a 
                                                          
42 The roulette used for the study was modified ad hoc and entailed only two outcomes: red and black. 
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sequence of four red slots compared to that of one red slot. The probability estimate did not 
affect the choice43.  
Such results seem to indicate that the people’s choices were based on affective 
processes, the preference for a colour (red rather than black), rather than on erroneous 
evaluations of probability, index of a cognitive process. This result is in line with the study of 
Matarazzo et al. (2017) where, in a card guessing game (high vs. low card), the participants 
preferred to bet mainly on high cards and reversed this tendency, choosing low cards 
(according with the gambler's fallacy), only when the run of high-cards increased (4 high 
cards vs. 1 high card). On the contrary, when the sequences ended with low cards, participants 
preferred to bet on high cards, independently of the series length.  
The influence of the slot colour on participants’ judgment was found even in the results 
concerning the probability estimates of the next outcome, emerging both from ANOVA and 
from the mediation analysis. In the condition in which the sequence ended with four red slots, 
the black probability was higher than the red probability, whereas no difference due to the 
colour emerged in the other conditions. Therefore these results, showing that a stimulus 
feature, such as colour, has moderated a cognitive process, as probability estimates, highlight 
the role played by intrinsic, contextual or spurious factors in phenomena as the cognitive 
distortions. To the best of my knowledge, the incidence of simple stimulus features on the 
occurrence of the gambler’s fallacy has been found only in Matarazzo et al.’s study (2017).  
From the review of the literature on the gambler’s and hot hand fallacies, it emerges 
that the factors assumed to affect one or the other phenomenon have been the 
representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman, & Tversky, 1972; 
Rabin, 2002), the level of controllability of the events  (Ayton & Fisher, 2004, Burns & 
Corpus, 2004), the prior successes or failures (Boynton, 2003), the different cognitive load 
required by the gambler’s fallacy vs. the hot hand fallacy (Braga et al., 2013), the degree of 
perceived intentionality exerted by the agent generating the runs (Caruso et al. 2010), and so 
on. It should be noted that, in the present study, the use of two distinct (cognitive and 
behavioural) indexes of fallacy has allowed inferring that choice and probability estimates 
seem to be two independent processes. 
                                                          
43 As it has been written in the results section, in the moderated mediation analysis the difference 
between black and red probability values was entered in the model as putative mediator.   
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Concerning the third index of fallacy, i.e. the bet amount, the results showed only the 
effect due to the gambling status: problem gamblers bet more than non-problem gamblers. 
Probability estimates choice and covariates did not affect the bet amount.  
In the present study, two differences due to the gambling status were found: problem 
gamblers bet more than non-problem gamblers, and the distance between black and red 
probability estimates was reduced in problem gamblers compared to non-problem gamblers. 
However, as probability estimates did not affect the bet amount, one cannot infer that problem 
gamblers bet more than non-problem gamblers despite of their less proneness to probability 
distortions. Since the participants were the same as in the previous study, it must be 
remembered that problem gamblers scored higher than non-problem gamblers on the 
sensation-seeking and impulsivity scales. Nevertheless, also in this study no covariates effect 
on any of the fallacy-indexes was found. So, once again one must acknowledge that these 
results do not corroborate the widespread hypotheses that higher proneness to cognitive 
distortions, such as the gambler’s fallacy, and specific personality factors, such higher levels 
of impulsivity and sensation-seeking, make people more subject to the illusion of control and 
to related behaviors, such as the increase in bet amount (Davis et al., 2000; Griffiths, 1994; 
Lim et al. 2015; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Michalczuk et al. 2011; Miller & Currie, 2008; 
Myrseth et al. 2010; Nower et al., 2004; Petry, 2001; Romo et al., 2016). 
Finally, it is noteworthy that in this study the probabilities attributed to black and red 
outcomes were more correctly estimated than in the previous study on the illusion of control 
(with the same participants): regardless of experimental conditions and gambling status, 263 
participants out of 320 considered the two probabilities complementary (and 173 evaluated 
them correctly), while the remaining 57 considered the two probabilities as reciprocally 
independent.  
Perhaps this difference is due to the fact that in the previous study it was asked to 
estimate the winning probabilities linked to each agent choice, whereas in this study the 
questions concerned merely the probability of occurrence of each of the two possible 
outcomes.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Emotions and decision-making in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers 
 
Psychological research has widely acknowledged the role that emotions exert on cognitive 
processes, as well as on decision-making. Scholars suggested that emotions affect decisions 
in different ways. Loewenstein & Lerner (2003) proposed a distinction between anticipated 
and immediate emotions. Anticipated, or expected, emotions involve expectations on the 
emotional consequences that will be experienced when the outcome of choices materializes. 
They are not felt as emotions at the time of the decision but are predictions about the emotional 
outcomes associated with the various alternative courses of an action. So, they are 
characterized by a strong cognitive component. Such emotional states are related to the 
individual’s experiential baggage and are used to evaluate future events similar to those 
experienced in the past. Based on the emotional valence re-activated by the emotion 
previously felt, the decision-maker will choose the most appropriate behaviour to adopt 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2010). Differently, immediate emotions are experienced at the time 
of decision and are due to the presence of the stimulus. They are distinguished by a somatic 
component, such as facial expressions and changes in the autonomic nervous system. 
Immediate emotions have been distinguished in integral emotions, which arise from the 
object of decision and its affective valence, and incidental emotions, which arise from factors 
disconnected from the decision-making context (Bodenhausen, 1993; Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003). These factors are independent from the decisional stimulus and may include the 
immediate environment or chronic dispositional affects. Their influences are difficult to 
predict as incidental emotions, by definition, arise from factors that are irrelevant to the 
decision (Pham, 2007). 
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4.1. Incidental emotions and risk-taking in decision-making 
 
The research of the influences of the incidental emotions on decision-making has 
adopted two main approaches: one based on valence and the other based on cognitive 
appraisal. The valence-based perspective considers the hedonic qualities of emotion, mood 
or affect, as these terms are used often in an interchangeable way. Different emotions of the 
same valence would exert similar influences on decision-making. Regarding risk-proneness, 
two leading valence-based hypotheses have been advanced: Mood Maintenance Hypothesis 
(MMH, Isen, 1978), and the Affect Infusion Model (AIM, Forgas, 1995). According to MMH, 
the effect of emotional states on the tendency to take risks is explained by an innate desire to 
maintain a positive affective state or to mitigate a negative one. Specifically, individuals in a 
positive emotional state tend to behave cautiously in order to preserve their positive affective 
status, thus avoiding risks. On the contrary, individuals in a negative emotional state tend to 
be more willing to accept risks in order to improve their emotional state (Isen & Patrick, 
1983). As regards negative emotional states, empirical support for this hypothesis derives 
from the studies of Gehring & Willoughby (2002), showing that risky choices increased after 
negative experiences as a strategy for improving their current emotional state, and Chuang & 
Kung (2005), where participants in a negative emotional state preferred more risky choices 
than those in a positive one. Analogously, Kliger & Levy’s study (2003) showed that the 
positive emotional state was associated with risk aversion. Instead, according to the AIM, 
emotions can influence the evaluation of judgments and decision-making through a 
"congruence effect". Thus, the valence of the evaluation would be in line with the actual 
emotional state. This model hypothesizes that a positive emotional state leads to a more 
positive evaluation of owns thoughts and environmental objects, which in turn increases the 
tendency to take risks; conversely, a negative emotional state, influencing evaluations and 
judgments in a similar way, can lead to risk-avoiding behaviours. Empirical support for these 
hypotheses derives from Constants & Mathews’s study (1993), where participants induced in 
a positive emotional state by autobiographical recall technique, estimated more likely the 
occurrence of positive future events than those induced in a negative emotional state. In Yuen 
& Lee’s study (2003), the induction of a negative emotional state by movie clips caused in 
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participants a lower disposition to take risks, operationalized as hypothetical choices in 
everyday life dilemmas, compared to those induced in a positive or neutral emotional state. 
An analogous trend was found by the study of Chou et al. (2007), where the risk was defined 
by the same procedure used by Yuen & Lee. Induced participants in a positive emotional state 
by movie clip increased their willingness to take risks compared to those in a negative 
emotional state. In the study of Xie et al. (2011), the induction by picture of a positive 
emotional state increased optimism levels and reduced risk perception.  
However, some studies found mixed results in line with both the predictions of the two 
theories. Williams et al. (2003) showed that participants in a positive emotional state were 
less willing to take risks and, at the same time, those in a negative emotional state did not 
show risk-proneness. Similarly, Drichoutis & Nayga (2013) showed that both negative and 
positive emotional states increased the tendency to avoid risks. 
A limit of the value-based approach is the inability to identify whether different 
emotions of the same valence would affect decisions in a different way. Instead, the Appraisal 
Tendency Framework (ATF), proposed by Lerner & Keltner (2000, 2001), assumes that 
specific emotions have specific effects on decision-making and that such effects would result 
from the different evaluation schemes of every emotion. According to this perspective, 
emotional states evoke specific cognitive styles and assessments that integrate information 
and prioritize different outcomes. Based on the appraisal theories (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 
Lazarus, 1991), according to which each emotion would be characterized by a single 
evaluation scheme laid on central dimensions (i.e.: pleasure, certainty, control), the ATF 
assumes that each emotion activates a cognitive predisposition to evaluate future events in 
line with the central evaluation dimension triggering the emotion. This predisposition for 
future evaluation is the tendency towards the evaluation, which is the basis of the effects 
through which emotions influence judgments and decision-making.  
According to ATF, the dimensions of certainty and control appear to be particularly 
influential in the context of decision-making because of their close association with cognitive 
assessments determining risk estimates. For example, fear is typically evoked in situations 
where the outcome is uncertain. Such uncertainty characterizes the evaluation scheme that 
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influences the judgment and, in turn, increases the risk estimates. Differently, anger is evoked 
in situations of low uncertainty: being characterized by high evaluations of both certainty and 
control, it would reduce risk estimates. 
Several studies have provided empirical support to this theory, showing that emotions 
with the same valence can have divergent effects on decision-making. Raghunathan & Pham 
(1999) found that low-activation threshold emotions, such as sadness, induced greater 
propensity towards high-risk and high-reward bets, while high-activation threshold emotions, 
such as anxiety, induced a preference towards low-risk and low-reward bets. Lerner & Keltner 
(2000) revealed that individuals in an emotional state of fear made cautious choices whereas 
those induced in a state of anger made more risky choices. In addition, the choices of the 
latter were similar to those of participants in a state of happiness. The study conducted by 
Fessler et al. (2004) also revealed that, using the autobiographical recall technique, high-
activation negative emotional states, such as anger, increased risky choices. Moreover, the 
study conducted by Stanton et al. (2014) found that people induced in a positive emotional 
state via films tended to make more risky choices than those in a negative and neutral one, 
which did not show any differences. 
 
4.2. Incidental emotions and risk-taking in problem-gamblers  
 
A growing body of research indicates that, in problem gamblers, emotional states and 
cognitive distortions correlate with perseverance in gambling despite continuous losses. The 
studies focused on the relationship between gambling and states as social isolation, 
depression, anxiety, and stress, revealed that gamblers tend to increase such behaviour in 
order to alleviate their own negative emotional states. However, this behaviour seems 
efficacious to reduce such negative states in the short term but, in the long term, a rebound 
effect tends to worsen them (Dickerson, 1993; Coventry & Constable, 1999; Washburn et al., 
2003; Williams et al., 2012).  
Few studies investigated the effects of incidental emotions on decision-making in the 
gambling context. Potenza et al. (2003) compared the specific effects of sadness and 
happiness. Participants (10 pathological gamblers vs. 11 control subjects) were exposed to 
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the viewing of 3 video-recorded scenarios, each of which entailed sad, happy or gambling 
content: their task was to indicate, by pressing a button, the emergence of an emotional or 
motivational response (need to drink, eat or gamble) while they watched the scenarios. At the 
end of the scenarios, participants had to indicate the intensity of their emotions and 
motivations. Results showed that the responses to the sad and happy scenarios did not differ 
between pathological gamblers and control participants. However, the responses to the 
gambling scenario differed, as shown by the greater intensity of the gamblers’ need to play. 
In addition, gamblers did not need to play during the viewing of the sad and happy scenario, 
while this desire was felt viewing the gambling scenario. Instead, only 3 control group 
participants reported the need to play during the game scenario44. 
Hills et al. (2001) investigated the effect of emotional states on the number of rounds 
played in a computerized version of the card-cutting game (Breen and Zuckerman, 1999). 
The experimental procedure provided the assignment to three conditions, based on the 
induced emotional state (sadness, happiness, neutral), of 120 students rated as regular 
gamblers (those who bet at least once a week) and non-regular gamblers (those who bet less 
than once a month). A 10-minute video viewing induced the emotional state. The emotional 
measurements were recorded in three moments: after watching the video, after the first five-
game rounds and at the end the game. The task of the participants was to bet on low or high 
cards. The results showed that in regular gamblers, the emotional induction did not affect the 
number of game rounds, which did not differ among the three experimental conditions. 
Among non-regular gamblers, those induced in a happy emotional state played more than 
those induced in a sad state did. In addition, no differences between regular and non-regular 
gamblers induced in a neutral or happy state emerged, whereas regular gamblers induced in a 
sad state played more than non-regular ones. Furthermore, regular gamblers’ emotional 
                                                          
44 At a neural level, the major differences were recorded during the initial phase of the scenarios, 
before they consciously indicated the variations in emotional and motivational states. In the 
gambling-scenarios, pathological gamblers showed a reduced activity of the orbitofrontal cortex, base 
ganglia and thalamus compared to the control group, while no differences were found between the 
two groups during the viewing of the sad and happy scenarios. In addition, in the final part of the sad 
scenarios, pathological gamblers showed a reduced right frontal gyrus activity, while there was no 
difference between the two groups during the viewing of the end of the happy scenario. In the final 
part of gambling-scenarios, where stimuli were more intense, pathological gamblers showed a 
reduced activity of the ventricular-anterior cingulate cortex compared to the control group. 
 
 
90 
assessments at the end of the game were linked to winnings. Those who lost were less happy 
at the end than during the game, compared to both those who won and non-regular gamblers. 
Instead, non-regular gamblers’ emotional evaluations were not dependent on the winnings 
and only slightly varied in the interval from during to the end of the game. 
More recently, Mishra et al. (2010) investigated the effect of the induction of emotional 
states on gambling behaviour at Video Lottery Terminals (winning amount, game duration, 
time spent to finish credit) while participants (non-problematic, low-risk, and problem 
gamblers) were observed (by a man or a woman) or not. Emotional induction (positive, 
negative, neutral) took place with the autobiographical recall technique combined to the 
listening of instrumental music. Results showed that the induced positive or negative 
emotional state did not affect the subsequent gambling behaviour. Regardless of the severity 
level of the gambling problem, the emotional state did not affect the time spent playing or the 
amount won. Differences in emotional state levels were found only after the game. Regardless 
of the gambling severity, participants induced in an emotional or neutral state showed an 
increase of negative emotional state levels and a decrease in positive ones compared to 
participants induced in a negative one. Moreover, differently from the positive state levels, 
the negative ones after playing were higher than before. In addition, participants spent less 
time playing when a woman observed them rather than when they were not observed. Instead, 
Munoz et al. (2010) investigated, in Video Lottery Terminals players, the effect of a 
threatening stimulus different in threat gradient (weak, moderate, strong), coming from two 
different sources (medical or related to the game) on seven different variables, measured 
through the answers to seven questionnaires.45. Participants’ answers indicated that higher 
levels of stimulus threats were associated with high levels of information processing depth. 
The latter also related to the gambling involvement and to the medical source. Moreover, the 
most involved players showed higher fear levels. The more people were involved in the 
gambling, the more they felt vulnerable.  
                                                          
45 The seven dependent variables were the cognitive assessment of the threat (perceived severity and 
vulnerability), feeling fear, information processing, source reliability, change of attitude, behavioural 
intent, and involvement. 
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4.3. Emotions and physiology: the physiological components of primary emotions 
The interest for the role of the physiological components in emotional processing has 
given rise to a large body of research (Ekman et al., 1983; Bernston et al., 1991; Loewwnstein, 
1996) that focused on variations in the parameters (heart rate, skin conductance, body 
temperature, muscular and respiratory activity) reflecting the action of the autonomic nervous 
system (SNA).  
Although some studies found evidence for a specificity of activation of the autonomic 
system during emotional states (Ekman et al., 1983; Christie and Friedman, 2004; Stemmler 
et al., 2001), in literature there is no agreement on the definition of typical patterns of 
physiological activation of emotional states (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Mauss et al. 2005). This 
disagreement also seems to depend on the emotion induction procedure (Quigley and Barret, 
2014). 
The physiological response in anger-inducing situations seems to be related to a pattern 
of reciprocal activation of the sympathetic nervous system and increased respiratory activity 
(e.g. faster breathing). Studies investigating the physiological responses to the induction of 
the anger by the autobiographical recall technique (Prkachin et al., 1999; Neumann and 
Waldstein, 2001; Hamer et al., 2007) found some cardiovascular effects characterized by 
increased heart rate (HR) and systolic and diastolic blood pressure46. However, the induction 
of anger through the viewing of movies or images of facial expressions with angry content 
results in a reduction in heart rate (Christie and Friedman, 2004). Moreover, studies 
investigating the electro-dermal activity related to anger (Tsai et al., 2002; Marci et al., 2007; 
Rochman and Diamond, 2008) found an increase both in skin conductance levels (SCLs) and 
in skin conductance responses (SCRs).  
As regards the physiological pattern of fear, the study of Aue et al. (2007), where the 
emotional induction occurred with autobiographical recall, found an increase in HR. 
However, studies where induction of fear occurred through the movies viewing found a 
                                                          
46 The study of Stemmler et al. (2007) found the influence of motivation on HR in anger: when 
motivation leads to contact, HR is unchanged, whereas when motivation tends to withdrawal, HR 
decreases. 
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reduction in HR (Fredrickson and Levenson, 1988, Theall-Honey and Schimidt, 2006). 
Studies investigating the electro-dermal activity related to fear found, regardless of the 
emotional induction procedure, an increase in both SCLs (Christie and Friedman, 2004; 
Williams et al., 2005; Gilissen et al., 2007, 2008) and the SCRs (Collett et al., 1997; Stemmler 
et al., 2001). The study of Van Oyen et al., 1995, where fear was induced through viewing 
images, showed an increase in HR but unchanged SCLs. Other studies found a reduction in 
the HR associated with an increase in SCRs (Bernat et al., 2006; Codispoti and De Cesarei, 
2007) or a reduction in SCLs (Stemmler, 1989; Krumhansl, 1999) 47. 
Studies investigating the physiological components of sadness showed a 
heterogeneous pattern of sympathetic and parasympathetic system activation, depending both 
on the emotional induction technique and on the presence of the weeping variable. Generally, 
two classes of physiological activity emerge from the emotional induction of sadness: an 
activating response and a deactivating one. The former, corresponding to the physiological 
response of sadness with tears, appears to be characterized by an increase in the sympathetic 
cardiovascular system (Levenson et al., 1990; 1991; 1992) and by heterogeneous variations 
in SC. Specifically, participants who cried viewing videos reported an increase in HR 
(Luminet et al., 2004; Kunzmann and Gruhn, 2005). Such responses were associated with 
increased (Ritz et al., 2000; Tsai et al, 2003; Vienna and Tranel, 2006) or unchanged (Chan 
and Lovibond, 1996) SCLs. Even when the emotional induction occurred through the 
autobiographical recall, several studies found an increase in HR associated with increased 
(Ekman et al., 1983; Rochman and Diamond, 2008; Tsai et al., 2002) or unchanged (Marci et 
al., 2007) SCLs. In the deactivating responses of sadness, which overlapped the physiological 
responses to sadness with no cry, a decrease in HR (Britton et al., 2006; Gruber et al., 2008; 
Tsai et al., 2000) with a reduction both in SCLs (Tsai et al., 2000; Marsh et al., 2008) and 
SCRs (Britton et al., 2006) was found. However, in the study of Fredrickson and Levenson 
(1998) no changes in HR were found. 
                                                          
47 Further studies found that increased HR was accompanied by an increase in blood pressure 
(Montoya et al., 2005; Rainville et al., 2006) or in respiratory activity (Pauls and Stemmler, 2003; 
Rainville et al., 2006). 
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As regards the pattern of joy, studies using the autobiographical recall technique (Sinha 
et al., 1992; Neumann & Waldstein, 2001) found a physiological response characterized by 
an increase in HR. In addition, research conducted by Vrana, where participants were exposed 
to standardized images of joy, showed either increased (Vrana & Gross, 2004) or remained 
unchanged (Vrana 1993; Vrana & Rollock, 2002) SCLs. 
 
4.4. Emotions, arousal, and gambling  
 
Gambling entails reactions to risk and uncertain events, as well as a continued exposure 
to activating environment stimuli. Arousal, in both subjective and objective side, is currently 
considered an integral component to the onset and maintenance of gambling behaviour 
(Blaszczyncky & Nower, 2002; Sharpe, 2002). 
A growing body of research indicates that gamblers showed increased physiological 
levels of arousal when involved in a gambling environment, during real (Anderson and 
Brown, 1984) or experimental (Leary and Dickerson, 1985; Rockloff et al., 2007) settings. 
The seminal study conducted by Anderson and Brown (1984) examined the heart rate (HR) 
during blackjack game in both a real and a laboratory casino (12 students tested in a laboratory 
and 12 gamblers in both laboratory and real casino). They found that gamblers reported higher 
HR in the real casino than in laboratory, while no differences between gamblers and students 
emerged in laboratory. Moreover, gamblers showed a positive correlation between the bets 
carried out and the increase in HR in the real casino48. Subsequently, the studies of Meyer et 
al. (2004) and Krueger et al. (2005) extended Anderson and Brown’s findings. Meyer et al. 
(2004) measured HR49 in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers during blackjack 
playing in a casino and control setting. They found increases in HR, and cortisol levels, in 
both groups at the onset of the game in the actual session; however, gamblers showed 
significantly higher levels over the entire gambling session. In addition, the level of 
                                                          
48 The authors stated the importance of winning or losing big sums of money for increased HR. 
49 As well as salivary cortisol levels and the endocrine ones of norepinephrine and dopamine. 
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participants' gambling severity correlated negatively with the HR during the control condition 
whereas during the experimental one did not50. Similar results emerged from the Krueger et 
al.’s (2005) study, conducted only with gamblers, without control group: gamblers showed 
increased HR, as well as cortisol levels, during blackjack playing in a casino setting where 
they had to bet their own money. Conversely, when they were required to play cards in a 
laboratory without betting money, they did not exhibit increases in physiological arousal. In 
addition, more impulsive gamblers showed increased HR (but not cortisol levels), during the 
gambling session. Furthermore, a positive relationship between impulsivity scores and 
gambling severity was found.  
The first study in which gamblers exhibited an increased HR even in a laboratory 
setting has been that of Leary and Dickerson’s (1985). They compared the HR of high and 
low frequency gamblers, before, during and after playing video poker in a laboratory. They 
found that, although HR between the two groups did not differ during the baseline, both 
groups exhibited increases in HR during the gambling task that, compared to low-frequency 
gamblers, was greater in high-frequency gamblers. In addition, compared to the high-
frequency gamblers, low-frequency gamblers showed a decreased subjective arousal during 
and after playing51.  
However, other psychophysiological studies comparing problem gamblers and non-
gamblers or high vs. low frequency gamblers in laboratory or real settings found discordant 
results.  
Sharpe et al. (1995) investigated in a laboratory study which stimulus related to 
gambling increased arousal. They compared the performance of three groups of poker 
gamblers (pathological, high and low frequency) in five tasks where skin conductance levels 
(SCL) and HR were measured. One task required participants to watch a video of a poker 
game and to imagine playing, whereas a second was the distracting version of the previous 
one (participants also had to count the wins). The other three tasks required to watch a horse-
                                                          
50 Dopamine levels were significantly higher in gamblers during the casino task compared to non-
problem gamblers. 
51 As high-frequency gamblers played more and lost more money than low-frequency gamblers, data 
comparison at the end of the game was not possible. 
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race video, to imagine a past personal win and, in a neutral condition, to count letters of the 
alphabet. The results showed differences between pathological and low/high-frequency 
gamblers. SCLs in the pathological gamblers’ group were higher than in the other two groups 
during the viewing of the poker game, with respect to the neutral condition and to the horse 
racing video. Low and high frequency gamblers’ groups did not differ in any of the 
physiological measures. In addition, while recalling a personal win, pathological gamblers 
showed SCLs higher than the other two groups. Instead, HR did not differ among the groups 
in any condition. Griffiths’ (1995) study compared high and low frequency gamblers who 
were given a sum to play with a slot machine in a naturalistic setting. Participants were 
encouraged by instructions to play at least 50 games, and then they could decide to keep 
playing or to withdraw the winning sum. The HR was measured before, during and after the 
game. The results showed that the two groups did not differ in HR in any of the three intervals: 
both groups showed increased HR during the game and higher HR after the game compared 
to the beginning of the game.  
In a real setting, Coventry & Norman (1997) measured HR of off-course horse races 
gamblers, before, during and after betting their own money. The HR was measured every 30 
seconds at different stages of the betting process. The results showed that, although there were 
no differences between high and low frequency gamblers, the HR was higher during bet 
placement and at the end of races. In addition, although to a lesser extent, HR rate was higher 
in gamblers who were winning than those who were losing. Subsequently, in a laboratory 
study, Coventry & Norman (1998) examined the gamblers’ HR in a task in which, at each 
trial, they had to choose which of the four turtles would win by first reaching the finish line. 
The outcomes of their betting were presented in ascending, descending or random order. 
Apart from a slight increase in HR, particularly in early trials, the two groups did not show 
differences. In addition, the order of the presentation of wins and losses had no effect on HR. 
On average, wins increased HR whereas losses did not.  
Little differences between compulsive gamblers and the control group were found in 
the laboratory study conducted by Blanchard et al. (2000), which compared the SCLs, HR 
and blood pressure in a group of seven compulsive gamblers with a control group paired by 
sex and age. Participants were required to listen to personally meaningful gambling 
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audiotapes, fear audiotapes, and to carry out an arithmetic mental task. The two participants’ 
groups only differed in the HR, which was higher in the gamblers than the control group 
during the gambling audiotapes. 
Finally, in the laboratory study of Rockloff et al. (2007), gamblers (with many vs. few 
problems) were presented with a noise increasing the skin conductance responses (SCRs), 
prior to, and at various intervals, a simulated slot machine game. In a control condition, no 
noise was presented. Results revealed that gamblers with many problems, opposed to 
gamblers with few problems, showed smaller bet size in the noise condition compared to the 
control one. The authors argued that arousal might provide different signals to gamblers: 
gamblers with many problems might associate arousal with losing money, while gamblers 
with few or no problems may associate it with excitement due to the winning.  
Instead, some studies found that the measures of subjective arousal did not necessarily 
correlate with objective measures of physiological arousal. For example, Roby and Lumley 
(1995) found a decreased subjective arousal in high-frequency gamblers compared to low-
frequency ones. They assessed the effect of an accuracy feedback and the possibility to win 
or lose money on HR, SCL and skin temperature, during a laboratory-gambling situation. 
Participants had to choose which of the two lights below a panel would light. At the end of 
each trial, in a condition the participants received a feedback on their accuracy, whereas in a 
second one they had to make a bet. Results showed higher SCL and HR in the latter condition. 
In addition, high-frequency gamblers showed a decrease in subjective pleasure and skin 
temperature. In a field study conducted on a female sample, Coventry & Constable’s (1999) 
found a non-significant correlation between HR and perceived arousal. Participants (low vs. 
high frequency gamblers) played a slot machine with their own money. No difference between 
low and high frequency gamblers was found. However, HR was higher during the game than 
both before and after. In addition, the HR was higher in gamblers who won, both during and 
after the game, than in those who lost. In addition, they found a negative correlation between 
gambling frequency and sensation seeking scores, measured by Zuckerman’s SSS (1979). 
Diskin and Hodgins (2003) showed that both pathological and non-pathological video-lottery 
gamblers exhibited a similar level of HR and SCL (as well as muscle tone) in response to an 
imaginary gambling task.  
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However, during the same task, pathological gamblers report greater levels of 
subjective arousal compared to non-pathological gamblers. Ladouceur et al. (2003) compared 
occasional (those who played less than once a month) and regular (at least once a month) 
gamblers measuring differences in HR responses to video lottery games in a laboratory 
setting. In two conditions, participants were offered the chance to win either real money or 
worthless credits. They found no difference due to the gambling severity. Participants exposed 
to high-winning expectations experienced increased HR prior to, and during, the gambling 
session compared to those exposed to a low one. In addition, self-reports indicated the 
expectancy of winning real money to be exciting, not playing the game for fun. 
Finally, in a study with healthy volunteer participants, Studer et al. (2016) investigated SC 
and HR sensitivity to winning odds during bet selection. Participants took part in the Roulette 
Betting task (Studer and Clark, 2011), where the winning probability and the type of bet 
selection varied. At each trial, participants were presented with a wheel of 10 blue (winning) 
and red (losing) slots, whose proportion changed according to the winning probability (40% 
60% 80%). In one condition, participants could choose between three different bets (10, 50, 
90 points) while in another condition the three bets were identical (50, 50, 50). The task of 
the participants was to bet at each trial trying to accumulate as many points as possible. The 
results showed that SC and HR accelerations were susceptible to winning probability, 
particularly in the condition where it was possible to choose the bet. In fact, during the betting 
selection phase, the SC increased as the winning probability increased in the active choice 
condition, while it diminished in the inactive choices. Instead, HR only increased as the 
winning probability in the active choice increased. 
 
Overview of the study   
The present study aimed to examine the effect of positive and negative emotional states on 
decision making of problem and non-problem gamblers in four fictitious gambling tasks.  
Specifically, the study investigated (i) whether the activation of incidental discrete 
positive/negative emotions was accompanied by a change of physiological parameters, (ii) 
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whether the induced emotional states affected the participants’ bet choice and (iii) whether 
such choices were influenced by physiological arousal. Finally, it investigated whether such 
effects were present to a different extent in problem and non-problem gamblers. 
To this end, a quasi-experiment with a mixed design was created - described in the 
materials and procedure section - with two between-subject independent variables, one of 
which (emotion) was manipulated whereas the other (gambling status) was not, and two 
within-subjects variables (winning probabilities and bet provenance). In addition, throughout 
the experimental session, two physiological indices of emotional activation, such as skin 
conductance (SC) and heart rate (HR), were recorded with the biofeedback technique. 
After the emotional induction, participants took part in four decision-making tasks, 
each of them representing a computer-simulated bet game that differed for the supposed 
provenance of the hypothetical money used to play (experimenter or oneself) and winning 
probabilities (fixed or varying): in each game participants had to decide whether and how 
much to bet. 
Depending on the opposite theoretical perspectives, different results could be expected 
from the effect of emotional induction. According to the Affect Infusion Model (AIM, Forgas, 
1995), the activation of negative emotional states should produce more prudent choices than 
the one of a positive emotional state, which should generate a more risky behaviour. 
Conversely, according to the Mood Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH, Isen, 1978), the 
activation of a negative emotional state should generate a behaviour riskier than the one 
triggered in a positive emotional state, which should produce more cautious choices. 
Differently, the Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF, Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001) 
predicts that the activation of negative emotions of the same valence should produce different 
effects on choices: more specifically, anger, sadness, happiness and joy should generate more 
risky choices compared to fear.  
As to the effect of physiological arousal on decision-making of problem and non-
problem gamblers, empirical evidence is far from being congruent, as the literature review 
has shown: so, no specific hypotheses were formulated on this topic.   
However, it was expected that this study could contribute to better understand: (i) 
whether there is congruence between the subjective perception of emotional states and the 
physiological indices of emotional arousal, (ii) whether problem and non-problem gamblers 
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are similar or different in emotional self-assessment and in emotional arousal, (iii) whether 
the assumed effect of perceived emotional activation on decision-making was mediated by 
emotional arousal.   
Also in this study, no monetary incentives were contemplated. However, through the 
use of the "bet provenance" variable, participants were asked to imagine what they would do 
if they had been invited to play in the classic experimental settings (i.e. with money given by 
the experimenter) or if they had to imagine playing in real life (that is with their own money). 
Although in both cases they had to simulate (imagining that money was their own or given 
by the experimenter), it was assumed that people would vividly imagine situations and 
therefore be able to make choices "as if" they were really in those situations. In the games 
that are supposed to have ecological validity, participants play with money made available by 
the experimenter and not with their own money. Therefore, the classical experimental settings 
probably lead to overestimating risk proneness (precisely because they do not take into 
account the provenance of money). 
 
Experiment 
Participants 
Differently from the previous two studies, where the sample was composed of 320 
participants, in this study the sample was composed of 300 participants aged between 18 and 
68 years (mean = 33.87, SD = 10.65). This reduction was due to the fact that about ten problem 
gamblers did not consent to the use of electrodes to assess emotional arousal: consequently 
the number of participants per experimental condition was reduced and also the non-problem 
gamblers sample was diminished.  
The participants’ features and the recruitment procedure were already descripted in the 
study on the illusion of control. Moreover, in the informed consent form for this study, in 
which participants were invited to take part in an emotions and decision-making research, it 
was specified that, during the experiment, heart rate and skin conductance would be measured 
through electrodes in order to evaluate whether their emotional state modified. As it was 
already told, those who did not accept the use of electrodes left the experimental session.  
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Design  
The 5 x 2 x 2 x 2 quasi-experimental mixed design involved two between-subjects variables 
– emotion (anger, fear, sadness, joy, control) and gambling status (problem gamblers vs. non-
problem gamblers) – and two within-subjects variables - supposed bet provenance 
(experimenter vs. participant) and winning probability (fixed vs. varying) - whose intersection 
gave rise to the 4 games played by each participant. The 5 categories of the emotion variable 
corresponded to the four emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and joy) that it was intended to induce 
by the autobiographical recall technique, and the control condition in which no emotion was 
induced. The dependent variable was the bet choice in the four bet games. 
 
Materials and Procedure  
Once informed about general objectives of the experiment, participants were informed 
that the experiment was divided into two parts: in the first, the relationship between memories 
and emotional states was investigated; in the latter, they were asked to make some decisions.  
After reading the instructions, in order to record a resting state activity, participants 
were required to look at the cross at the centre of the screen for 2 minutes (baseline phase). 
At the end of the 2 minutes, the next screen appeared automatically, and participants were 
asked to evaluate, through a 9-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely), the intensity 
of six emotions, presented in a random order: anger towards something or someone, fear, 
sadness; joy, satisfaction, serenity (pre-emotion induction measures).   
After that, depending on the experimental condition in which they were placed, 
participants were required to recall an autobiographical event of their life in which they had 
felt anger, fear, sadness or joy. More specifically, participants were required to relive in their 
mind, for 1 minute, as intensely and in detail as possible, an episode of their life in which they 
had felt anger, fear, sadness or joy. Differently, participants in the control condition were 
required to rethink for a minute at events of their life in which they had not felt any particular 
emotion (emotional induction phase). 
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In order to check whether the experimental manipulation had been successful, after the 
induction phase, participants evaluated their emotional state using the same procedure of the 
first emotional assessment (post-emotion induction measures). At the end of the second 
emotional self-evaluation, participants were presented with four decision-making tasks in 
computer-simulated bet games, each of which with five choice options. The order of the games 
and of the choice options was random. 
In the first task (Game 1: fixed probability / experimenter bet-provenance), participants 
were told to imagine they had a hypothetical budget of 10€ available for playing “heads or 
tails”. The instructions specified that winning odds were 50%. The game rules explained they 
had the possibility to bet the entire available sum or just a part. They also specified that the 
size of the hypothetical reward varied depending on the bet: in case of winning, the expected 
reward was added to the initial 10€, minus the bet; in the case of losing, the bet was deducted 
from the initial sum. There was also the possibility of not betting: in that case, 1.5 € was 
deducted from the sum available (so they had 8.5 € left). Once participants accepted to play, 
they were presented with five options, which varied for the wager size while the winning 
probability was kept constant (50%). Participants’ task was to choose on which option to bet 
(table n.1). 
In the second task (Game 2: varying probability / experimenter bet-provenance), 
participants were told to imagine they had a hypothetical budget of 10€ available to play a 
“card guessing game”. The game rules explained that the winning probability and related 
rewards varied as a function of the number of cards that they chose to turn in order to find 
the winning card. Participants had the possibility to bet the available sum in a gamble where 
the winning probability and the resulting reward varied. They also had the possibility of not 
betting: in that case, 5 € was deducted from the sum available (so they had 5€ left). Once 
participants accepted to play, they were presented with five options varying in winning 
probability and reward size, while the wager size was kept constant. Participants’ task was to 
choose on which option to bet (table n.2).  
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The third task (Game 3: fixed probability / participant bet-provenance) had the same 
structure of game 1, except for the fact that participants were asked to imagine to bet their 
own money, instead of having a hypothetical budget offered by the experimenter (table 1).  
Analogously, the fourth task (Game 4: varying probability / participant bet-
provenance) had the same structure of game 2, except for the fact that participants were asked 
to imagine to bet their own money (3€), instead of having a hypothetical budget offered by 
the experimenter (table 2). 
As mentioned previously, in each game the participants’ task was to choose whether 
and on which option to bet. Responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale, from “very 
cautious” (choosing not to bet), to “very risky” behaviour (choosing to bet the entire amount 
available). 
The choice options had the same expected value: the mean of wins and losses, weighted as a 
function of the probability.  
Table 1: Structure of the tasks 1 and 3 with their five response options. 
(Game 1 = fixed-probability / experimenter bet-provenance. 
Game 3 = fixed-probability / participant bet-provenance). 
Game 1 
 
Game 3 
No bet: 
you will leave with 8.5€ 
No bet 
Bet 2.5€ Winning 5€: 
if you win then you will have 12.5€ 
if you lose then you will have 7.5€ 
Bet 1.5€ Winning 3€ 
if you win then you will have 3€ 
if you lose then you will have -1.5€ 
Bet 5€  Winning 10€: 
if you win then you will have 15€ 
if you lose then you will have 5€ 
Bet 3€  Winning 6€ 
if you win then you will have 6€ 
if you lose then you will have -3€ 
Bet 7.5€  Winning 15€: 
if you win then you will have 17.5€ 
if you lose then you will have 2.5€ 
Bet 4.5€  Winning 9€ 
if you win then you will have 9€ 
if you lose then you will have -4.5€ 
Bet 10€  Winning 20€ 
if you win then you will have 20€ 
if you lose then you will have 0€ 
Bet 6€  Winning 12€ 
if you win then you will have 12€ 
if you lose then you will have - 6€ 
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In game 1, the bet options had the same expected value, i.e., the mean of wins and 
losses, weighted as a function of the probability: (12.5 x 0.5 + 7.5 x 0.5) = (15 x 0.5 + 5 x 0.5) 
= (17.5 x 0.5 + 2.5 x 0.5) = (20 x 0.5 + 0 x 0.5) = 10. 
In game 3, the expected value of the bet options was in progression: (3 x 0.5 + -1,5 x 
0.5) = 0.75; (6 x 0.5 + -3 x 0.5) = 1.5; (9 x 0.5 + -4.5 x 0.5) = 2.25; (12 x 0.5 + -6 x 0.5) = 3. 
 
Table 2: Structure of the tasks 2 and 4 with their five response options. 
(Game 2 = varying-probability / experimenter bet-provenance. 
Game 4 = varying -probability / participant bet-provenance). 
Game 2 Game 4 
No bet (you will leave with 5€) No bet 
8 cards: Probability 80% Win 12.5€ 8 cards: Probability 80% Win 3.75€ 
6 cards: Probability 60% Win 16.5€ 6 cards: Probability 60% Win 5€ 
4 cards: Probability 40% Win 25€ 4 cards: Probability 40% Win 7.5€ 
2 cards: Probability 20% Win 50€ 
2 cards: Probability 20% Win 15€ 
Also in games 2 and 4, the choice options had the same expected value. Game 2: (0.8 
x 12.5 + 0.2 x 0) = (0.6 x 16.5 = 0.4 x 0) = (0.4 x 25 + 0.6 x  0) = (0.2 x 50 + 0.8 x 0) = 10. 
Game 4: (0.8 x 3.75 + 0.2 x 0) = (0.6 x 5 + + 0.4 x 0) = (0.4 x 7.5 + + 0.6 x 0) = (15 x 0.2 + 
+ 0.8 x 0) = 3.    
 
Acquisition of physiological data 
 
A ProComp 5 Infiniti BioGraph software version 6.0.4 (Thought Technology Ltd.) was 
used to measure skin conductance and heart rate. Skin conductance was measured using two 
electrodes attached to the distal phalange of the index and ring fingers of the non-dominant 
hand, and heart rate using an electrode attached to the distal phalange of the middle finger of 
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the non-dominant hand. Physiological data was measured continually using a laptop (Dell 
Inspiron 13), on which the software was installed, receiving the transmitted signal from the 
laptop (Hp Compaq 6730s) on which the participant conducted the experimental task. Such 
signal, by a polar interface port, aimed to scan the temporal windows in which the 
participants’ responses to the task took place.  
 
Extraction of physiological data  
 
Skin conductance and heart rate data were extracted for each participant. A 1-minute 
window immediately preceding the first emotional assessment served as baseline. In order to 
investigate whether physiological changes took place during the emotional induction, another 
1-minute window was extracted from the emotional induction phase. Moreover, four 5-
seconds windows were extracted in order to investigate the physiological arousal immediately 
before the choice in the four tasks. For each recorded session, every noise was cleaned with 
a manual procedure of artefacts rejection. 
 
Results 
 
 
Analogously to the previous two studies, the data were first analysed without the two 
covariates, i.e. the BSSS and BIS_11 scores, and then with the two covariates in order to 
examine their impact on the results. 
 
 
- Manipulation check  
 
Three mixed ANOVAs were conducted to check whether the experimental 
manipulation was effective in modifying the intensity of participants’ emotional state 
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(through three indices: self-reported emotions, HR and SCL) after emotion induction, and to 
investigate putative differences between problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers. 
It should be remembered that, before and after the emotion induction, participants 
assessed the intensity of six emotions: anger towards something or someone, fear, sadness, 
satisfaction, serenity and joy, in a 9-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 9 = extremely). 
Henceforth, the term condition will be used to indicate the five emotions inducted through 
autobiographical recall, whereas the term emotion will be used to indicate the six self-assessed 
emotions.  
The physiological indices of physiological arousal (HR and SCL) considered for the 
manipulation check were the following: a 1-minute window immediately preceding the first 
emotional assessment (which served as baseline) and a 1-minute window extracted from the 
emotional induction phase.  
 
- Self-reported emotion intensity  
 
To analyse the putative changes in self-report assessment before and after emotion 
induction in function of the five experimental conditions and gambling status, a 5 (condition: 
control, anger, fear, sadness, joy) x 2 (gambling status: problem gamblers vs. non-problem 
gamblers) x 2 (time: before vs. after induction) x 6 (emotion: anger towards something or 
someone, fear, sadness, satisfaction, serenity, joy) mixed ANOVA was performed. The 
between-subject variables were condition and gambling status, whereas the within variables 
were time and emotion.  
As expected, results revealed the three-way interaction condition x emotion x time, F20, 
1445 =15.92; p <.000; p-η² =.181, whereas the four-way interaction condition x gambling status 
x emotion x time was not significant (F20,1445 = 1.44; p =.094; p-η² =.02). The latter finding 
revealed that the emotion induction did not differ between problem gamblers and non-
problem gamblers. The three-way interaction condition x emotion x time was examined 
through the simple effects analysis with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
Results revealed that the anger condition led to a significant increase of anger, fear and 
sadness and to a significant decrease of joy. In the fear condition, participants experienced a 
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significant higher intensity of fear and a significantly lower intensity of joy. In the sadness 
condition, sadness increased significantly while serenity and joy decreased. The joy condition 
showed a significant increase of anger, joy and satisfaction while sadness decreased. Finally, 
in the control condition, changes in the intensity of the emotions between pre- and post- 
induction were not observed. Such results indicated that the experimental manipulation was 
successful.  
Table 1 shows the pre/post induction means (with SD) of emotion intensity in function 
of condition and time. 
 
Table 1– Means (and s.d.) of self-report emotions before and after emotions induction in five 
experimental conditions. 
 
Experimental Conditions 
CONTROL ANGER FEAR SADNESS JOY 
Emotions Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Anger 
3.06 
(.25) 
3 
(.26) 
3.06* 
(.25) 
4.78* 
(,26) 
3.04 
(.25) 
2.77 
(.26) 
3.41 
(.25) 
3.8 
(.26) 
3.38 
(.25) 
2.75 
(.25) 
Fear 
2.06 
(.18) 
1.95 
(.21) 
1.8* 
(.18) 
2.3* 
(.21) 
1.69* 
(.18) 
2.98* 
(.21) 
2.55 
(.18) 
2.2 
(.21) 
1.78 
(.18) 
1.46 
(.21) 
Sadness 
2.93 
(.22) 
3.21 
(.24) 
3.05*  
(.22) 
3.65* 
(.24) 
3.94 
(.22) 
4.08 
(.24) 
2.71* 
(.22) 
4.23* 
(.24) 
2.71* 
(.22) 
1.81* 
(.24) 
Satisfaction 
6.25 
(.26) 
6 
(.27) 
5.1 
(.26) 
5.35  
(.27) 
4.06 
(.27) 
4.37 
(.28) 
4.9 
(.26) 
4.53 
(.27) 
5.31* 
(.26) 
5.8* 
(.27) 
Serenity 
5.48 
(.23) 
5.63 
(.23) 
5.21 
(.23) 
4.9 
(.23) 
4.52 
(.23) 
4.24 
(.23) 
5.08* 
(.23) 
4.4* 
(.23) 
5.65 
(.23) 
5.55 
(.23) 
Joy 
4.73 
(.23) 
4.75 
(.23) 
4.65* 
(.24) 
3.31* 
(.23) 
3.44* 
(.23) 
2.88* 
(.23) 
3.5* 
(.23) 
2.88* 
(.23) 
3.78* 
(.23) 
5.2* 
(.23) 
 
 
The ANCOVA52 testing the impact of the BSSS and BIS-11 scores as covariates on the 
self-assessments of participants’ emotions did not show different effects from the ones above 
described. 
 
                                                          
52  Also in this study the ANCOVAs were performed after checking that the assumption of 
homogeneity of regression slopes was respected.  
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- Heart Rate (HR)  
 
To investigate putative HR variations during the emotion induction as a function of 
condition and gambling status, a 5 (condition: control, anger, fear, sadness, joy) x 2 (gambling 
status: problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) x 2 (time: HR before vs. after induction) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted, with condition and gambling status as between-subjects 
variables, and time as within-subjects variable.  
The results showed a two-way interaction between condition and time, F4,290 = 5.369;  
p <.000; p-η² = .069, and a three-way interaction gambling status x condition x time, F4,290 = 
2.896; p < .05; p-η²= .038. Such interactions were examined through the analysis of simple 
effects with Bonferroni correction.  
The two-way interaction condition x time was due to the fact that HR means 
significantly increased in anger, fear and joy conditions after the emotional induction, 
whereas in the control and sadness conditions they did not differ significantly between the 
two temporal windows.  
The three-way interaction condition x gambling status x time, where the two-way 
interaction condition x time was included, showed the different HR means, pre/post emotional 
induction, as a function of the experimental conditions and gambling status. More 
specifically, in the anger condition, non-problem gamblers experienced significantly 
increases of HR after the emotional induction (p< .000), whereas problem gamblers did not 
report differences between the two temporal intervals (p=.438). Also in the sadness condition, 
only non-problem gamblers (p< .05) showed a decrease in HR after emotional induction, 
whereas problem gamblers did not show any difference (p=.354). Instead, both problem 
gamblers and non-problem gamblers experienced significant increases in the HR means after 
the emotion induction in the fear (p<.005 and p<.05, respectively) and joy (both p<.005) 
conditions. In the control condition, both participants’ groups did not reveal differences in 
HR pre/post emotional induction.  
The same results were obtained from ANCOVA. 
HR means and S.D. pre/post emotional induction as a function of the condition and gambling 
status are reported in table 2. 
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Table 2 Means and S.D. of Hearth Rate (HR beats/min) in the different experimental conditions as a 
function of the Gambling status and emotional induction (before and after). 
 
CONTROL ANGER FEAR SADNESS JOY 
NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG 
Before 
76.13 
(1.56) 
75.79 
(1.57) 
78.5* 
(1.56) 
76.93 
(1.56) 
78.17* 
(1.56) 
73.73* 
(1.56) 
78.89* 
(1.56) 
77.55 
(1.56) 
79.04* 
(1.56) 
77.67* 
(1.56) 
After 
77.28 
(1.96) 
75.83 
(1.96) 
84.27* 
(1.96) 
77.99 
(1.96) 
81.64* 
(1.96) 
77.78* 
(1.96) 
75.67* 
(1.96) 
78.82 
(1.96) 
83.19* 
(1.96) 
81.78* 
(1.96) 
NPG: Non-problem gamblers; PG: Problem gamblers 
 
- Skin conductance levels (SCL) 
 
To analyse whether SCL changed during the emotional induction as a function of 
condition and gambling status, a 5 (condition: control, anger, fear, sadness, joy) x 2 (gambling 
status: problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) x 2 (time: SCL before vs. after emotional 
induction) a mixed ANOVA was conducted. Condition and gambling status were the 
between-subjects variables and time was the within-subjects variable.  
The results revealed two two-way interactions: condition x time, F4,290 = 4.571; p<.001; 
p-η²= .059, and gambling status x time, F1,290 = 10.542; p <.05; p-η² = .035.  
Such interactions were examined through the simple effects analysis with Bonferroni 
correction. Results showed that the condition x time interaction was due to the fact that, in the 
anger (p<.000), fear (p<.05) and joy (p<.000) conditions, SCL increased after emotional 
induction, whereas in the sadness (p=.217) and in the control (p=.114) conditions SCL did 
not vary significantly between the two the temporal intervals.  
The gambling status x time interaction showed that both participants’ groups 
experienced a significant increase in SCL after emotional induction. However, in non-
problem gamblers group (p<.000) this increase was much higher than in the problem 
gamblers’ group (p<.05).  
Once again, when BSSS and BIS scores were entered into the ANCOVA model as 
covariates, results did not show different effects. 
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Table 3 shows the means and s.d. of SCL values pre/post emotional induction as a function 
of condition and gambling status. 
 
Table 3 - Means (and s.d.) of SCL (μS) before and after the emotional induction in different 
experimental conditions as a function of the gambling status. 
 
CONTROL ANGER FEAR SADNESS JOY 
NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG 
Before 
3.18 
(1.55) 
2.82 
(.79) 
3.57 
(1.74) 
3.27 
(1.73) 
2.83 
(1.16) 
2.67 
(.62) 
3.39 
(1.84) 
2.93 
(1.25) 
3.04 
(.98) 
2.86 
(1.11) 
After 
3.31 
(1.62) 
2.97 
(.95) 
4.38 
(2.33) 
3.63 
(1.98) 
3.31 
(1.51) 
2.61 
(.66) 
3.53 
(2) 
3.02 
(1.43) 
3.5 
(1.26) 
2.79 
(.75) 
NPG: non-problem gamblers; PG: problem gamblers. 
 
- Effect of independent variables on bet choice  
 
In order to investigate the incidence of the independent variables condition and 
gambling status on the bet choice in the four games, a mixed ANOVA was performed. The 
four games were entered in the analysis based on the two variables by which they were 
composed: money provenance (experimenter vs. oneself) and probability (fixed vs. varying). 
Bet choice was a continuous variable whose values went from 1 (choice of not betting) to 5 
(highest bet amount). Consequently, a 5 (condition: control, anger, fear, sadness, joy) x 2 
(gambling status: problem gamblers vs. non-problem gamblers) x 2 (money provenance: 
experimenter vs. oneself) x 2 (probability: fixed vs. varying) mixed ANOVA was performed. 
Condition and gambling status were the between-subjects variables; money provenance and 
probability were the within-subjects variables.  
Table 4 displays means and S.D. of bet choice in function of condition and gambling 
status in the four games.  
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Table 4 – Means and s.d. of bet choice in the four games in function of experimental conditions and 
gambling status (NPG=non-problem gamblers; PG=problem gamblers). 
 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
CONTROL ANGER FEAR SADNESS JOY 
NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG NPG PG 
GAME I 
2.31 
(1.1) 
2.87 
(1) 
2.5 
(1.33) 
2.67 
(1.32) 
1.86 
(.63) 
2.57 
(1) 
2.13 
(.77) 
1.93 
(.9) 
3.23 
(1.1) 
2.8 
(.88) 
GAME II 
2.76 
(1.05) 
3.57 
(1.07) 
3.33 
(.92) 
3.7 
(1.29) 
2.14 
(.91) 
3.23 
(.93) 
2.5 
(1.04) 
3.2 
(1.18) 
3.37 
(1.12) 
3.37 
(1.21) 
GAME III 
1.86 
(.95) 
2.23 
(.77) 
2.03 
(.92) 
2.6 
(1.03) 
1.34 
(.48) 
2.13 
(1.07) 
1.6 
(.89) 
2.3 
(1.2) 
2.23 
(.93) 
2.53 
(.68) 
GAME IV 
2.59 
(.98) 
3.3 
(.98) 
3.13 
(1.4) 
3.83 
(1.23) 
1.86 
(.74) 
2.93 
(1.17) 
2.67 
(1.38) 
3.1 
(1.44) 
3.27 
(1.61) 
3.27 
(1.17) 
Game I: fixed probability and experimenter money; Game II: varying probability and experimenter money; 
Game III: fixed probability and oneself money; Game IV: varying probability and oneself money 
 
The results showed four main effects due to condition, F4,288 = 10.804; p<.000; p-
η²=.13, gambling status, F1,288 = 27.514; p <.000; p-η² =.087, probability, F1,288 = 179.737; p 
<.000; p-η² =.384, and money provenance F4,288 =32.165; p <.000; p-η² =.1.  
They also showed five two-ways interactions: condition x gambling status, F4,288= 
2.954; p <.05; p-η² =.039, gambling status x probability, F1,288 = 4.268; p <.05; p-η² =.015, 
condition x money provenance, F4,288 = 2.56; p <.05; p-η² =.034, probability x money 
provenance, F1,288 = 9.435; p <.005; p-η² =.032, and gambling status x money provenance 
F1,288 = 4.184; p <.05; p-η² =.014. Finally, they revealed a three-way interaction: gambling 
status x probability x money provenance, F1,288 = 4.792; p <.05; p-η² =.016.  
The main effect of the condition showed that participants bet more in joy and anger 
conditions than in the other conditions; in the sadness (M=2.42) condition they bet less than 
in the joy (M=3) and anger (M=2.97) conditions, whereas no difference emerged with control 
(M=2.68) and fear (M=2.25) conditions. In the fear condition, they bet less than in the other 
conditions, except for sadness. 
The main effect of the gambling status revealed that problem gamblers (M=2.9) bet 
more than non-problem gamblers (M=2.43). The main effect of the probability showed that 
participants bet more in the two games (“card guessing”) where the winning probabilities 
varied (M=3.05) than in those where the winning probabilities were fixed (M=2.28). The main 
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effect of the money provenance revealed that participants bet more in the two games where 
they had to imagine that the hypothetical money was provided by the experimenter (M=2.8) 
than in the two games where they had to assume that the hypothetical money belonged to 
them (M=2.54). 
The main effects of the condition, gambling status, probability and money provenance 
were moderated by the interaction effects, examined through the analysis of simple effects 
with Bonferroni correction.  
Concerning the two-way interaction condition x gambling status, problem gamblers 
bet significantly more than non-problem gamblers in all experimental conditions, except in 
the joy condition where the two groups’ bets did not differ.  
The probability x gambling status interaction revealed that both problem gamblers and 
non-problem gamblers placed higher bets in the two games where the winning probabilities 
varied (card guessing game) than in the ones where they were fixed (“heads or tails”). 
However, this difference was more accentuated in problem gamblers than in non-problem 
gamblers.  
The condition x money provenance interaction showed that in the fear, joy and control 
conditions, participants placed higher bets when they had to imagine that the experimenter 
provided hypothetical money rather than if they had to assume the hypothetical money as 
their own, whereas in the anger and sadness conditions no difference emerged.  
The probability x money provenance interaction revealed that, in the two games where 
the winning probabilities were fixed (heads or tails), participants placed higher bets when 
they had to imagine that hypothetical money was provided by experimenter (M=2.48) than 
when they had to imagine that hypothetical money belonged to themselves (M=2.08). Instead, 
in the two games where winning probabilities varied, this difference was not significant. 
The gambling status x money provenance interaction showed that both problem 
gamblers and non-problem gamblers placed higher bets when they had to imagine that 
hypothetical money was provided by experimenter (M=2.99 and M=2.61, respectively) than 
they had to imagine that the money belonged to themselves (M=2.82 and M=2.25, 
respectively). However, this difference was more accentuated in non-problem gamblers 
(p<.000) than in problem gamblers (p<.05).  
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The three-way interaction gambling status x money provenance x probability included 
the main effects of money provenance and probability, and the two-way interactions gambler 
status x probability, gambler status x money provenance and probability x money provenance. 
This interaction revealed that, in the two games where winning probabilities were fixed, both 
problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers placed higher bets when they had to imagine 
that hypothetical money was provided by experimenter (M=2.56 and M=2.4, respectively) 
rather than when they had to imagine that hypothetical money was their own (M=2.36 and 
M=1.8, respectively). However, this difference was more accentuated for non-problem 
gamblers (p<.000) than for problem gamblers (p<.05). No difference emerged in the two 
games where the winning probabilities varied. The graphic n. 1 shows the three-way 
interaction gambling status x money provenance x probability.  
 
Graphic 1: Means of bet choice in the three-way gambling status x probability x money provenance 
interaction.
 
When the ANCOVA model was performed introducing the BSSS and BIS-11 scores 
as covariates, the two-way interactions gambling status x money provenance and probability 
x money provenance were no longer significant (p=.281 and p=.166, respectively) as well as 
Experimenter
money-
provenance
Participant
money-
provenance
Experimenter
money-
provenance
Participant
money-
provenance
Fixed probability 2,56 2,36 2,4 1,81
Varying probability 3,14 3,28 2,81 2,7
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
Problem gamblers                                           Non-problem gamblers
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the three-way interaction gambling status x money provenance x probability, in which they 
were comprised (p=.14). Instead, two new two-way interactions emerged: probability x 
condition, F4,287 = 2.587; p <.05; p-η² =.035, and probability x BIS-11 scores, F1,287 = 4.151; p 
<.05; p-η² =.014. 
The probability x condition interaction was examined through the analysis of simple 
effects with Bonferroni correction. Results showed that in the two games where the winning 
probabilities were fixed, in the joy (M=2.69) and anger (M=2.44) conditions, participants bet 
more than those in sadness (M=1.98) and fear (M=1.97) conditions, whereas no significant 
difference emerged compared with the participants in the control condition (M=2.33). Such 
effects also emerged in the two games where the winning probabilities varied, although the 
participants’ bets in joy and sadness conditions did not significantly differ.  
The probability x BIS-11 scores interaction, examined through parameter estimates, 
showed that the impulsiveness levels were directly proportional to bet wager in the two games 
where the winning probabilities were fixed (B =.001 and .009, in game 1 and 3, respectively) 
and inversely proportional in the two games where the winning probabilities varied (B = -
.007 and -.008, in game 2 and 4, respectively).  
 
- Mediation analyses  
 
To examine whether the effect of experimental conditions on bet choice would be 
mediated by skin conductance and heart rate, the SCRs and HR means related to a 5-seconds 
window immediately before the choice in the four tasks were extracted from participants’ 
physiological tracks.  
After that, eight different mediation analyses, four concerning the putative mediation 
of SCR on the bet choice for each game and the same for the HR putative mediation, were 
carried out. Mediation analyses were conducted with the PROCESS macro (Model 4) for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2013). For each analysis, the multicategorical independent variable, 
corresponding to the five experimental conditions, was coded as four dummy variables 
(Anger = 1; other conditions = 0 / Fear = 1; other conditions = 0 / Sadness = 1; other conditions 
= 0 / Joy = 1; other conditions = 0), with control condition as reference category. The 
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dependent variable was the bet choice for the four games and each physiological measure was 
included as mediator. Gambling status, coded in a dummy variable (1 = problem gamblers; 0 
= non-problem gamblers), was included as covariate rather than as a moderator since Process 
macro (as well as Mplus structural equation models) does not allow to carry out a moderated 
mediation analysis whereas the independent variable is multicategorical. Results did not show 
any incidence of SCRs or HR on the bet choice in none of the four games: so, no mediation 
was exerted by the two physiological arousal indices in the relationship between study 
conditions and bet choice.  
The same results were obtained when the BSSS and BIS_11 scores were added as 
other covariates.   
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The present study investigated the incidence of induced positive and negative 
emotions, in problem and non-problem gamblers, on the choice of the bet amount in four 
gambling tasks where the winning probabilities and bet provenance were manipulated. 
More specifically, the study aimed to examine whether experiencing positive or 
negative emotional states would match with modifications in physiological parameters, 
whether different induced emotions with the autobiographical recall technique would 
specifically affect the participants’ choices, and whether such choices were mediated by the 
physiological arousal. Finally, the study aimed to identify potential differences between 
problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers and to investigate whether personality factors, 
such impulsivity and sensation-seeking affected the participants’ responses. For this purpose, 
physiological indices of skin conductance (SC) and heart rate (HR) were recorded. 
Participants were assigned to one of five experimental conditions based on the induced 
emotion (anger, fear, sadness, joy, and control condition without induction) and the behavioral 
indices of how much they wanted to bet in each of the four games were collected.  
The results of the analyses conducted on the self-reported emotional evaluations 
indicated that the experimental manipulation was successful for both participants’ groups. 
Whereas in the control condition the intensity of the six self-assessed emotions did not vary, 
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in the other four conditions (anger, fear, sadness, joy) the intensity of the induced emotion 
varied considerably after the induction procedure. 
 Regarding the variations of physiological indices, the results revealed a lower activation 
in problem gamblers compared to non-problem gamblers. As to the specific effects of the HR, 
only in fear and joy inductions it increased in both groups. In anger and sadness conditions, 
HR variations were observed only in non-problem gamblers: the induction of anger produced 
an increase in HR, whereas sadness caused a decrease. In the control condition, HR did not 
change in both groups. 
The physiological modifications in non-problem gamblers are in line with the literature 
on emotional arousal: the induction by the autobiographical recall technique of anger 
(Prkachin et al., 1999; Neumann and Waldstein, 2001; Hamer et al., 2007), fear (Aue et al., 
2007) and joy (Sinha et al., 1992; Neumann & Waldstein, 2001) was characterized by 
increased HR, while sadness with no cry entailed a decrease of HR (Britton et al., 2006; 
Gruber et al., 2008; Tsai et al., 2000).   
As to SCLs, they increased with the induction of anger, fear, and joy, whereas they did 
not vary in sadness and in control conditions. However, although both groups showed an 
increase in SCL in the abovementioned conditions, such effect was higher in non-problem 
gamblers than in problem gamblers. In addition, SCLs did not vary in the two participants’ 
groups in the control condition. 
These results differ from those of the studies reporting higher physiological arousal in 
problem gamblers compared to non-problem gamblers (Leary and Dickerson, 1985; 
Blanchard et al., 2000) or no significant differences between the groups (Anderson and 
Brown, 1984; Griffiths, 1995; Coventry and Norman, 1997).  
They suggest that problem gamblers are less activated on a physiological level even if 
they perceive a significant difference pre/post induction in self-reported emotional 
assessment. For example, although problem-gamblers reported higher subjective levels of 
anger after emotional induction, this did not correspond to their actual physiological 
activation, as unchanged heart rate showed.  
Concerning the main goals of the study, i.e. examining whether the induction of 
different emotions caused dissimilar effects on participant’s bet choice, the results are in line 
with the Appraisal Tendency Framework (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Regardless of their 
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gambling status, participants engaged in a riskier behavior after joy and anger inductions, 
whereas they were more cautious after fear induction; sadness induction did not seem to 
produce specific effects on decision behavior, since no difference emerged between sadness 
and control conditions. This finding is in line with the results of the study of Lerner and 
Keltner (2000), where inducing fear led participants to a lower risk-taking behavior, while 
anger had the opposite effect. Instead, differently from the predictions of AIM and MMH, 
according to which positive and negative emotions would have an opposite influence on risk-
taking, the participants induced in a negative state, as anger, did not make choices different 
from the ones they made in a positive state, as joy. Indeed, in such conditions, participants 
made more sizeable bets as well as found in Stanton et al. (2014).  
As expected, problem gamblers made higher bets than non-problem gamblers except 
for the joy condition where the bet amount of the two groups did not differ. An analogous 
result was found in the study of Hills et al. (2001), where no differences were found between 
regular and non-regular gamblers in happy and control conditions, whilst regular gamblers 
induced in a sad state played more than non-regular ones.  
The results of the present study also showed that both problem gamblers and non-
problem gamblers were more cautious when they were asked to imagine having to bet with 
their own money rather than when they had to suppose that bets would be made with the 
experimenter’s money. Such effect, also observed in the control condition, showed that the 
participants were able to imagine in their mind the difference between their own money and 
non-personal money. 
Participants bet more in the two games where the winning probabilities varied 
compared to the ones where probabilities were fixed. This effect was greater in problem 
gamblers than in non-problem gamblers. However, the preference for such type of games was 
not related to variations in the physiological parameters, contrarily to the findings of Studer 
et al. (2016) with a sample of healthy university students.  
Bet wager in these two games was inversely proportional to the impulsiveness levels 
of participants, while it was directly proportional in the games with fixed winning 
probabilities. Such effect was probably due to the fact that, in the game where winning 
probability were fixed, participants had to be less careful doing the calculations. Therefore, 
the most impulsive participants preferred to bet more in these two games. 
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However, also in this study no relevant effects of personality traits emerged. In fact, 
the introduction of impulsiveness and sensation-seeking scores as covariates into the model 
revealed that they made non-significant some effects that were already quite weak. Besides, 
such effects were analogous but more accentuated in one term of the interaction than in the 
other.  
The mediation models tested to investigate whether the effects of the induced 
emotional states on the bet choice in the four games were mediated by physiological factors 
showed that neither SCRs nor HR affected the participants’ choices. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are not studies that have examined the effect of physiological responses on 
dependent variables using them as mediators of the effect of the emotional activation. 
Although a comparison with the concerning literature cannot be carried out, these results 
suggest that the role of emotional arousal in decision-making should be further investigated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
Conclusions  
 
The present research focused on the cognitive and emotional factors involved in 
decision-making related to problem gamblers and healthy individuals. The first two studies 
investigated the effects of two specific cognitive distortions - the illusion of control and the 
gambler’s fallacy - on problem and non-problem gamblers, whereas the third study 
investigated the influence of some induced discrete emotions on decision-making of the two 
participants’ groups. 
To this end, a large group composed by 160 problem gamblers (recruited in the 
Gambling Addiction Services of Campania), without comorbidity, was compared with an 
analogous non-problem gamblers’ group, whose participants were matched by age  (from 18 
to 68) and educational level (mainly high school, with low percentages of degree and primary 
middle school). The gambling activities reported by the problem gamblers were Sport betting 
(53%), VLT (Video Lottery Terminal) and Slot machines and (26%), Cards games (11%), 
and Lotto-Lottery-Scratchcard (10%). On the contrary, in the only Italian prevalence study 
(Barbaranelli, 2013) in which the gambling activities were reported, the most played games 
were (instant and traditional) lotteries. The prevalence studies of Bastiani et al. (2011) and 
Colasante et al. (2013) did not indicate the usual gambling games. 
In the study on the illusion of control, it was examined whether previous outcomes of 
personal and random choices in a gambling task influenced the winning probability estimates 
(linked to personal or random choice of the next betting turn), the choice of the agent, and the 
bet amount. From this study emerged that both participants’ groups showed both a tendency 
to illusion of control and a preference for agency. Indeed, all participants preferred to choose 
personally the slot colour on which to bet (index of preference for agency) and also tended to 
attribute greater winning probabilities to personal choice (index of illusion of control) than 
to the random one entrusted to another agent (the computer). Only in the experimental 
condition in which the number of wins and losses had be largely in favour of the computer, 
the participants tended to attribute similar winning probabilities to themselves and to pc. On 
the contrary, also when personal choices were mainly losing and the ones made by the 
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computer were equally distributed in wins and losses, a misattribution of the winning 
probabilities in line with the illusion of control was found. 
However, on the one hand people were influenced by the illusion of control on a 
cognitive level (the more participants overestimated their personal winning probabilities, the 
more they opted for personal choices) but, on the other hand, they were influenced by previous 
events on a behavioural level, i.e. when they had to bet. Indeed, compared to the control 
condition (where wins and losses were equally distributed between participants’ choices and 
pc choices) they bet less in the two conditions in which their previous personal choices mainly 
resulted in losses.  
The second study investigated the occurrence of the gambler’s fallacy and its 
relationship with probability estimates of the next outcome and the bet amount in a gambling 
task. In literature the gambler’s fallacy has been associated with the representativeness 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman, & Tversky, 1972; Rabin, 2002), the level 
of controllability of the events (Ayton & Fisher, 2004, Burns & Corpus, 2004), the previous 
winning or losing outcomes (Boynton, 2003), the implied cognitive load (Braga et al., 2013), 
and the degree of perceived intentionality exerted by the agent generating the runs (Caruso et 
al. 2010). To my knowledge, only Boynton (2003) checked the possible effect of the intrinsic 
characteristics of the stimulus, not finding any effect.  
In the study presented in this thesis, two indexes of fallacy were used: a cognitive index 
(the probability estimate of occurrence of a given event) and a behavioural index (the choice 
of the slot on which to bet). Such a procedure, on the one hand, allowed to detect that these 
processes were independent; on the other hand, it allowed to discover that people’s choices 
were based primarily on an affective process, that is, the preference for a particular outcome 
(i.e., the red slot). Indeed participants preferred to bet on a red slot both when previous series 
ended with (one or four) black slots and when it ended with one red slot. Only when the 
sequences ended with four red slots, participants reversed their preference in a choice in line 
with the gambler’s fallacy, i.e. choosing a black slot. Furthermore, as it emerged from the 
moderated mediation analyses, probability estimates did not influence that choice. Such 
finding seems not casual, as the same result pattern was recently found in the study of 
Matarazzo et al. (2017) with a different decision-making task. In this study, in a card guessing 
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game (high vs. low card), individuals preferred to bet mainly on high cards and reversed this 
tendency, choosing low cards (in line with the gambler's fallacy), only when the run of high-
cards increased (4 high cards vs. 1 high card). On the contrary, when the sequences ended 
with low cards, people preferred to bet on high cards, independently of the run length.  
On the whole, these findings seem to support the hypothesis according to which the 
preference for a given stimulus is an automatic and basic process acting on decision-making 
(Zajonc, 1980). Instead, the judgment heuristic would be a more complex process that in 
certain circumstances (e.g., in case of a long sequence) acts on decision-making, upstaging 
the influence of the affective heuristic.  
These processes did not affect differentially the two participants’ groups. The 
difference between the two groups was related to betting behaviour, as problem gamblers bet 
more than non-problem gamblers, and to personality traits, as problem gamblers showed 
higher impulsivity and sensation-seeking levels than non-problem gamblers. This latter result 
is in line with the studies showing a proneness to impulsiveness (Blaszczynski et al., 1997; 
Vitaro et al., 1999; Nower & Blaszczynski, 2006; Ledgerwwod et al., 2009) and to sensation 
seeking (Kuley and Jacobs, 1988; Powell et al. 1999; Gupta et al. 2006; Hodgins and Holub 
(2015) in problem gamblers. However, in the present studies these personality factors do not 
seem to have affected the participants’ behaviour in a relevant way.  
Overall, the two studies indicate that problem gamblers do not show a greater 
propensity to the two cognitive distortions compared to non-problem gamblers. So, these 
findings do not to corroborate the widely shared assumption that problem gamblers report 
more cognitive distortions, and to a greater extent, than non-problem gamblers (Davis et al., 
2000; Griffiths, 1994; Lim et al. 2015; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996; Michalczuk et al. 2011; 
Miller & Currie, 2008; Myrseth et al. 2010; Nower et al., 2004; Petry, 2001; Romo et al., 
2016).  
 However, to the best of my knowledge, so far only two studies have compared the 
extent of the two phenomena in problem gamblers and non-problem gamblers. Orgaz et al. 
(2013) investigated the occurrence of the illusion of control in 49 problem gamblers and 51 
controls, with a contingency judgment task. They found that pathological gamblers 
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overestimated their control more than the control group, although the behaviour of the two 
groups in decision-making did not differ. Results from the study of Wilke et al. (2014), whose 
sample was composed by 92 experienced gamblers and 72 individuals with little gambling 
experience, found that, in line with the hot-hand fallacy, gamblers preferred to bet on the 
random sequence, which allowed to perceive more illusory patterns (positive recency effect) 
rather than on the sequence negatively autocorrelated. The control group did not show any 
preference for one or the other sequence.   
It should be emphasised that the findings presented in this thesis do not prove that problem 
gamblers are not subject to the cognitive distortions but highlight that non-problem gamblers 
also seem to be prone to these distortions in a similar extent.  
The third study has investigated the effect of four emotions (anger, fear, sadness and 
joy) on gambling-related decision-making. Starting from the Appraisal-tendency framework 
(ATF, Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001), the specific effect of discrete emotions on decision-
making has been increasingly recognized. Nevertheless, only a few studies (Hills et al., 2001; 
Potenza et al., 2003; Mishra et al., 2010) have been interested in the effect of discrete emotions 
in gambling behaviour. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that investigates 
the effect of four emotions. 
The results seem to corroborate Lerner and Keltner’s hypothesis, as shown by the 
different effects on decision-making following the induction of the three negative emotions. 
In fact, anger induction caused different effects (more risky behavior) than those caused by 
fear induction (more prudent behavior), whereas sadness induction did not have effects 
different from those of the control condition (where no emotional induction was expected). 
Differently from the predictions of Affect Infusion Model (AIM, Forgas, 1995) and Mood 
Maintenance Hypothesis (MMH, Isen, 1978), according to which positive and negative 
emotions have opposite effects on decision-making, the effects of inducing a positive emotion 
(i.e., joy) did not differ from that of negatively-valenced emotions like anger. Additionally, 
the highest bets were found following the induction of these two emotions. Probably, the 
central dimensions (certainty, control, responsibility) of these emotions played a role. 
Especially anger, which attributes responsibility for negative events to others, is characterised 
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by individual control and sense of certainty about what happened and, therefore, lower risk 
perception in new situations.  
Also in this study, the observed effects were independent from gambling status: in fact, 
problem gamblers made more risky choices than non-problem gamblers, both as a result of 
the emotional induction and in the condition of control. The only exception was found 
following the joy induction, where the choices between the two groups did not differ.  
This study also has investigated whether people’s behaviour was influenced by 
physiological arousal and whether this putative influence differed between the two 
participants’ groups. The results showed a lower physiological activation in problem 
gamblers than non-problem gamblers. In the latter group, the physiological variations due to 
emotional induction seem in line with the literature on emotional physiological activation 
through autobiographical recall (Neumann & Waldstein, 2001; Hamer et al., 2007; Aue et al., 
2007). Such effects were not found in problem gamblers, as the unchanged physiological 
parameters (HR) following anger and sadness induction revealed. However, self-reported 
assessments of problem gamblers showed higher values of these emotions after the emotional 
induction. This incongruity is at least surprising as it concerns emotions that in literature are 
frequently associated with problem gambling. These results indicate that the association 
between these two emotions and the gambling behaviour should be investigated further. 
Problem gamblers also showed an increase in SCLs as a result of emotional induction that 
was lower than in non-problem gamblers. It seemed reasonable to expect that problem 
gamblers, which showed higher scores in the personality traits of impulsivity and sensation-
seeking, would show more elevated physiological activation indices and that such indices 
would be associated with the proneness to bet. On the contrary, a major finding of this study 
is that problem gamblers seem to be motivated to bet independently from the previous 
emotional state and from their physiological activation. Here, it appears that the levels of 
physiological arousal are more an incidental component during the game situations than a 
factor leading people to assume riskier behaviour. In light of the different findings obtained 
in other studies, the relationship between gambling and physiological arousal also need to be 
further investigated. The results so far obtained did not allow to understand whether problem 
gamblers bet more in order to increase their arousal or, contrarily, to alleviate their excessive 
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arousal. The present results do not let to decide between the two hypotheses but certainly do 
not support the latter. 
One might think that the games presented in the third study, the experimental setting and the 
absence of monetary rewards would not precisely reproduce a gambling context and, 
consequently, were not sufficiently activating on a physiological level. However, it should 
be noted that problem gamblers scored less than non-problem gamblers on physiological 
indices following autobiographical recalls, a technique with high ecological validity. 
Moreover, even in a “non-excting setting” like the one we created, problem gamblers bet 
more than non problem gamblers.  
Finally, as it has been pointed out previously, monetary rewards were deliberately 
excluded from the experimental setting for ethical and theoretical reasons. As some authors 
(Kühberger, 2001; Read, 2005) posit,  the presence of economic incentives is not necessary 
to evaluate how people behave in hypothetical contexts. Furthermore, even when real money 
is involved, it may have a different subjective value for both problem gamblers and non-
problem gamblers (Clark, 2014). As the results of this study revealed, the effect of bet 
provenance clearly shows how the participants were able to represent the differences between 
imagining to have a budget available for betting (in conformity with what happens in 
canonical procedures with monetary incentives) and imagining to have to bet their own 
money.  
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Figure 3 - Probability estimates questions 
Figure 5 – Choice questions (in the two possible orders) 
Figure 6 – Bet question 
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Appendix Study 2 
Figure 1 – General instructions 
Figure 2 – Round 
 
Figure 3 – Possible outcomes   
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Figure 4 –Probability estimates questions 
Figure 5 – Choice question 
Figure 5 – Bet question 
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Appendix Study 3 
Figure 1 -2: Game 1: General instructions and choice options 
Figure 3 -4: Game 2: General instructions and choice options 
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Figure 7-8: Game 4: General instructions and choice options 
Figure 5-6: Game 3: General instructions and choice options 
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